Welfare Economics and Antitrust Policy — Vol. II : Mergers, Vertical Practices, Joint Ventures, Internal Growth, and U.S. And E.U. Law

This book is Volume II of a two-volume set on antitrust policy, analyzing the economic efficiency and moral desirability of various kinds of antitrust-policy-coverable conduct and various possible government responses to such conduct, including US and EU antitrust law. The overall study consists of three parts. Part I (Chapters 1-8) introduces readers to the economic, moral, and legal concepts that play important roles in antitrust-policy analysis. Part II (Chapters 9-16) analyzes the impacts of eight types of conduct covered by antitrust policy and various possible government responses to such conduct in terms of their economic efficiency, their impact on liberal moral rights, and their instantiation of various utilitarian and other egalitarian conceptions of the moral good. Part III (Chapters 17-18) provides detailed information on US antitrust law and EU competition law and compares the extent to which―when correctly interpreted and applied―these two bodies of law could increase economic efficiency, protect liberal moral rights, and instantiate various morally defensible conceptions of the moral good. This second volume contains the last 6 chapters of Part II, which focus respectively on horizontal (M&A)s, conglomerate (M&A)s, surrogates for vertical integration, vertical (M&A)s, joint ventures, and internal growth and Part III, which focuses on US antitrust law and EU competition law. The book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students of economics and law who are interested in welfare economics, antitrust policy, and The General Theory of Second Best. Preface Contents Part IIThe Morally-Relevant Effects of Specific Categories of Antitrust-Policy-Coverable Conduct and the Ability of Government to Secure Better Outcomes (Continued) 11 Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions 11.1 The 16 Ways in Which Horizontal (M&A)s Can Increase Their Participants’ Profits 11.1.1 The 8 “Sherman-Act-Licit” Ways in Which Horizontal (M&A)s Can Increase Their Participants’ Profits—That Is, Can Do So Without Increasing Those Profits by Reducing the Absolute Attractiveness of the Most-Attractive Offers Against Which They Will Have to Compete in a Way That Would Render the (M or A) Profitable Even If It Would Have Been Economically Inefficient in an oPp Economy 11.1.2 The 8 Sherman-Act-Illicit Ways in Which a Horizontal (M or A) Can Increase Its Participants’ Profits 11.2 The Determinants of the Amount of Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Will Yield Its Participants in Each of the 16 Ways in Which It Can Yield Them Profits, the Relationship Between Each of These 16 Profit-Yields and the (M or A)’s Associated Impact on Economic Efficiency, the Relevance of the Fact That a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants Profits in Each of the 16 Ways in Which It Can Do So to the (M or A)’s Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness, and the Relevance of the Fact That a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants Profits in Each of the 16 Ways in Which It Can Do So for the (M or A)’s Serving or Disserving the Instantiation of the Various Pure (Utilitarian, Equal-Utility, Equal-Resource, and Other-Equal-Opportunity) and Mixed Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good 11.2.1 Analyses That Relate to Any Static Marginal-Cost Efficiencies a Horizontal (M or A) Generates 11.2.2 Analyses That Relate to Any Static Fixed-Cost Efficiencies a Horizontal (M or A) Generates 11.2.3 Analyses That Relate to Any Dynamic Efficiencies That a Horizontal (M or A) Generates 11.2.4 Analyses That Relate to a Horizontal (M or A)’s Increasing Its Participants’ Profits by Substituting for a Situation in Which No Participant Could Profit by Making a QV or PPR Investment Even Though at Least Two of Them Would Have Found Such an Investment Profitable If It Would Not Have Induced Another Participant to Make an Investment a Situation in Which the Resulting Firm Can Make One Such Investment Without Inducing Anyone to Make Another 11.2.5 Analyses That Relate to a Horizontal (M or A)’s Increasing Its Participants’ Profits by Creating a Resulting Firm Whose Selection of the Investments It Will Make Is Influenced by the Alternative Investments’ Impacts on the Profits Yielded by the Other Projects of All Participants 11.2.6 Analyses That Relate to a Horizontal (M or A)’s Increasing Its Participants’ Profits or Equivalent-Dollar Gains by Enabling the Owner or Owner/Manager of One Participant to Liquidate His or Her Assets and Retire from Management 11.2.7 Analyses That Relate to the Equivalent-Dollar Gains a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by Creating a Resulting Firm That Can Take Advantage of a Tax-Loss Incurred by a Participant That Could Not Use It as a Separate Entity 11.2.8 