Worldviews, Science And Us: Studies Of Analytical Metaphysics - A Selection Of Topics From A Methodological Perspective - Proceedings Of The 5th Metaphysics Of Science Workshop

this Volume Brings Together The Lectures Presented At The 5th Metaphysics Of Science Workshop Held From June 2 To 3, 2005, In Ghent, Belgium. The Aim Of This Volume Is Twofold. First, It Fields A Selection Of Ongoing Discussions On A Central Topic In Contemporary Analytical Metaphysics. Authors Were Asked To Encapsulate Their Lecture Topic Into A Précis, Highlighting The Contesting Views, Accentuating The Pro And Contra Of The Main Arguments, And Shedding Light On The Origin, The Evolution And The Eventual Offspring Of A Respective Discussion. Second, This Volume Addresses The Methodological Question By Examining What Can Be Learned If We Compare These Discussions From A Methodological Perspective. What Are The Red Herrings And Shortcomings? Is An Integrated Methodology Possible? Does Each Discussion Finally Await A Pluralism Of Plausible Positions Or Will An Overall Convincing Account Be Expected? And Finally, Can Analytical Metaphysics Methodologically Assert And Investigate Their Basic Assumptions, If Not From A Common Sense Stance? CONTENTS 6 Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective Robrecht Vanderbeeken and Bart D'Hooghe 8 1. Introduction 8 2. Contributions 9 Acknowledgments 10 Introduction: Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics, its Crisis and Challenge Robrecht Vanderbeeken 11 1. Analytic Metaphysics Today 11 2. Caveats 12 2.1. Methodological Illusion? 13 2.2. Fragmentation and Constriction 14 References 16 Holism and Structural Realism Michael Esfeld and Vincent Lam 17 1. Structural Realism as a Metaphysical Position 17 2. The Argument from Quantum Entanglement 27 3. The Argument from Space–Time 30 4. Conclusion and Open Issues 34 Acknowledgments 36 References 36 Common Sense, Relativity and Theories of Time Phil Dowe 39 1. Methodologies 39 2. McTaggart's Argument 41 3. Theories of Time 42 4. Closed Time-like Curves in the General Theory of Relativity 44 5. Is Dynamism Coherent? 45 6. Loops 46 Acknowledgments 49 References 49 Purely Dispositional Worlds Sungho Choi 51 1. Dispositional Essentialism and Categoricalism 51 2. Dispositions All the Way Round? 53 3. The Problem of Random Coincidence 57 4. What is Wrong with Holton's Model? 60 5. A Concluding Remark 60 Acknowledgments 69 References 69 Natural Kinds — What Are They? Joanna Odrow a_z Sypniewska 71 1. Introduction 71 2. The Problems with the Kripke–Putnam Account of Natural Kinds 76 3. Taking Stock 87 4. Natural Kinds — What are they? 88 Acknowledgments 91 References 91 Personal Identity, Conceptual Analysis and No-Fault Disagreement Caroline West 94 1. Introduction 94 2. Personal Identity and Conceptual Analysis 97 3. Conceptual Analysis and The Soul 99 4. Error Theory or Conceptual Revision? 100 5. Faultless Disagreement 102 6. Beyond Mere Semantics 107 7. Conclusion 111 Acknowledgments 111 References 111 A World of Tropes? Anna-So a Maurin 114 1. Introduction 114 2. Truthmaker Theory 118 3. How Does Truthmaker Theory Regiment? 121 4. Tropes as Truthmakers 127 5. Why Should One Hold That the World Is a World of Tropes? 133 Acknowledgments 135 References 135 Causal Pluralism Stathis Psillos 138 1. Introduction 138 2. The Straightjacket View 140 3. The Functional View 142 4. The Two-Concept View 144 5. Varieties of Pluralism 146 5.1. The Symptoms of Causation 148 6. Wittgensteinian Pluralism 151 7. Three Objections 156 Acknowledgments 157 References 158 Why Social Emergence? Discussing the Use of Analytical Metaphysics in Social Theory Jeroen Van Bouwel 159 Introduction 159 1. Philosophy of Mind and Social Theory 160 2. Keith Sawyer's Nonreductive Individualism 161 3. The Introduction of Emergence and Its Use(fullness) in Social Theory 163 4. How to Evaluate Sawyer's Metaphysics? Questioning Social Emergence 167 5. Conclusion: If At All ... 169 Acknowledgments 171 References 172 Counterfactuals, Causation and Humean Supervenience Paul Noordhof 174 Introduction 180 1. Counterfactuals and Humean Supervenience 180 2. Counterfactuals, the Future Similarity Objection and Chance 186 2.1. Isolating the Cause 187 2.2. Indeterminism and Lewis's Similarity Weighting 191 3. Causal Asymmetry 201 3.1. Microphysical Causal Asymmetry? 203 3.2. Tooley's Inverted Universes 206 4. Concluding Remarks: Methodological Implications 208 Acknowledgments 211 References 211 Disentangling Causal Pluralism Leen de Vreese 214 1. Introduction 214 2. Conceptual Causal Pluralism 215 3. Three Metaphysical Questions 218 3.1. Causation as a Realistic Notion Versus a Mental Construct 218 3.2. Causation as a Single Versus a Plural Empirical Relation 221 3.3. Causation as a Relation Between Elements at the Fundamental Versus at All Levels of Reality 222 4. The Relations Between Metaphysical and Conceptual Positions 225 5. Epistemological-Methodological Causal Pluralism 228 6. Conclusion 228 Acknowledgments 229 Bibliography 229 Mathematical Entities Lieven Decock 231 1. No Mathematical Entity With Identity 231 2. The Size of Plato's Heaven 235 3. Fear of the Abstract 239 4. The Social Construction of Mathematical Entities 242 5. Metaphysical Methodology 244 Acknowledgments 247 References 247 CONTENTS......Page 6 1. Introduction......Page 8 2. Contributions......Page 9 Acknowledgments......Page 10 1. Analytic Metaphysics Today......Page 11 2. Caveats......Page 12 2.1. Methodological Illusion?......Page 13 2.2. Fragmentation and Constriction......Page 14 References......Page 16 