Who One Is: Book 1: Meontology of the "I": A Transcendental Phenomenology (Phaenomenologica, 189)

Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out __who__ one is from __what__ one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but beyond her properties. Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the "transcendental person." For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on "the afterlife." This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion. If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, "Who are you?" I, in answering, might say "I don{u2019}t know who in the world I am." Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what "I" refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, "Who are you?"has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal "myself." For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but "Who are you? Or "Who am I?" might be more anguished and be rendered by "What sort of person are you" or "What sort am I?" Such a question often surfaces in the face of a "limit-situation," such as one{u2019}s death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our "centers," what we also will call "Existenz." "Existenz" here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one{u2019}s being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one{u2019}s normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one{u2019}s non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of "vocation." We will see that it has especial ties to one{u2019}s Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage "Yonder." Front Matter....Pages i-xvi Phenomenological Preliminaries....Pages 1-64 The First Person and the Transcendental I....Pages 65-132 Ipseity's Ownness and Uniqueness....Pages 133-171 Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective....Pages 173-268 Ontology and Meontology of I-ness....Pages 269-344 The Paradoxes of the Transcendental Person....Pages 345-422 The Death of the Transcendental Person....Pages 423-451 The Afterlife and the Transcendental I....Pages 453-544 Back Matter....Pages 545-566 Bk. 1. Meontology Of The 'i': A Transcendental Phenomenology -- Bk. 2. Existenz And Transcendental Phenomenology. By James G. Hart. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.