Why Comrades Go To War : Liberation Politics and the Outbreak of Africa's Deadliest Conflict

In October 1996, a motley crew of ageing Marxists and unemployed youth coalesced to revolt against Mobutu Seso Seko, president of Zaire/Congo since 1965. Backed by a Rwanda-led regional coalition that drew support from Asmara to Luanda, the rebels of the AFDL marched over 1500 kilometers in seven months to crush the dictatorship. To the Congolese rebels and their Pan-Africanist allies, the vanquishing of the Mobutu regime represented nothing short of a 'second independence' for Congo and Central Africa as a whole and the dawning of a new regional order of peace and security. Within fifteen months, however, Central Africa's 'liberation peace' would collapse, triggering a cataclysmic fratricide between the heroes of the war against Mobutu and igniting the deadliest conflict since World War II. Uniquely drawing on hundreds of interviews with protagonists from Congo, Rwanda, Angola, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Africa, Belgium, France, the UK and the US, Why Comrades Go To War offers a novel theoretical and empirical account of Africa's Great War. It argues that the seeds of Africa's Great War were sown in the revolutionary struggle against Mobutu-the way the revolution came together, the way it was organized, and, paradoxically, the very way it succeeded. In particular, the book argues that the overthrow of Mobutu proved a Pyrrhic victory because the protagonists ignored the philosophy of Julius Nyerere, the father of Africa's liberation movements: they put the gun before the unglamorous but essential task of building the domestic and regional political institutions and organizational structures necessary to consolidate peace after revolution. "In October 1996, a motley crew of ageing Marxists and unemployed youths coalesced to revolt against Mobutu Seso Seko, president of Zaire/Congo since 1965. Backed by a Rwanda-led regional coalition that drew support from Asmara to Luanda, the rebels of the AFDL marched over 1500 kilometers in seven months to crush the dictatorship. To the Congolese rebels and their Pan-Africanist allies, the vanquishing of the Mobutu regime represented nothing short of a “second independence” for Congo and Central Africa as a whole. Within 15 months, however, Central Africa’s “liberation Peace” would collapse, triggering a cataclysmic fratricide between the heroes of the war against Mobutu and igniting the deadliest conflict since World War II. Uniquely drawing on hundreds of interviews with protagonists from Congo, Rwanda, Angola, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Africa, Belgium, France, the UK and the US, Why Comrades Go to War offers a novel theoretical and empirical account of Africa’s Great War. It argues that the seeds of Africa’s Great War were sown in the revolutionary struggle against Mobutu—the way the revolution came together, the way it was organized, and, paradoxically, the very way it succeeded. In particular, the book argues that the overthrow of Mobutu proved a Pyrrhic victory because the protagonists ignored the philosophy of Julius Nyerere, the father of Africa's liberation movements: they put the gun before the unglamorous but essential task of building the domestic and regional political institutions and organizational structures necessary to consolidate peace after revolution." -- University Press Scholarship Online In October 1996, a group of ageing Marxists and unemployed youth coalesced to revolt against Mobutu Seso Seko, president of Zaire/Congo since 1965. Backed by a Rwanda-led regional coalition that drew support from Asmara to Luanda, the rebels of the AFDL marched over 1500 kilometers inseven months to crush the dictatorship. To the Congolese rebels and their Pan-Africanist allies, the vanquishing of the Mobutu regime represented nothing short of a "second independence" for Congo and Central Africa as a whole and the dawning of a new regional order of peace and security. Within fifteen months, however, Central Africa's "liberation peace" would collapse, triggering a cataclysmic fratricide between the heroes of the war against Mobutu and igniting the deadliest conflict since World War II. This book gives an account Africa's Great War. It argues that the seeds of Africa's Great War were sown in the revolutionary struggle against Mobutu- the way the revolution came together, the way it was organized, and, paradoxically, the very way it succeeded. In particular, the book argues that the overthrow of Mobutu proved a Pyrrhic victory because the protagonists ignored the philosophy of Julius Nyerere, the father of Africa's liberation movements: they put the gun before the unglamorous but essential task of building the domestic and regional political institutions and organizational structures necessary to consolidate peace after revolution The conclusion explores the book’s broader implications. The unraveling of the AFDL happened within the same fifteen-month timeframe that would also see the outbreak of a “war of brothers” between Eritrea and Ethiopia (May 1998) and a violent fall-out between the RPF and Uganda's NRM (August 1999)—on Congolese territory. The fall of Kinshasa in May 1997 marked the last successful violent revolution brought about by liberation movements in Africa (save for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s (SPLM) partial victory in Sudan). Existing liberation regimes shifted their focus to internal development and a narrow conception of national interest rather than continuing to export revolution and building deep institutional ties with brother countries. Thus, rather than the AFDL triumph ushering in a new era of liberation politics and regional solidarity that would transform Africa, it was in some sense the __Thermidor__ of the Pan-Africanist, Nyerere-driven vision of unity and security through regime change campaigns. The final pages of the book assess the lasting impact of the liberation project on African politics. Introduction -- Liberation, Counter-revolution And War -- Winning The War, Losing The Peace: The Liberation Of Zaire And The Outbreak Of Africa's Great War -- The Gathering Storm: Mobutu's Zaire, The African Liberation Project And The Rwandan Patriotic Front -- Comrades Preparing For War: The Alliance To Overthrow Mobutu -- The Campaign: The Sprint To Kinshasa And The Rwandan-angolan Cold War -- The Post-mobutu Order And Politics After Liberation -- The Unraveling: Internal And External Strains On The Alliance - Back Against The Wall: The Return Of The Génocidaire Threat -- Kabila's Pre-emptive Stike: The Kinshasa Endgame -- Comrades Go To War: Triangular Diplomacy Between Kinshasa, Kigali And Luanda -- Why Comrades Go To War. Philip Roessler, Harry Verhoeven. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 431-447) And Index. Drawing on hundreds of interviews with protagonists from Congo, Rwanda, Angola, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Africa, Belgium, France, the UK and the US, 'Why Comrades Go to War' offers a theoretical and empirical account of Africa's Great War. It argues that the seeds of Africa's Great War were sown in the revolutionary struggle against Mobutu - the way the revolution came together, the way it was organized, and, paradoxically, the very way it succeeded. In particular, the work argues that the overthrow of Mobutu proved a Pyrrhic victory because the protagonists ignored the philosophy of Julius Nyerere, the father of Africa's liberation movements xix, 483 pages, 8 unnumbered pages of plates : 23 cm