نبرد برای غرب اروپا، پاییز 1944: ارزیابی عملیاتی (نبردهای قرن بیستم)

Mr Adams is a business man and amateur historian that has written another superlative book on WWII. His earlier book dealt with the operational appraisal of the Pacific War. The keystone to the author’s books is that they’re highly researched and thought out and include many primary examples to back up his comments. Included in the narrative are written orders, communiques, diary entries, referencing important comments from key people. The extensive Bibliography of primary and secondary sources will support this contention of thoroughness. A creditable Notes section is also provided.

The author’s emphasis is on the operational details with special attention for the logistical and command and control problems facing the Allies in the fall of 1944. It will be shown that the logistical problems of supplying the front line had a monumental affect on the prosecution of the war and the impact it had on the command decisions made, especially Montgomery’s. It will also be shown the differences in war doctrine (narrow front – wide front, single prong – dual prong) between Eisenhower and Montgomery will have a major disruptive influence on the battlefield as well as between Allies. Montgomery will constantly badger, humilitate and try to wear down Eisenhower into following his game plan for the capture of Berlin by the northern route. Just like Operations Comet and Market Garden were failures, Montgomery’s plan for 21st AG to attack in the north while most of the US forces played supporting roles would have also been a failure but on a scale that could’ve eclisped the casualties of the “Bulge”. Montgomery had grossly underestimated German strength and with Model in charge the results would have been terrible for the British / Canadians and the attached Americans as their flanks grew.

There are many books covering the controversy between commanders and to a lesser extent the supply problems of getting fuel, ammo and supplies to the front line which by September was approaching the Rhine River but this is the best account that I’ve read on the subject.
The author has meticulously researched and assembled information from primary and secondary sources, using hundreds of orders, communiques, diary entries, quotes from key personnel, and data from biographies to fortify his narrative as to the causes and reasons why the Western Allies hit a brick wall in September after a momentous August.
Nightly reports sent to Brooke from Montgomery, the letters Eisenhower sent Marshall, the field orders Eisenhower sent to his “Lieutenants” are important and given ample attention. The author will show the orders that were intended for Montgomery were being altered by British sympathers on SHAEF giving Montgomery greater latitude than Eisenhower wanted to give the Field Marshall. It will also be shown the many times Montgomery tried to discredit Eisenhower to Brooke and Churchill in order to have Eisenhower removed as Supreme Commander. It will also be shown Montgomery’s obsession in his narrow front, single phase advance on Berlin and that once Montgomery secured enough ports to fulfill his supply needs for 21st Army Group, he had no desire to capture Antwerp, or the Sheldt which were to be used for Bradley’s 12th Army Group.

It was shown that had 21st AG tackled Antwerp and the Sheldt in the opening days of September when the Germans were ill prepared that the objectives would have been quickly secured and the Allies could have started using the port almost immediately. Instead Montgomery was negligent, maybe worse, and Antwerp would not be used until November.
By September the 1st and 3rd Armies were hamstrung by lack of supplies and were forced to slow their advance. This condition was exacerbated by Montgomery’s risky plan, Operation Market-Garden which Eisenhower agreed to without thought or consultation with his planners. The supply pirority was raised for Montgomery for this operation at the expense of Patton which had been making the greatest gains. A chapter is devoted to each of the following: Operation Market-Garden, First Army’s repeated attempts at Aachen, the West Wall, Roer River / Hurtgen Forest campaigns, Patton’s Lorraine. The landings of Seventh Army on southern France and its drive north is also covered but to a lesser extent. The book opens with a brief summary of the Cobra breakout and moves on to the Falaise Gap and the race to the Seine by the end of August. This sets the scene for the remainder of the narrative. The whole second chapter discusses the logistics of war and shows how a successful army is amply supplied.

Much time is spent on building personal profiles on Eisenhower and Montgomery but Smith and other Eisenhower’s deputies, Bradley, Patton, Dempsey, Simonds are also discussed but to a lesser degree. Eisenhower’s command style is shown; his desire to lead from the rear, allowing his deputies, especially Smith run the day to day stuff. Its also shown that Eisenhower was constantly concern of offending the British or charged with discrimination and would go out of his way to accomodate them. To me, this was Eisenhower’s weakness and the British, especially Montgomery, took advantage of it. If Eisenhower had taken a stronger hand at Falaise, the Sheldt, refused the dangerous Operation Market-Garden, curtailed the British in SHAEF that were changing Eisenhower’s orders for Montgomery’s benefit, had not given priority to Monty so many times over Bradley and Patton the Allies would have crossed the Rhine much sooner. The author clearly shows the antics Montgomery pulled degraded the overall Allied effort. Montgomery is also shown as the embittered Field Marshall who wanted and thought deserved Ike’s job and would follow his own agenda as much as possible.

There are also 20 maps which were very good. Most showing actual deployments and axes of attack while couple maps showed diffeneces in plans between US and British planners.
The author provides analysis of key events and their impact on the future running of the war. In some instances he provides alternative scenarios that could have been more successful. Securing Antwerp in the opening days of September and using the port sooner or not running Operation Market-Garden are two examples.
If you want a clear picture of the hardships facing the front line due to shortages and the inside story of the machinations of Eisenhower and Montgomery then this will be a must read.
Even if you’ve read D’Este, Blumenson, Weigley, Breuer and others, you should still seriously consider adding this book to your collection. There will be new information to be gained by most of us and its highly recommended.