1. Structural Realism as a Metaphysical Position......Page 17 2. The Argument from Quantum Entanglement......Page 27 3. The Argument from Space–Time......Page 30 4. Conclusion and Open Issues......Page 34 References......Page 36 1. Methodologies......Page 39 2. McTaggart's Argument......Page 41 3. Theories of Time......Page 42 4. Closed Time-like Curves in the General Theory of Relativity......Page 44 5. Is Dynamism Coherent?......Page 45 6. Loops......Page 46 References......Page 49 1. Dispositional Essentialism and Categoricalism......Page 51 2. Dispositions All the Way Round?......Page 53 3. The Problem of Random Coincidence......Page 57 5. A Concluding Remark......Page 60 References......Page 69 1. Introduction......Page 71 2. The Problems with the Kripke–Putnam Account of Natural Kinds......Page 76 3. Taking Stock......Page 87 4. Natural Kinds — What are they?......Page 88 References......Page 91 1. Introduction......Page 94 2. Personal Identity and Conceptual Analysis......Page 97 3. Conceptual Analysis and The Soul......Page 99 4. Error Theory or Conceptual Revision?......Page 100 5. Faultless Disagreement......Page 102 6. Beyond Mere Semantics......Page 107 References......Page 111 1. Introduction......Page 114 2. Truthmaker Theory......Page 118 3. How Does Truthmaker Theory Regiment?......Page 121 4. Tropes as Truthmakers......Page 127 5. Why Should One Hold That the World Is a World of Tropes?......Page 133 References......Page 135 1. Introduction......Page 138 2. The Straightjacket View......Page 140 3. The Functional View......Page 142 4. The Two-Concept View......Page 144 5. Varieties of Pluralism......Page 146 5.1. The Symptoms of Causation......Page 148 6. Wittgensteinian Pluralism......Page 151 7. Three Objections......Page 156 Acknowledgments......Page 157 References......Page 158 Introduction......Page 159 1. Philosophy of Mind and Social Theory......Page 160 2. Keith Sawyer's Nonreductive Individualism......Page 161 3. The Introduction of Emergence and Its Use(fullness) in Social Theory......Page 163 4. How to Evaluate Sawyer's Metaphysics? Questioning Social Emergence......Page 167 5. Conclusion: If At All .........Page 169 Acknowledgments......Page 171 References......Page 172 Counterfactuals, Causation and Humean Supervenience Paul Noordhof......Page 174 1. Counterfactuals and Humean Supervenience......Page 180 2. Counterfactuals, the Future Similarity Objection and Chance......Page 186 2.1. Isolating the Cause......Page 187 2.2. Indeterminism and Lewis's Similarity Weighting......Page 191 3. Causal Asymmetry......Page 201 3.1. Microphysical Causal Asymmetry?......Page 203 3.2. Tooley's Inverted Universes......Page 206 4. Concluding Remarks: Methodological Implications......Page 208 References......Page 211 1. Introduction......Page 214 2. Conceptual Causal Pluralism......Page 215 3.1. Causation as a Realistic Notion Versus a Mental Construct......Page 218 3.2. Causation as a Single Versus a Plural Empirical Relation......Page 221 3.3. Causation as a Relation Between Elements at the Fundamental Versus at All Levels of Reality......Page 222 4. The Relations Between Metaphysical and Conceptual Positions......Page 225 6. Conclusion......Page 228 Bibliography......Page 229 1. No Mathematical Entity With Identity......Page 231 2. The Size of Plato's Heaven......Page 235 3. Fear of the Abstract......Page 239 4. The Social Construction of Mathematical Entities......Page 242 5. Metaphysical Methodology......Page 244 References......Page 247 "This volume brings together the lectures presented at the 5th Metaphysics of Science Workshop held from June 2 to 3, 2005, in Ghent, Belgium. The aim of this volume is twofold. First, it fields a selection of ongoing discussions on a central topic in contemporary analytical metaphysics. Authors were asked to encapsulate their lecture topic into a precis, highlighting the contesting views, accentuating the pro and contra of the main arguments, and shedding light on the origin, the evolution and the eventual offspring of a respective discussion. Second, this volume addresses the methodological question by examining what can be learned if we compare these discussions from a methodological perspective. What are the red herrings and shortcomings? Is an integrated methodology possible? Does each discussion finally await a pluralism of plausible positions or will an overall convincing account be expected? And finally, can analytical metaphysics methodologically assert and investigate their basic assumptions, if not from a common sense stance?"--Jacket This volume brings together the lectures presented at the 5th Metaphysics of Science Workshop held from June 2 to 3, 2005, in Ghent, Belgium. The aim of this volume is twofold. First, it fields a selection of ongoing discussions on a central topic in contemporary analytical metaphysics. Authors were asked to encapsulate their lecture topic into a précis, highlighting the contesting views, accentuating the pro and contra of the main arguments, and shedding light on the origin, the evolution and the eventual offspring of a respective discussion. Second, this volume addresses the methodological question by examining what can be learned if we compare these discussions from a methodological perspective. What are the red herrings and shortcomings? Is an integrated methodology possible? Does each discussion finally await a pluralism of plausible positions or will an overall convincing account be expected? And finally, can analytical metaphysics methodologically assert and investigate their basic assumptions, if not from a common sense stance?