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Good book! The introduction sets the tone and the theme for the book: thus, it hangs together despite being one of those books which covers the battles of the war in numbing detail. His theses are several:

(1)The Korean War substituted for WW III between the two superpowers. (2)The U.N. was not exclusively a U.S. tool. (3)Stalin’s motive was to hurt US/China relations, the US, to stop communism; neither cared about Korea. (4)The war had a global impact on defense expenditures, treaties and economic alliances between the various blocs.

There is much speculation about times when the war could have come ended sooner. What would the political impact have been? Stueck suggests that great men–Stalin, Mao, Truman/Acheson–not just great ideology, played a role in this critical history.

Occupation of Korea by Russian and US forces at the end of WWII was without any specifics..that hurt as relations between the two nations hardened. Both occupying forces were heavyhanded. Russians used reform to calm things down, but the south was in chaos among its political factions. The US, wishing to wash its hands of Korea, turned to the UN as a way to have peninsular elections; the north refused to take part. Some improvement took place in the south in 1950, helped by ruthless suppression of insurrections by Syghman Rhee in the central mountains of Korea. To Stalin, an asian war would detract from the European theatre, and hurt China. Still the USA, China and Russia had profound reasons NOT to clash head on those summer days of 1950. Early diplomatic moves made it clear that the 3 superpowers would confine the battlefield to Korea.

Discussion about Allied forces going over the 38th parallel were underway in the US as early as the 10th of August. A status quo ante bellum in September might have been doable. But Stueck never addresses the American argument that we could be ‘bled dry’ by always merely pushing back Bloc armies: communist insurgencies all over the globe gave the Russians far more flexibility.

The In’chon landing changed the momentum of the war; now it was the Russians who tried to slow down Allied progress and momentum for Japanese peace treaties and European rearamament.

Military events occurred so quickly those first few months in Korea that they overwhelmed diplomatic processes. Stalin was now in Truman’s position three months earlier…his ally trashed, his influence on the line. Given US and Chinese reservations about the course of events, it is a pity they did not talk directly to one another; they might have reached some sort of armistice. Still…how to ‘reunite’ North with South Korea would remain problematic.

Stueck spends vast amounts of time trying to divine the intentions of the combatants. This is not easy: the NKPA were arrogant in July; Americans felt invincible in October; Chinese stubbornness peaked in early 1951. The gloom that swirled in US and European capitals in early December 1950 is far better described by other authors.

Early 1951 brought much progress: Ridgway’s offensives and restoration of Army battlefield confidence; on the diplomatic front, a Japanese peace treaty, NATO membership and German re-armament now firmly in place. The Marshall Plan and Japanese economic recovery were also well under way.

The peace talks were a struggle between the UN side, which wanted only Korean issues discussed, and the Chinese, who wanted discussions to be much broader. China had as much contempt for their nationalist Kim as America did for Rhee. Where to fix the truce line was an initial test of each sides backbone. The communist break of negotiations was designed to pressure the US on its treaty with Japan: it backfired. That treaty, NATO settlement and some failed offensives made the Russians lose on 3 major points. In fact the communist side often found that suspending negotiations was not in their interest: it denied them a valuable propaganda platform. The peace talks dragged on: in some ways, each side had a vested interest in a prolonged stalemate: The US continued european rearmament; China coninued to train its army; Russia continued to bleed the US. Surely the soldiers in the trenches felt differently.

Stueck concludes that the death of Stalin, operation Little Switch, and the cost of advancing to the ‘neck’ of Korea pushed the USA and the communists back to the negotiating table. Russia was having problems with its eastern European satellites–the initial tremors of the Hungary 1956.

In his `Aftermath’ chapter, the author returns to his thesis that Korea was a proxy for WWII between the US and Russia. Did Korea prevent a far greater crisis in Europe? Did it prevent an attack–well planned– against Yugoslavia in 1951??

How did the `Great Men’ fare? Kim Il Sung, who assumed the war would be over in days, became as much a puppet of the Chinese as Rhee ever was for the USA. MacArthur thought we would be home by Christmas– but got his own summons before Easter. Mao’s fantasy that hungry masses could overwhelm western technology died an early, miserable death with millions of his soldiers. Stalin fostered China’s dependency on the USSR but now faced an armed and developing Europe. As for Truman, establishing voluntary repatriation became his legacy.

What about those great ideas and ideologies? China obtained immense prestige, strutting its stuff at conferences in Geneva and Bandung; but its liberal economy gave way to stalinist style planning; and they distrusted the Russians ever more. The USA was now firmly identified, in Asia, as an ally of European colonial powers; still, at least OUR allies prospered and set an example to developing countries. The UN didn’t set too firm an example for collective action; few countries really took part. Nor could it resolve great disputes between the powers. It did, however, encourage Russia to stay engaged with the organization since its governing bodies were so vital.