Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science Book 9470)

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015, held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, in December 2015. The 30 regular papers presented together with 8 abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 142 submissions and cover results on incentives and computation in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics. Front Matter....Pages I-XIX Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations....Pages 1-15 Price Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare?....Pages 16-30 Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing....Pages 31-45 The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments....Pages 46-59 Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction....Pages 60-73 Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks....Pages 74-88 New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem....Pages 89-103 Ad Exchange: Envy-Free Auctions with Mediators....Pages 104-117 Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing Cost Functions....Pages 118-131 On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games....Pages 132-145 Impartial Selection and the Power of up to Two Choices....Pages 146-158 Online Allocation and Pricing with Economies of Scale....Pages 159-172 Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms....Pages 173-186 Testing Consumer Rationality Using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs....Pages 187-200 Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games....Pages 201-215 Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction....Pages 216-229 Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities....Pages 230-243 The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games....Pages 244-257 Adaptive Rumor Spreading....Pages 258-271 Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games....Pages 272-285 Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium....Pages 286-299 Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets....Pages 300-313 Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players....Pages 314-327 The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling....Pages 328-342 Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games....Pages 343-356 Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money....Pages 357-369 Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands....Pages 370-383 Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation....Pages 384-397 Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities in Succinct Games....Pages 398-412 Back Matter....Pages 413-427 ....Pages 429-442