Why Be Moral?: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers (Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture)

Yong Huang presents a new way of doing comparative philosophy as he demonstrates the resources for contemporary ethics offered by the Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao (1032{u2013}1085) and Cheng Yi (1033{u2013}1107), canonical neo-Confucian philosophers. Huang departs from the standard method of Chinese/Western comparison, which tends to interest those already interested in Chinese philosophy. While Western-oriented scholars may be excited to learn about Chinese philosophers who have said things similar to what they or their favored philosophers have to say, they hardly find anything philosophically new from such comparative work. Instead of comparing and contrasting philosophers, each chapter of this book discusses a significant topic in Western moral philosophy, examines the representative views on this topic in the Western tradition, identifies their respective difficulties, and discusses how the Cheng brothers have better things to say on the subject. Topics discussed include why one should be moral, how weakness of will is not possible, whether virtue ethics is self-centered, in what sense the political is also personal, how a moral theory can be of an antitheoretical nature, and whether moral metaphysics is still possible in this postmodern and postmetaphysical age. Contents 8 Acknowledgments 12 Introduction 16 1. Introduction 16 2. Possibility of Comparative Philosophy 17 3. How to Do Comparative Philosophy 22 4. The Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers 28 5. Looking Ahead 33 6. Conclusion 40 Chapter 1: Joy (le 樂): “Why Be Moral?” 42 1. Introduction 42 2. The Question of “Why Be Moral?” 43 3. Representative Answers in Western Philosophy and Their Inadequacies 49 4. The Chengs’ Neo-Confucian Answer: Joy in Being Moral 58 5. Joy and Knowledge 64 6. To Be Moral and to Be Human 69 7. Conclusion 76 Chapter 2: Virtue (de 德): Is a Virtuous Person Self-Centered? 78 1. Introduction 78 2. Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics 79 3. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The First Level 83 4. Virtue and Human Nature 88 5. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The Second Level 96 6. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The Foundational Level 107 7. Conclusion 113 Chapter 3: Knowledge (zhi 知): How Is Weakness of the Will (akrasia) Not Possible? 114 1. Introduction 114 2. The Problem of Weakness of the Will in Western Philosophy 116 3. Knowledge and Action: Why Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible? 120 4. Knowledge of/as Virtue versus Knowledge from Hearingand Seeing: How Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible? 127 5. Cheng Brothers versus Socrates and Aristotle 130 6. Absence of Weakness of the Will and the Presence of Moral Responsibility 136 7. Conclusion 143 Chapter 4 Love (ai 愛): Ethics between Theory and Antitheory 146 1. Introduction 146 2. The Ethics of Commonality and Its Problem 147 3. Love with Distinction 151 4. Extension of Love 159 5. Training of Emotions 167 6. Conclusion 174 Chapter 5: Propriety (li 禮): Why the Political Is Also Personal 176 1. Introduction 176 2. The Political/Personal Division in the Liberal Traditionand Its Problems 177 3. The Possibility of a Confucian Political Philosophy 183 4. Propriety as External Rules 186 5. Propriety as Inner Feelings 191 6. Propriety as Human Nature 196 7. Defending the Neo-Confucian Conception of Propriety as a Political Philosophy 202 8. Conclusion 209 Chapter 6: Creativity (li 理): The Metaphysic of Morals or Moral Metaphysics? 210 1. Introduction 210 2. Metaphysic of Morals, Moral Theology, and Moral Metaphysics 211 3. Li: Ontological Articulation of Confucian Morality 215 4. Sheng 生 (Life-Giving Activity): Dereification of the Ultimate Reality 223 5. Shen 神 (Divinity or God): Toward a Confucian Theology 229 6. Conclusion 236 Chapter 7: Classics (Jing 經): Hermeneutics as a Practical Learning 238 1. Introduction 238 2. Classics as Carriers of Dao (Jing Yi Zai Dao 經以載道) 239 3. To Grasp Dao through Classics (You Jing Qiong Li 由經窮理) 242 4. Multiple Ways to Dao (Qiong Li Duo Duan 窮理多端 246 1. Study History (Kao Gujin 考古今) 246 2. Handle Human Affairs (Kui Renshi 揆人事) 248 3. Reflect upon Oneself (Qu Zhushen 取諸身) 249 4. Investigate External Things and Events (Cha Wuqing 察物情) 250 5. Hermeneutics as a Practical Learning (Jingxue Shixue Ye 經學實學也) 251 6. Hermeneutic Circles (Jiao Xiang Yang Ye 交相養也) 254 7. Conclusion 256 Appendix Neo-Confucian Hermeneutics at Work: Cheng Yi’s Philosophical Interpretation of Analects 8.9 and 17.3 258 1. Introduction 258 2. Conventional Interpretations of Analects 8.9 259 3. Cheng Yi’s Interpretation of Analects 8.9 264 4. Conventional Interpretation of Analects 17.3 269 5. Cheng Yi’s Interpretation of Analects 17.3 274 6. The Role of Sages: Education 278 7. Conclusion 282 Notes 284 Bibliography 324 Index 342 Yong Huang presents a new way of doing comparative philosophy as he demonstrates the resources for contemporary ethics offered by the Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao (1032-1085) and Cheng Yi (1033-1107), canonical neo-Confucian philosophers. Huang departs from the standard method of Chinese/Western comparison, which tends to interest those already interested in Chinese philosophy. While Western-oriented scholars may be excited to learn about Chinese philosophers who have said things similar to what they or their favored philosophers have to say, they hardly find anything philosophically new from such comparative work. Instead of comparing and contrasting philosophers, each chapter of this book discusses a significant topic in Western moral philosophy, examines the representative views on this topic in the Western tradition, identifies their respective difficulties, and discusses how the Cheng brothers have better things to say on the subject. Topics discussed include why one should be moral, how weakness of will is not possible, whether virtue ethics is self-centered, in what sense the political is also personal, how a moral theory can be of an antitheoretical nature, and whether moral metaphysics is still possible in this postmodern and postmetaphysical age. Book jacket