Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism : Understanding Psychological Nominalism

"Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism is the first study of its kind to address a range of realist and idealist views inspired by psychological nominalism. Bringing together premier analytic realists and distinguished defenders of German idealism, it reveals why psychological nominalism is one of the most important theories of the mind to come out the 20th century. The theory, first put forward by Wilfrid Sellars, argues that language is the only means by which humans can learn the types of socially shared practices that permit rationality. Although wedded to important aspects of German idealism, Sellars' theory is couched in bold realist terms of the analytic tradition. Those who are sympathetic to German idealism find this realist's appropriation of German idealism problematic. Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism and Realism thus creates a rare venue for realists and idealists to debate the epistemic outcome of the mental processes they both claim are essential to experience. Their resulting discussion bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy. In providing original and accessible chapters on psychological nominalism, this volume raises themes that intersect with numerous disciplines: the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics. It also provides clarity on arguably the best available account of why humans can reason, be self-aware, know, and act as agents."--Bloomsbury Publishing. Cover page 1 Halftitle page 2 Series page 3 Title page 4 Copyright page 5 Dedication 6 Contents 8 Abbreviations of Sellars’ Texts 9 Introduction: Psychological Nominalism and German Idealism 10 Nominalism, realism, and a logical space 10 Knowing that, know how, and conceptual holism 14 Normative functionalism and psychological nominalism 18 The relevancy of psychological nominalism 20 Psychological nominalism and German idealism 21 Notes 23 Bibliography 24 Part One Psychological Nominalism and Realism 26 1 “Psychological Nominalism” and the Given, from Abstract Entities to Animal Minds 28 Psychological nominalism and the Myth of the Given in EPM 30 Rorty, Brandom, and McDowell on psychological nominalism, realism, and idealism 34 Sellar’ psychological nominalism as a naturalistic empiricism 41 Notes 46 Bibliography 47 2 Hegel and Sellars’ “Myth of Jones”: Can Sellars Have More in Common with Hegel than Rorty and Brandom Suggest? 50 A Rortian world of augmented neo-Ryleans 53 Hegel on perceptual and refl ective judgments 55 Sellars on thoughts, impressions, and their modeling 57 Jones’ theory of thoughts and perceptual thoughts 60 Notes 64 Bibliography 66 3 The Metaphysics of Sensation: Psychological Nominalism and the Reality of Consciousness 68 The transcendental difference and the rejection of givenness 69 Awareness and thought 70 Meaning 71 Intuition and sensation 75 Perceptual form and perceptual content 79 The grain argument 81 Homogeneity and process 84 Concluding remarks 86 Notes 88 Bibliography 89 4 Language, Norms, and Linguistic Norms 92 Normativity and modality 92 Norms, purposes, and rules 95 Norms, language, and explanations 98 A partial grounding of social norms 104 Notes 107 Bibliography 109 Part Two Psychological Nominalism and Idealism 110 5 On the Pittsburgh School, Kant, Hegel, and Realism 112 Sellars’ Kantianism and psychological nominalism 112 Psychological nominalism, the given, and the Pittsburgh School 114 Kant, Sellars, and the given 117 Sellars’ view of knowledge after the given 118 Brandom, McDowell, and knowledge aft er the given 120 On a Hegelian approach to experience and knowledge 123 On the disjunction between analytic neo-Hegelianism and Hegel 124 Conclusion: Psychological nominalism, conceptual frameworks, and the given 126 Notes 127 Bibliography 128 6 Reading Sellars’ “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” with Robert Brandom at One’s Side 130 Notes 153 Bibliography 156 7 A Kantian Critique of Sellars’ Transcendental Realism 158 Objects of experience 158 The “bifurcation” of nature rejected 160 The sense-impression-inference 162 An explanatory gap 167 Transcendental philosophy: The sense-impressions 169 Scientific realism 170 The “bifurcation” of nature regained? 174 Notes 175 Bibliography 179 8 Psychological Nominalism and Conceptual Relativism: An Idealist’s Take 182 Sellars’ stereo-scopic vision and his materialistreduction of man-in-the-world 183 Conceptual holism and schemas 186 Conceptual bias and conceptual relativism 189 Picturing, structural fallibilism, and the contingent life-world 194 Closing remarks 199 Notes 200 Bibliography 201 Index 204 Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism' is the first study of its kind to address a range of realist and idealist views inspired by psychological nominalism. Bringing together premier analytic realists and distinguished defenders of German idealism, it reveals why psychological nominalism is one of the most important theories of the mind to come out the 20th century. The theory, first put forward by Wilfrid Sellars, argues that language is the only means by which humans can learn the types of socially shared practices that permit rationality. Although wedded to important aspects of German idealism, Sellars' theory is couched in bold realist terms of the analytic tradition. Those who are sympathetic to German idealism find this realist's appropriation of German idealism problematic. 'Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism and Realism' thus creates a rare venue for realists and idealists to debate the epistemic outcome of the mental processes they both claim are essential to experience. Their resulting discussion bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy. 0In providing original and accessible chapters on psychological nominalism, this volume raises themes that intersect with numerous disciplines: the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics. It also provides clarity on arguably the best available account of why humans can reason, be self-aware, know, and act as agents