Wartime economic planning in agriculture : a study in the allocation of resources

UNFORTUNATELY, not even at this late date can the serious food problems discussed in this study be dismissed as a closed chapter in war and early post-war history. Shortages rooted in wartime developments remain a continuing source of economic dislocations, political instability and human want. Indeed, there was little cause for astonishment in the finding of the United Nations' department of economic affairs, as reported in the New York Times for February 5, 1948, that shortages of food were " the world's number one economic problem." Six months later, The New Statesman and Nation for August 7 warned that food stringencies represent a problem transcending in importance those reflected in more spectacular current news headlines, and added that: . . . the pressure of hunger breeds restlessness and discontent, manifest throughout the world today. Those are the greater realities. They are with us in the continuing threat of famine, in a world not yet brought back to pre-war levels of food production, with 100,000,000 more mouths to feed. They press upon us increasingly year after year.... Everywhere, east and west of the Iron Curtain, the need to cope with the food problem is insistent. ## PREFACE 7 Above all, the writer owes to Professor Robert S. Lynd of Columbia University a debt greater than can be caught up here in words-as longtime teacher and friend, as an editor with hob-nailed boots, and as a social scientist in the forefront of efforts to bring social research closer to the tumultuous realities of current living. BELA GOLD ## UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH JANUARY 15, 1949 increases in agricultural production were not made until the spring of 1941, however, after Congressional approval of the Lend-Lease Act, with its promise of greater immediate export outlets. On April 3, 1941, the Department of Agriculture announced a cautious plan to stimulate the production of certain livestock products and of a few crops by encouraging price advances and offering stipulated minimum price supports for dairy products, hogs, chickens and eggs up to June 30, 1943. 4 How limited was the conception of prospective food requirements even at this time is apparent from Secretary Wickard's confident prediction two weeks later that, " With our ability to produce, there isn't the slightest need for rationing and there isn't likely to be. American consumers should be able to buy all they want when they want it." 6 Indeed, although the April announcement may be clearly identified on the basis of hindsight as a forerunner of later programs directed toward expansion, it was not until the fall of 1941, two years after the outbreak of the war and on the eve of our own involvement, that the Department of Agriculture committed itself unequivocally to a continuing program of wartime mobilization by launching the " Food for Freedom " drive and publicizing its comprehensive array of specific agricultural goals for 1942. (3) The development and execution of agricultural mobilization measures was also powerfully influenced by the ominous uncertainty of post-war economic prospects. From the outset many farmers, legislators and government officials appeared to be almost as deeply preoccupied with PREFACE TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES PART A. STRATEGIC TASKS OF AGRICULTURAL MOBILIZATION CHAPTER I. THE WARTIME CHALLENGE TO ECONOMIC PLANNING CHAPTER II. FOOD SHORTAGES ABROAD PART Β. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES CHAPTER III. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT CHAPTER IV. UTILIZATION OF LAND RESOURCES CHAPTER V. UTILIZATION OF LIVESTOCK RESOURCES CHAPTER VI. AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER CHAPTER VII. FARM MACHINERY CHAPTER VIII. FERTILIZERS CHAPTER IX. OTHER PRODUCTIVE RESOURCES PART C. DISTRIBUTION OF U. S. FOOD SUPPLIES CHAPTER Χ. SHARING WITH OUR ALLIES CHAPTER XI. DOMESTIC CIVILIAN CONSUMPTION CHAPTER XII. FOOD DISTRIBUTION CHAPTER XIII. PRICE POLICY, INFLATION CONTROL AND MOBILIZATION PART D. THE ADEQUACY OF AGRICULTURAL MOBILIZATION CHAPTER XIV. FOOD SHORTAGE EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES CHAPTER XV. AFTERMATH PART E. CONFLICTING PRESSURES AND PRACTICAL ECONOMIC PLANNING CHAPTER XVI. PLANNING OBJECTIVES AND THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY CHAPTER XVII. PLANNING AND EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL PRESSURES CHAPTER XVIII. PLANNING AND INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS CHAPTER XIX. SOME REQUIREMENTS OF MORE EFFECTIVE PLANNING INDEX