Analyses That Relate to Any Horizontal (M or A)’s Yielding Its Participants Profits by Enabling Them (and Their Rivals) to Make Additional (Jointly-Profitable) Expenditures on Political Campaigns/Parties/Candidates and Government-Decision-Making-Process Participation 11.2.9 Analyses That Relate to Any Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by Increasing Their HNOPs by Freeing Them From Each Other’s Price-Competition 11.2.10 Analyses That Relate to Any Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by Freeing Them From Each Other’s Investment-Competition 11.2.11 Analyses That Relate to Any Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by Creating a Resulting Firm That Realizes More Profits by Driving Out Extant Rival Investors by Engaging in Predatory Pricing, Predatory Advertizing, or Making Other Predatory Moves Than the Participants Would Have Done as Separate Entities 11.2.12 Analyses That Relate to Any Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by (Predatorily) Critically Increasing the Retaliation Barrier to Entry Faced by an Otherwise-Effective Potential Competitor or the Retaliation Barrier to Expansion Faced by an Otherwise-Effective Established-Firm Potential Investment-Expander 11.2.13 Analyses That Relate to Any Horizontal (M or A)’s Increasing Its Participants’ Profits by Predatorily Inducing an Established Rival to Change the Product-Space Location of an Existing Investment or by Predatorily Inducing an Established Rival or Potential Entrant to Change the Product-Space Location of a New Investment (When the Location-Change Does Not Increase Economic Efficiency) 11.2.14 Analyses That Relate to Any Horizontal (M or A)’s Increasing Its Participants’ Profits by Creating a Resulting Firm That Is Better Able Than the Participants Would Have Been to Increase Their and Their Mutual Rivals’ Across-the Board HNOPs by Altering the Sequence in Which They and Their Mutual Rivals Announce and “Lock Themselves Into” Their Prices 11.3 The Economic Efficiency of Particular Horizontal (M or A)s and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Proposed/Consummated Horizontal (M&A)s 11.3.1 The Economic Efficiency of Particular Horizontal (M&A)s 11.3.2 The Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding in Appropriate Ways to Proposed/Consummated Horizontal (M&A)s 11.4 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Horizontal (M&A)s and the Ability of a Government to Instantiate Its Liberal Justice-Commitments by Responding Appropriately to Horizontal (M&A)s 11.4.1 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Horizontal (M&A)s 11.4.2 The Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Reduce the Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violations Firms Commit When Consummating Horizontal (M&A)s and Operating the Resulting Firms 11.5 The Impact of Horizontal (M&A)s on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Governments to Instantiate These Various Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Proposed and Consummated Horizontal (M&A)s 11.5.1 The Impact of Horizontal (M&A)s on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good 11.5.2 The Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Serve the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Proposed and Consummated Horizontal (M&A)s 11.6 Conclusion References 12 Conglomerate Mergers and Acquisitions 12.1 The Differences in the Ways in Which Conglomerate and Horizontal (M&A)s Can Yield Their Participants Profits and the Relationship Between the Determinants of the Magnitudes of the Impacts That Conglomerate and Horizontal (M&A)s Will Have on Their Participants’ Profits 12.1.1 The Relevant Differences Between Conglomerate and Horizontal (M&A)s When Neither Participant Is an Effective Potential Competitor of the Other 12.1.2 The Relevance of One or Both Participants’ Being an Effective Potential Competitor of the Other to the Profits That a Conglomerate (M or A) Yields Its Participants and the Determinants of the Impacts That a Conglomerate (M or A) Will Have on Its Participants’ Profits by Virtue of One or More Participants’ Being an Effective Potential Competitor of the Other in Various Situations 12.2 The Economic Efficiency of Particular Conglomerate (M or A)s and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Proposed/Consummated Conglomerate (M&A)s 12.2.1 The Economic Efficiency of Particular Conglomerate (M or A)s 12.2.2 The Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Proposed/Consummated Conglomerate (M&A)s 12.