Wednesday's Child : From Heidegger to Affective Neuroscience, a Field Theory of Angst

Philosophy of emotion is a vital topic within contemporary philosophy of mind. Beginning from insights latent in Heidegger's early philosophy, Wednesday's Child is an argument that, with the recognition of a suitable field of consciousness, it ought to be possible to speak scientifically about our non-cognitional and non-volitional but nevertheless rational moods, in particular "that most celebrated mood," namely, Angst. With the emergence of twentieth-century existentialism and its attention to human experience, and with Heidegger's revolutionary insight that an emotional mood such as Angst (long-term anxiety or anguish) has intentionality, the time was ripe for serious phenomenological work on the emotional aspect of our human being. Much more recently, advances in neurological imaging have enabled us to contemplate the phenomenon of human emotion scientifically. At present, the new discipline of social neuroscience affords us a philosophical and scientific opportunity to attend to the emotional aspect of our being, a long-neglected aspect of our humanity. Proceeding from Heidegger's insight regarding the intentionality of moods, this book adumbrates a type of social neuroscience capable of validating Heidegger's understanding of the centrality of Angst for human being. Wednesday's Child concludes with an Afterthought pointing to the religious and non-religious uses of Angst, which the author depicts as a "prime datum" of our human being and includes a glossary, and an appended outline of the book's argument. Beginning From Heidegger's Insight Regarding The Intentionality Of Moods, The Author Argues That, With The Recognition Of A Suitable Field Of Consciousness, It Ought To Be Possible To Speak Scientifically About Non-cognitional And Non-volitional But Nevertheless Rational Moods Within A Type Of Social Neuroscience Capable Of Validating Heidegger's Understanding Of The Centrality Of Angst As A Prime Datum Of Our Human Being. The Author Makes A Case For A Field Theory Validation Of Angst Within A Twenty-first Century Scientific Phenomenology Which, With The Help Of The Scientific Advances Of Neurological Imaging, Affords Us The Philosophical Opportunity To Attend To A Long Neglected Aspect Of Our Phenomenological Condition, And To Assess The Religious And Non-religious Uses Of Angst In Our Phenomenal Experience. From A Feeling Of Angst To A Field Theory Of Consciousness -- Toward An Affective Neuroscience Of Mood -- How The Nood Of Angst Might Be Verified Empirically -- Appendix: The Argument. Gregory P. Schulz. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 131-136).