Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare)

For more than a century, from 1900 to 2006, campaigns of nonviolent resistance were more than twice as effective as their violent counterparts in achieving their stated goals. By attracting impressive support from citizens, whose activism takes the form of protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and other forms of nonviolent noncooperation, these efforts help separate regimes from their main sources of power and produce remarkable results, even in Iran, Burma, the Philippines, and the Palestinian Territories. Combining statistical analysis with case studies of specific countries and territories, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan detail the factors enabling such campaigns to succeed and, sometimes, causing them to fail. They find that nonviolent resistance presents fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment, and that higher levels of participation contribute to enhanced resilience, greater opportunities for tactical innovation and civic disruption (and therefore less incentive for a regime to maintain its status quo), and shifts in loyalty among opponents' erstwhile supporters, including members of the military establishment. Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that successful nonviolent resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies, which are less likely to regress into civil war. Presenting a rich, evidentiary argument, they originally and systematically compare violent and nonviolent outcomes in different historical periods and geographical contexts, debunking the myth that violence occurs because of structural and environmental factors and that it is necessary to achieve certain political goals. Instead, the authors discover, violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds. Columbia University Press Cover......Page 2 Half title......Page 3 Series Page......Page 4 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 7 Contents......Page 8 Illustrations......Page 9 Tables......Page 10 Acknowledgments......Page 11 Part I: Why Civil Resistance Works......Page 16 Chapter One: The Success of Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns......Page 17 Chapter Two: The Primacy of Participation in Nonviolent Resistance......Page 43 Chapter Three: Exploring Alternative Explanations for the Success of Civil Resistance......Page 75 Part II: Case Studies......Page 95 Introduction to the Case Studies......Page 96 Chapter Four: The Iranian Revolution, 1977-1979......Page 100 Chapter Five: The First Palestinian Intifada, 1987-1992......Page 125 Chapter Six: The Philippine People Power Movement, 1983-1986......Page 152 Chapter Seven: Why Civil Resistance Sometimes Fails: The Burmese Uprising, 1988-1990......Page 176 Case Study Summary......Page 195 Part III: The Implications of Civil Resistance......Page 201 Chapter Eight: After the Campaign: The Consequences of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance......Page 202 Chapter Nine: Conclusion......Page 221 Epilogue......Page 229 Appendix......Page 232 Notes......Page 244 References......Page 259 Index......Page 275 - Cover 2 Half title 3 Series Page 4 Title 5 Copyright 6 Dedication 7 Contents 8 Illustrations 9 Tables 10 Acknowledgments 11 Part I: Why Civil Resistance Works 16 Chapter One: The Success of Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns 17 Chapter Two: The Primacy of Participation in Nonviolent Resistance 43 Chapter Three: Exploring Alternative Explanations for the Success of Civil Resistance 75 Part II: Case Studies 95 Introduction to the Case Studies 96 Chapter Four: The Iranian Revolution, 1977-1979 100 Chapter Five: The First Palestinian Intifada, 1987-1992 125 Chapter Six: The Philippine People Power Movement, 1983-1986 152 Chapter Seven: Why Civil Resistance Sometimes Fails: The Burmese Uprising, 1988-1990 176 Case Study Summary 195 Part III: The Implications of Civil Resistance 201 Chapter Eight: After the Campaign: The Consequences of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance 202 Chapter Nine: Conclusion 221 Epilogue 229 Appendix 232 Notes 244 References 259 Index 275 Political,Science/General Political Science/General Combining statistical analysis with case studies of specific countries and territories, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan detail the factors enabling nonviolent resistance campaigns to succeed and, sometimes, fail. They find such campaigns present fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment, and higher levels of participation contribute to enhanced resilience, greater opportunities for tactical innovation and civic disruption (and therefore less incentive for a regime to maintain its status quo), and shifts in loyalty among opponents' erstwhile supporters, including members of the military establishment Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that successful nonviolent resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies, which are less likely to regress into civil war. Presenting a rich, evidentiary argument, they originally and systematically compare violent and nonviolent outcomes in different historical periods and geographical contexts, debunking the myth that violence occurs because of structural and environmental factors and that it is necessary to achieve certain political goals. Instead, the authors discover, violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds. Book jacket Though it defies consensus, between 1900 & 2006 campaigns of nonviolent resistance were more than twice as effective as violent struggles. This study combines statistical analysis with case studies to debunk the myth that violence occurs because of structural & environmental factors & is necessary to achieve certain political goals