What We Owe to Each Other

It is an excellent book concerning moral norms and specifically emphasizes Scanlon's contractualist view. Scanlon seems to make 'justification' the core basis of ethics. But his contractualist view has several contoversial issues, as in the case of Gauthier's contractarian view. But, without doubt, this an important book by a first-rate scholar. Title Page......Page 1 Acknowledgments......Page 4 Contents......Page 7 Introduction......Page 8 I - REASONS AND VALUES......Page 21 1.Introduction......Page 22 2.Judgment-Sensitive Attitudes......Page 23 3.Rationality......Page 27 4.Irrationality Narrowly Construed......Page 30 5.The (Most) Rational Thing to Do......Page 35 6.Reasonableness......Page 37 7.Reasons and Motivation......Page 38 8.Reasons and Desires:Motivation......Page 42 9.Reasons and Desires:Justification......Page 46 10.Reasons and Desires:Structure......Page 55 11.Metaphysical Doubts about Reasons......Page 60 12.How Do We Know What Reasons We Have?......Page 69 13.Other People ’s Reasons......Page 77 14.Conclusion......Page 81 1.Introduction......Page 83 2.Teleology......Page 84 3.Values:Some Examples......Page 92 4.An Abstract Account of Value......Page 100 5.The Shadow of Hedonism......Page 105 6.The Value of Human (or Rational) Life......Page 108 1.Introduction......Page 113 2.Questions of Well-Being......Page 116 3.Accounts of Well-Being......Page 118 4.The Importance of Well-Being:First-Person Perspectives......Page 131 5.The Importance of Well-Being:Third-Person Perspectives......Page 139 6.The Importance of Well-Being:Moral Perspectives......Page 141 7.Conclusion:Well-Being Not a Master Value......Page 146 II - RIGHT AND WRONG......Page 149 1.Moral Motivation......Page 150 2.Formal and Substantive Accounts of Moral Motivation......Page 152 3.A Contractualist Account of Motivation......Page 156 4.Importance......Page 161 5.Priority......Page 163 6.Some Objections......Page 171 7.Fragmentation of the Moral......Page 174 8.The Scope of Morality......Page 180 9.Conclusion......Page 190 1.Introduction......Page 192 2.Reasonableness......Page 194 3.Principles......Page 200 4.Standpoints......Page 205 5.Generality and Fairness......Page 209 6.Reasonable Rejection......Page 216 7.Impersonal Values......Page 221 8.Priority for the Worst Off?......Page 226 9.Aggregation......Page 232 10.Conclusion......Page 244 1.Introduction......Page 251 2.The Value of Choice......Page 254 3.Responsibility and Choice......Page 259 4.Moral Appraisal......Page 270 5.Preconditions for Moral Appraisal......Page 280 6.Conclusion......Page 293 1.Introduction......Page 298 2.Manipulation and Regard for Expectations......Page 299 3.Fidelity and the Value of Assurance......Page 305 4.The Roles Practices Can Play......Page 312 5.Some Difficulties......Page 314 6.Summary......Page 317 7.Lying and Truth Telling......Page 320 8.Oaths and Other Values......Page 326 9.Conclusion......Page 329 2.What Is Relativism?......Page 331 3.Contractualism and Relativism......Page 341 4.Relativism and Morality in the Broader Sense......Page 345 5.Disagreement about Right and Wrong......Page 352 6.Disagreement and Skepticism......Page 357 7.Conclusion......Page 363 APPENDIX - Williams on Internal and External Reasons......Page 365 1.Reasons......Page 376 2.Values......Page 383 3.Well-Being......Page 386 4.Wrongness and Reasons......Page 390 5.The Structure of Contractualism......Page 394 6.Responsibility......Page 400 7.Promises......Page 403 8.Relativism......Page 407 Appendix......Page 408 Bibliography......Page 410 Index......Page 418 Title Page 1 Acknowledgments 4 Contents 7 Introduction 8 I - REASONS AND VALUES 21 1 / Reasons 22 1.Introduction 22 2.Judgment-Sensitive Attitudes 23 3.Rationality 27 4.Irrationality Narrowly Construed 30 5.The (Most) Rational Thing to Do 35 6.Reasonableness 37 7.Reasons and Motivation 38 8.Reasons and Desires:Motivation 42 9.Reasons and Desires:Justification 46 10.Reasons and Desires:Structure 55 11.Metaphysical Doubts about Reasons 60 12.How Do We Know What Reasons We Have? 69 13.Other People 鈥檚 Reasons 77 14.Conclusion 81 2 / Values 83 1.Introduction 83 2.Teleology 84 3.Values:Some Examples 92 4.An Abstract Account of Value 100 5.The Shadow of Hedonism 105 6.The Value of Human (or Rational) Life 108 3 / Well-Being 113 1.Introduction 113 2.Questions of Well-Being 116 3.Accounts of Well-Being 118 4.The Importance of Well-Being:First-Person Perspectives 131 5.The Importance of Well-Being:Third-Person Perspectives 139 6.The Importance of Well-Being:Moral Perspectives 141 7.Conclusion:Well-Being Not a Master Value 146 II - RIGHT AND WRONG 149 4 / Wrongness and Reasons 150 1.Moral Motivation 150 2.Formal and Substantive Accounts of Moral Motivation 152 3.A Contractualist Account of Motivation 156 4.Importance 161 5.Priority 163 6.Some Objections 171 7.Fragmentation of the Moral 174 8.The Scope of Morality 180 9.Conclusion 190 5 / The Structure of Contractualism 192 1.Introduction 192 2.Reasonableness 194 3.Principles 200 4.Standpoints 205 5.Generality and Fairness 209 6.Reasonable Rejection 216 7.Impersonal Values 221 8.Priority for the Worst Off? 226 9.Aggregation 232 10.Conclusion 244 6 / Responsibility 251 1.Introduction 251 2.The Value of Choice 254 3.Responsibility and Choice 259 4.Moral Appraisal 270 5.Preconditions for Moral Appraisal 280 6.Conclusion 293 7 / Promises 298 1.Introduction 298 2.Manipulation and Regard for Expectations 299 3.Fidelity and the Value of Assurance 305 4.The Roles Practices Can Play 312 5.Some Difficulties 314 6.Summary 317 7.Lying and Truth Telling 320 8.Oaths and Other Values 326 9.Conclusion 329 8 / Relativism 331 1.Introduction 331 2.What Is Relativism? 331 3.Contractualism and Relativism 341 4.Relativism and Morality in the Broader Sense 345 5.Disagreement about Right and Wrong 352 6.Disagreement and Skepticism 357 7.Conclusion 363 APPENDIX - Williams on Internal and External Reasons 365 Notes 376 Introduction 376 1.Reasons 376 2.Values 383 3.Well-Being 386 4.Wrongness and Reasons 390 5.The Structure of Contractualism 394 6.Responsibility 400 7.Promises 403 8.Relativism 407 Appendix 408 Bibliography 410 Index 418

How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.

Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong.

Simon Blackburn

[Scanlon's] discussions are deep and honestand they illuminate many key concepts of moral philosophy: well-beingtrustfriendshiployaltypromises. —The New York Times Book Review

“This magnificent book...opens up a novel, arresting position on matters that have been debated for thousands of years.” —Times Literary SupplementHow do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism. Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? And if it is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? In this reconsideration of moral reasoning, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these enduring questions. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong involves considering what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. Scanlon shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon believes that contracutalism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong According to T. M. Scanlon's contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he demonstrates how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? This text offers answers to these questions, and explores the views and values behind them