انتقاد ویتگنشتاین از نظریهٔ روابط چندگانهٔ راسل در قضاوت (مطالعات آنتهم در ویتگنشتاین)

Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement (or MRTJ) marked a crucial turning point in the lives of two great twentieth-century thinkers. It was also a watershed moment within the history of analytic philosophy itself. Yet scholarly consensus around a satisfactory interpretation of the nature of the critique, the extent of and reasons for its impact on Russell, along with the role it played within Wittgenstein’s development have remained elusive. With these facts in mind, this book aims to accomplish four interrelated goals. The first is to develop a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s MRTJ. The second is to defend this reading, called the ‘logical interpretation’ (or LI) against its most prominent competitors in the scholarly literature. Third, the book aims to situate Wittgenstein’s critique of the MRTJ and Russell’s reaction to it, within the broader context of each of Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s respective philosophical developments. Fourth and finally, the book aims to introduce students and scholars of early analytic philosophy to, and familiarize them with the historical events, textual evidence, scholarly controversies, letters, notes and diagrams, consideration of which is integral to constructing a plausible reading of Wittgenstein’s objection. Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement (or MRTJ) marked a crucial turning point in the lives of two great twentieth-century thinkers. But it was also a watershed moment within the history of analytic philosophy itself. The critique led Russell to abandon his 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript and left a significant breach within his epistemology. It represented an important milestone within Wittgenstein’s philosophical development and marked the point at which he emerged on the scene as an independent philosophical force. It inaugurated the linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy which would dominate the course of analytic philosophy throughout the early and middle part of that century. For these and other reasons, it is worthy of careful study and deep understanding. Yet scholarly consensus around a satisfactory interpretation of the nature of the critique, the extent of and reasons for its impact on Russell, along with the role it played within Wittgenstein’s developmental trajectory have remained elusive. This partly reflects the fact that a correct interpretation of Wittgenstein’s critique depends upon a satisfactory resolution of several other, related exegetical controversies within the interpretation of Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s respective philosophies. With these facts in mind, this book aims to accomplish four interrelated goals. The first is to develop a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s MRTJ. For reasons which will become clear over the course of the book, this reading is called the ‘logical interpretation’ (or LI). The second main objective of the book is to defend LI against its most prominent competitors in the scholarly literature. These include interpretations of Wittgenstein’s objection offered by Nicholas Griffin and Steven Sommerville, Gregory Landini, Graham Stevens, Peter Hanks, Christopher Pincock, Rosalind Carey, Fraser MacBride and Samuel Lebens. Third, the book aims to situate Wittgenstein’s critique of the MRTJ and Russell’s reaction to it, within the broader context of each of Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s respective philosophical developments. While much scholarship has focused on probing the role played by the objection within the evolution of Russell’s thought, much less has been done to explore the impact on Wittgenstein’s development. Still less, if any scholarship has been devoted to highlighting the significant traces of Wittgenstein’s critique which can be found latent within his later philosophical viewpoint. This book seeks to fill these lacunae in the scholarship on Wittgenstein while also adding to the high-quality work on Russell which has already been done in this area. Fourth and finally, the book aims to introduce students and scholars of early analytic philosophy to and familiarize them with the historical events, textual evidence, scholarly controversies, letters, notes and diagrams, consideration of which is integral to constructing a plausible reading of Wittgenstein’s objection. To that end, it brings together a broad selection of relevant materials and information in a clear, accessible and organized way into one, relatively concise source. Cover 1 Front Matter 3 Half Title 3 Series page 4 Title page 5 Copyright information 6 Dedication 7 Dedication 8 Contents 9 List of figures 11 Acknowledgments 13 List of Abbreviations 15 Chapter Int-4 17 Introduction 17 Chapter 1 Historical and Philosophical Background 23 1.1 Neo-Hegelian Origins 23 1.2 Russellian Propositions 25 1.3 Why Did Russell Abandon Russellian Propositions? 29 1.4 The Multiple Relation Theory 35 1.5 Wittgenstein at Cambridge 42 1.6 The Theory of Knowledge Manuscript 43 Chapter 2 The Scholarly Controversy 49 2.1 The Direction Problems 49 2.2 The Standard Reading 55 2.3 Stevens’s First Critique of EI: Direct Inspection and the MRTJ 58 2.4 Stevens’s Second Critique of EI: The Logical Status of the Subordinate Relation 61 2.5 The Ontological Interpretation 62 2.6 Hanks’s Critique of the Standard Reading 64 2.7 Hanks on How Wittgenstein ‘Defeated’ the MRTJ 66 2.8 Pincock on the Standard Reading 67 2.9 Pincock on Hanks and the Unity of Judgement 70 2.10 The Correspondence Problem 70 2.11 Landini and Giaretta on Type* Distinctions 76 2.12 Landini on Wittgenstein’s Critique of the MRTJ 80 2.13 Lebens on the ‘Representation Concern’ and the Stoutian Evolution of the MRTJ 85 2.14 Lebens on the Demise of the MRTJ 88 Chapter 3 Russell’s Paralysis 91 3.1 The Logical Interpretation 91 3.2 Revising the Standard Reading 98 3.3 Re-examining Stevens on EI and OI 101 3.4 Hanks on the Judging Relation and Wittgenstein’s Critique of the MRTJ 107 3.5 Pincock on the Proposition Problem 109 3.6 Pincock on the Correspondence Problem 118 3.7 Russell’s Diagram of Understanding 125 3.8 ‘Props’ 130 3.9 Type* Distinctions Reappraised 135 3.10 Revisiting Landini on Wittgenstein’s Critique of the MRTJ 139 3.11 Reconsidering the Representation Concern 144 3.12 The Demise of TK and of the MRTJ 146 Chapter 4 Wittgenstein on Truth, Logic and Representation 151 4.1 The Picture Theory of Propositions 151 4.2 Wittgenstein and Type-Theory 157 4.3 Logical Form 160 4.4 Bipolarity and Extensionalism 163 4.5 Saying and Showing 170 4.6 Inference 172 4.7 Sense-Truth Regress 177 4.8 The Fundamental Thought (Grundgedanke) 181 4.9 The General Propositional Form 186 4.10 Transition 194 4.11 The Later View: Continuities amidst Contrasts 199 4.12 Conclusion 207 End Matter 211 References 211 Works by Russell 211 Works by Wittgenstein 211 Works by Other Authors 212 Index 217 This book sets out to adjudicate the scholarly controversy surrounding Wittgenstein's May-June 1913 critique of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgement. It also aims to familiarize readers with the historical events, textual evidence, letters, working notes and diagrams which are crucial to a correct appreciation of Wittgenstein's criticisms.