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Conglomerate (M or A)s and the Ability of a Government to Instantiate the Liberal Conception of Justice by Responding Appropriately to Proposed/Consummated Conglomerate (M&A)s 12.4 The Impact of Conglomerate (M&A)s on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Instantiate These Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Conglomerate (M&A)s References 13 Surrogates for Vertical Integration 13.1 “Fancy” Pricing-Techniques 13.1.1 The Functions of Fancy Horizontal Pricing-Techniques 13.1.2 The Economic Efficiency of Those Sellers’ That Find It Profitable to Do So Substituting Each Fancy Pricing-Technique I Have Identified for Single Pricing and the Economic Efficiency of the Government’s Deterring the Use of Each Such Type of Fancy Pricing-Technique 13.1.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Substitutions of Fancy Pricing-Techniques for Single Pricing 13.1.4 The Impact of Shifts From Single Pricing to Each of the Various Fancy Pricing-Techniques on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Different Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good 13.2 Tie-Ins and Reciprocity Agreements That Should Not Be Described as Pricing-Techniques 13.2.1 The Functions of “Non-Pricing-Techniques” Tie-Ins and Reciprocity13 13.2.2 The Economic Efficiency of Non-Pricing-Technique Tie-Ins and Reciprocity Agreements and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Increase Economic Efficiency by Deterring Economically-Inefficient Tie-Ins and Reciprocity Agreements 13.2.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Non-Pricing-Technique Tie-Ins and Reciprocity Agreements and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure Liberal-Moral-Rights-Related Interests by Responding Appropriately to Such Tie-Ins and Reciprocity Agreements 13.2.4 The Impact of Non-Pricing-Technique Tying and Reciprocity Agreements on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Various Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Instantiate These Conceptions of the Moral Good by Deterring and Allowing Such Tying and Reciprocity Agreements 13.3 Minimum-Price-Setting-Resale-Price-Maintenance (RPM) Clauses and Vertical-Customer-Allocation (VCA) Clauses That Are Surrogates for Vertical Integration 13.3.1 The Functions of Minimum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses and VCA Clauses That Are Surrogates for Vertical Integration 13.3.2 The Economic Efficiency of Minimum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses and VCA Clauses That Are Surrogates for Vertical Integration and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to a Producer’s Use of Such Vertical-Integration Surrogates 13.3.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Minimum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses and VCA Clauses and the Ability of the Antitrust-Policy-Implementation Authorities of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure Liberal Moral Rights by Responding Appropriately to the Use of Such Clauses 13.3.4 The Impact of Minimum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses and VCA Clauses on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Various Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of a Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Such Clauses 13.4 Maximum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses 13.4.1 The Functions That Maximum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses Can Perform 13.4.2 The Economic Efficiency of Maximum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to a Producer’s Using Such Clauses 13.4.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Maximum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure Liberal Moral Rights by Responding Appropriately to a Producers’ Using Such Clauses 13.4.4 The Impact of a Producer’s Using Maximum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses on Total Utility and the Instantiation of Various Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Instantiate Any Such Conception of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to a Producer’s Use of Maximum-Price-Setting-RPM Clauses 13.5 Single-Brand Exclusive Dealerships 13.5.1 The Functions of Single-Brand Exclusive Dealerships 13.5.2 The Economic Efficiency of Single-Brand Exclusive Dealerships and the Economic Efficiency of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society’s Responding to Single-Brand Exclusive Dealerships in Various Ways 13.5.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Single-Brand Exclusive Dealerships and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure Liberal Moral Rights by Responding Appropriately to the Creation of Such Dealerships 13.5.4 The Impact of Single-Brand Exclusive Dealerships on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Various Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Instantiate These Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Uses of Single-Brand Exclusive Dealerships 13.6 Long-Term Full-Requirements Contracts and Long-Term Total-Output-Supply Contracts 13.6.1 The Functions of Long-Term Full-Requirements Contracts and Long-Term Total-Output-Supply Contracts 13.6.2 The Economic Efficiency of Long-Term Full-Requirements Contracts and Long-Term Total-Output-Supply Contracts and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Them 13.6.