What makes the EU viable ? : European integration in the light of the antebellum US experience

drawing On International Relations Theory, Law And Historical Analysis, This Book Compares European Integration With The Antebellum Usa To Assess What Makes The Eu Viable Despite Contestation Over The Rules Of The Game Of Integration. It Reveals That Changing The System Of Representation Is No Shortcut Solution For The Eu's Constitutional Woes. 1.1 Introduction......Page 20 1.2 Viability as defined in relation to the 'Rules of the Game' of politics......Page 21 1.3 Scenarios of viability in a compound polity......Page 28 1.4 The theory of the compound polity and the issue of the units' sovereign status......Page 33 1.5 Comparing the EU with other political systems......Page 37 1.6 Conclusion......Page 44 2.1 Introduction......Page 45 2.2 The attraction of transatlantic comparison......Page 46 2.3 The caesura of the Civil War: The overlooked significance of antebellum political conflict......Page 50 2.4 Comparing viability in the EU and antebellum US: A question of praxis not preconditions......Page 56 2.5 Conclusion: Learning through analogy......Page 64 3.1 Introduction......Page 66 3.2 Viability and the conflict over the rules of the game of politics in the antebellum US......Page 67 3.3 Contesting the rules of the game in the EU ......Page 76 3.3.1 Dual federalism v. joint federalism......Page 79 3.3.2 A constitution for popular government v. a treaty system......Page 80 3.3.3 A project for freedom v. a project for undefined ever closer union......Page 82 3.3.4 A single fault line v. multiple fault lines......Page 83 3.3.5 A party system and Supreme Courtarbitrator v. politics of treaty reform and council arbitration......Page 84 3.4 Conclusion ......Page 86 4.1 Introduction......Page 87 4.2 The construction of the rules of the game of European politics, from the ECSC to the EEC......Page 88 4.2.1 The Coal and Steel Community......Page 89 4.2.2 The European Economic Community......Page 92 4.3 After the EEC: Unexpected constitutionalization(ECJ), the first enlargement (UK) and democratic consolidation (Mediterranean enlargement)......Page 94 4.3.1 The impact of the court on the rules of the game......Page 95 4.3.2 British accession: Opening up the Pandora's box of domestic politics......Page 99 4.3.3 The Mediterranean enlargement round: Defining the Community's democratic values......Page 106 4.4 Maastricht and after: Questioning the purpose and nature of integration......Page 110 4.5 Two steps forward but how many back? European integration's dynamic equilibrium......Page 120 4.6 Conclusion......Page 125 5.1 Introduction......Page 126 5.2 American dual federalism (with the highest functionsof government) v. European joint federalism (with the most numerous)......Page 128 5.3 A constitution for popular government v. a treaty system......Page 131 5.4 A project for freedom (the union as a meansto an end) v. a project for undefined ever closer union (integration as an end in itself )......Page 138 5.5 A single fault line v. multiple fault lines......Page 144 5.6 A party system and Supreme Court arbitrator v. politics of treaty reform and Council arbitration......Page 151 5.7 Conclusion: Recognizing what makes the EU viable......Page 163 6.1 Introduction......Page 165 6.2 Dynamic equilibrium: A self-reinforcing process?......Page 167 6.3 Compound polities and the problem of representing both states and individuals......Page 174 6.4 How to manage the voluntary centralization of representation......Page 182 6.5 The political process needed for justifying voluntary centralization......Page 186 6.6 Conclusion......Page 193 Conclusion: Implications for EU Studies and the Debate over the Future of Integration......Page 195 Applying the insights of this study......Page 197 Notes......Page 202 Bibliography......Page 219 C ......Page 237 E ......Page 238 F ......Page 239 K ......Page 240 N ......Page 241 R ......Page 242 S ......Page 243 U ......Page 244 Z ......Page 245 Drawing on international relations theory, law and historical analysis, this book compares European integration with the antebellum USA to assess what makes the EU viable despite contestation over the rules of the game of integration. It reveals that changing the system of representation is no shortcut solution for the EU's constitutional woes. This book is distinguished by its use of the antebellum US experience as a foil to address the under-explored question of what makes the EU viable. The nature of political conflict in both cases is defined in terms of four contested rules of the game: state sovereignty, federal competences, political representation and decision-making procedures. Hence, viabilty is conceptualized as the ability to find an agreement over these four elements. The analysis shows that, to remain viable, the antebellum USA resorted to an ultimately untenable voluntary centralization of these rules of the game. Conversely, the EU has maintained a dynamic equilibrium, although this is not a self-reinforcing process. The transatlantic contrast is then used to examine proposals for reforming the EU, especially its system of political representation. The comparison reveals that, despite high expectations, changing the system of representation is no shortcut solution for the EU's constitutional woes This book is distinguished by its use of the antebellum US experience as a foil to address the under-explored question of what makes the EU viable. The nature of political conflict is defined in terms of four contested rules of the game: state sovereignty, federal competences, political representation and decision making procedures