Who am I? Who is she? : a naturalistic, holistic, somatic approach to personal identity

Are ‘persons’ physical things, members of the species homo sapiens which exist solely in materialist form, continuous in structure with other living things? Or is the issue a more complex one: are there more dimensions to being a person than mere physical, biological existence? These are matters of interest and discussion in many fields of study in this age of individuality. In this wide-ranging essay, the author addresses various aspects of the issue, including the history of self and identity. The ancient tradition of dualism is rejected in favour of a straightforward holistic and naturalistic account of selfhood; it is argued that the mind arises in an emergent sense from the body and personal identity is best expressed in terms of a self-reflective and meaningful narrative. The approach is principally from an analytic philosophy point of view but also takes on–board psychological and sociological aspects of self and identity. Contents Acknowledgements 1 Quintessence, Aims and Structure 1.1 General Introduction 1.2 Working Definitions 1.3 Who Am I? Who Is She? 1.4 Methodological Considerations 1.5 Structure of the Argument 1.6 Note on Orthography and Typography 1.7 Building Arches 2 Self and Identity in Historical Context 2.1 Origins of Mind, Soul, Self and Identity 2.2 Pre-History to Plato 2.3 Early Christian Dualism 2.4 The Middle Age and the Soul 2.5 Renaissance and Reason: Descartes to Locke 2.6 Science Intervenes: Darwin to Freud 2.7 The Story so Far 2.8 General Historical Inferences 3 Dualism, Monism and the End of the Debate 3.1 Death of the Soul? 3.2 Predicate Dualism 3.3 Property Dualism and the Mind-Body Problem 3.4 The Zombic Debate 3.5 Two Classes of Dualism? And Monism? 3.6 Perspectives for Mind and Personal Identity 4 Body, Brain and Mind 4.1 Embodiment 4.2 What the Mind Cannot Be 4.3 Things, Functions and Processes 4.4 Body, Mind and World 4.5 What Do We Need the Body to Do? 4.6 The Making of the Mind 4.7 Conscious and Unconscious Mind 4.8 ‘My’ Philosophy of Mind 5 Aspects of Personal Identity 5.1 Dimensions of the Debate 5.2 Conditions of Personhood – Dimension( A) 5.3 Unity of Person – Dimension (B) 5.4 The Meaning of Identity 5.5 Persistence of Person – Dimension (C) 5.6 Structure of Personality – Dimension (D) 5.7 The Body in Philosophy 5.8 Summing up on Personal Identity 6 Some Reductionist Approaches 6.1 Aspects of Reductionism 6.2 Psychological Continuity and Replication 6.3 Body Transplant and the Somatic Aspect 6.4 Further Reductionist Discussions 6.5 Frankenstein’s Monster 6.6 Reflections on Reductionist Debate 7 Qualitative Aspects of Self and Identity 7.1 Introductory Remark 7.2 Constitution of the Self 7.3 Cultural Aspect of Identity 7.4 Relating Self to Other 7.5 Memory, Continuity and Identity 7.6 Broader Aspects of Memory 7.7 Additional Aspects of Continuity 7.8 Phenomena of Identity Main description: Are 'persons' physical things, members of the species homo sapiens which exist solely in materialist form, continuous in structure with other living things? Or is the issue a more complex one: are there more dimensions to being a person than mere physical, biological existence? These are matters of interest and discussion in many fields of study in this age of individuality. In this wide-ranging essay, the author addresses various aspects of the issue, including the history of self and identity. The ancient tradition of dualism is rejected in favour of a straightforward holistic and naturalistic account of selfhood; it is argued that the mind arises in an emergent sense from the body and personal identity is best expressed in terms of a self-reflective and meaningful narrative. The approach is principally from an analytic philosophy point of view but also takes on-board psychological and sociological aspects of self and identity