Why Paramilitary Operations Fail

This book analyzes U.S. pro-insurgency paramilitary operations (PMOs) or U.S. proxy warfare from the beginning of the Cold War to the present and explains why many of these operations either failed entirely to achieve their objective, or why they produced negative consequences that greatly diminished their benefits. The chapters cover important aspects of what PMOs are, the history of U.S. PMOs, how they function, the dilemmas of secrecy and accountability, the issues of control, criminal conduct, and disposal of proxies, as well as newer developments that may change PMOs in the future. The author argues that the general approach of conducting PMOs as covert operations is inherently flawed since it tends to undermine many possibilities for control over proxies in a situation where the interests of sponsors and proxies necessarily diverge on key issues. Armin Krishnan is Assistant Professor and Director of the Security Studies Program at East Carolina University, USA Front Matter ....Pages i-xvii What Are Paramilitary Operations? (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 1-20 A Short History of US Paramilitary Operations (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 21-54 Conducting Paramilitary Operations (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 55-84 Dilemmas of Secrecy (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 85-105 Accountability in Paramilitary Operations (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 107-132 Critical Loss of Control (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 133-155 War Crimes and Criminal Conduct (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 157-177 Endgames and Outcomes (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 179-203 The Disposal Problem (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 205-228 New Developments (Armin Krishnan)....Pages 229-248 Back Matter ....Pages 249-254