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Long-Term Provisions in Full-Requirements Contracts or Total-Output-Supply Contracts and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure Liberal Moral Rights by Responding Appropriately to Such Long-Term Provisions 13.6.4 The Impact of the Inclusion of Long-Term Provisions in Full-Requirements and Total-Output-Supply Contracts on Total Utility and the Instantiation of Various Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Instantiate Various Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to the Inclusion of Such Provisions in Such Contracts References 14 Vertical Mergers and Acquisitions 14.1 The Differences Between the Ways in Which Vertical (M&A)s and Horizontal (M&A)s Can Yield Their Participants Profits 14.2 The Economic Efficiency of (Profitable) Vertical (M&A)s and the Ability of the Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Vertical (M&A)s 14.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Vertical (M&A)s and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure Liberal Moral Rights by Responding Appropriately to Vertical (M&A)s 14.4 The Impact of Profitable Vertical (M&A)s on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Other Pure or Mixed Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Instantiate These Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Profitable Vertical (M&A)s Reference 15 Joint Ventures (and Functionally-Analogous Collaborative Arrangements) 15.1 The Functions of Joint Ventures 15.2 The Economic Efficiency of Joint Ventures and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Joint Ventures 15.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Joint Ventures, Functionally-Analogous Collaborations, and Any Restrictive Provisions Joint-Venture Agreements Contain and the Ability of a Government to Secure Liberal Moral Rights by Responding Appropriately to Such Arrangements and Provisions 15.4 The Impact of Joint Ventures, Functionally-Analogous Collaborative Arrangements, and Any Restrictive Provisions in Joint-Venture Agreements on the Instantiation of Various Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Instantiate Various Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Such Arrangements and Provisions References 16 Internal Growth 16.1 The Functions of Internal Growth 16.2 The Impact of Internal Growth on Economic Efficiency and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Internal Growth 16.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Internal Growth and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure Liberal Moral Rights by Responding Appropriately to Internal Growth 16.4 The Impact of Internal-Growth Investments on the Instantiation of Various Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of the Government of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Based Society to Secure the Instantiation of These Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Internal-Growth Investments References Part IIIThe Economic Efficiency, Liberal Justness, and Non-Liberal-Egalitarian Moral Desirability of U.S. Antitrust Law and E.U. Competition Law, Correctly Interpreted and Applied as a Matter of Law 17 U.S. Antitrust Law and E.U. Competition Law, Correctly Interpreted and Applied as Matters of Law: The Tests of Illegality They Respectively Promulgate and the Business Entities and Conduct to Which Those Tests Respectively Apply 17.1 The Business Entities Covered by, the Tests of Illegality Respectively Promulgated by, and the Conduct Respectively Covered by the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act—The 3 Major Sources of U.S. Federal Antitrust Law 17.1.1 The Test of Illegality Promulgated by and the Conduct-Coverage of the Sherman Act 17.1.2 The Conduct-Coverage of and Test of Illegality Promulgated by the Clayton Act 17.1.3 The Test of Illegality and Conduct-Coverage of the Federal Trade Commission Act 17.2 The Business Entities Respectively Covered by, the Tests of Illegality Respectively Promulgated by, and the Conduct Respectively Covered by What Is Now Article 101 of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, What Is Now Article 102 of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, and the EMCR 17.2.1 Article 101 of What Is Now the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon 17.2.2 Article 102 of What Is Now the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon 17.2.3 The European Merger Control Regulation (EMCR) 17.3 The Relationship Between the Business-Entity Coverages of, the Conduct-Coverage of, and the Tests of Illegality Promulgated Respectively by U.S. Antitrust Law, Correctly Interpreted and Applied, and E.U. Competition Law, Correctly Interpreted and Applied 17.3.1 Contrived-Oligopolistic and Natural-Oligopolistic Conduct 17.3.2 Predatory Conduct 17.3.3 Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions 17.3.4 Conglomerate Mergers and Acquisitions 17.3.5 Surrogates for Vertical Integration 17.3.6 Vertical Mergers and Acquisitions 17.3.7 Joint Ventures and Functionally-Analogous Collaborative Arrangements of Other Sorts (Such as Patent Pools) 17.3.8 Internal Growth References 18 The Differences in the Potentials of U.S. Antitrust Law and E.U. Competition Law as Written to Increase Economic Efficiency, Secure Liberal Moral Rights, and Instantiate Various Utilitarian and Other Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good 18.1 Oligopolistic Conduct: The Differences Between Written U.S. Antitrust Law’s and Written E.U. Competition Law’s Respective Potentials to Increase Economic Efficiency, Secure Liberal Moral Rights, and Instantiate Any Egalitarian Conception of the Moral Good That Are Attributable to Their Disparate Treatments of Oligopolistic Conduct 18.1.1 Natural Oligopolistic Pricing and Contrived-Oligopolistic Pricing 18.1.2 Natural-Oligopolistic Investment-Restrictions and Contrived-Oligopolistic Investment-Restrictions 18.1.3 Contrived-Oligopolistic Conduct That Is Designed to Enable Its Participants to Make a Different Set of Investments That Are Collectively More Economically Efficient as Well as More Profitable Because They Are Less-Economic-Inefficiently-Duplicative 18.1.4 Contrived-Oligopolistic Purchasing 18.2 Predatory Conduct: The Differences (If Any) Between Written U.S. Antitrust Law’s and Written E.U. Competition Law’s Respective Potentials to Increase Economic Efficiency, Secure Liberal Moral Rights, and Serve the Instantiation of any Egalitarian Conception of the Moral Good That Can Be Attributed to Their Disparate Treatments of Predatory Conduct 18.2.1 Predatory Pricing 18.2.2 Predatory Investing 18.2.3 Predatory Advertizing That Is Not Unfairly Competitive 18.2.4 Predatory Unfair Competition 18.2.5 Predatory Refusals to Deal 18.2.6 Allegedly-Predatory Systems Rivalry 18.3 Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions 18.4 Conglomerate Mergers and Acquisitions 18.5 Surrogates for Vertical Integration 18.5.1 Pricing-Techniques 18.5.2 Non-Pricing-Technique Tying and Reciprocity Agreements 18.5.3 Minimum-Price-Setting-RPM, Maximum-Price-Setting-RPM, and Vertical-Customer-Allocation (VCA) Clauses in Distributorship Agreements 18.5.4 Contractual Clauses Obligating Distributors to Place Specific Quantities and/or Qualities of Media Advertizing, to Provide Specified Quantities and/or Qualities of Promotional Displays, to Supply Specified Quantities and Qualities of Salesmanship, to Provide Specified Quantities and Qualities of Shelf-Space, to Provide Specified Repair-and-Maintenance Services (Perhaps Related to Warrantees), and to Use Specified Architectural Layouts and Contractual Clauses in Which a Producer Agrees to Subsidize/(Pay for) Distributor (Expenditures of These Kinds)/(Shelf-Space Allocations) 18.5.5 Sales-Policies: A Producer’s Communicating to Its Distributors Its Intention Not to Renew Their Distributorships If They Do Not Follow Its “Recommendations” and a Producer’s Not Renewing the Distributorships of Distributors That Do Not Follow Its “Recommendations” 18.5.6 Clauses in Distributorship Agreements That Impose Single-Brand Restrictions on the Distributor 18.6 Vertical Mergers and Acquisitions 18.7 Joint Ventures, Functionally-Related Collaborative Arrangements, and Any Restrictive Clauses the Contract That Creates Them Contain 18.8 Internal Growth Conclusion This is a two-volume set on antitrust policy, analyzing the economic efficiency and moral desirability of various tests for antitrust legality, including those promulgated by US and EU antitrust law. The overall study consists of three parts. Part I (Chapters 1-8) introduces readers to the economic, moral, and legal concepts that play important roles in antitrust-policy analysis. Part II (Chapters 9-16) analyzes the impacts of eight types of conduct covered by antitrust policy and various possible government responses to such conduct in terms of economic efficiency, the securing of liberal moral rights, and the instantiation of various utilitarian, non-utilitarian-egalitarian, and mixed conceptions of the moral good. Part III (Chapters 17-18) provides detailed information on US antitrust law and EU competition law, and compares the extent to which -- when correctly interpreted and applied -- these two bodies of law could ensure economic efficiency, protect liberal moral rights, and instantiate various morally defensible conceptions of the moral good. This first volume contains Part I and the first two chapters of Part II of the overall study -- the two chapters that focus on oligopolistic and predatory conduct of all kinds, respectively. These books will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students of economics and law who are interested in welfare economics, antitrust legality and the General Theory of the Second Best