War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy (Israeli History, Politics, and Society)
معرفی کتاب «War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy (Israeli History, Politics, and Society)» نوشتهٔ David Tal, (Historian)، منتشرشده توسط نشر Routledge در سال 2004. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.
Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was only in the wake of the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 that active military intervention was considered. The Arab League tried to form a unified army that would prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, but failed. In Egypt, the government and the army opposed the idea of dispatching an expeditionary force to Palestine, but the pressure of public opinion and King Farouq's insistence carried the day. The order was given and in May 1948, Egyptian forces crossed the international border with Palestine. The author analyses the reasons for the decisive victory enjoyed by Israel over a larger opponent; and the successes and failures that were sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in March 1948. "War in Palestine 1948: Strategy and diplomacy sheds new light on one of the most decisive moments in Arab-Israeli relations an the series of events that were to decide the modern borders of Israel." "Arab involvement in the Israeli-Palestine conflict had begun during the late 1930s, but military intervention was not considered until November 1947, when the United Nations passed its Partition Resolution to divide Palestine into two states: one Palestinian and the other Jewish. At a time when decisive action was badly needed, the Arab states were divided, both among themselves and internally. The Arab League tried to form a unified army to prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, and failed: even the government and army of the strongest Arab nation, Egypt, were opposed to the idea of sending a force to Palestine. However, the pressure of public opinion and the insistence of King Farouq carried the day and on 15 May 1948 Egyptian forces crossed the borders into Palestine. There was no resistance. Israeli forces were preoccupied with securing territory allotted to the new Israeli State by the UN and with the battle for the road to Jerusalem. The Israeli-Egyptian Front was a low priority. Farouq's forces penetrated as far as the UN-designated Palestine-Israel border, then stopped." "Against all expectations, the state of Israel did not collapse in the face of its larger and more powerful opponent. Dr. Tal examines the reasons behind the new state's victories against Egypt, as well as its failures, which were decisive in delimiting Israel's borders, finally sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, signed on Rhodes in March 1948."--BOOK JACKET Book Cover 1 Title 4 Contents 5 Acknowledgements 10 Abbreviations 11 Maps 12 Introduction 16 Towards Invasion 22 Communal War 56 Invasion 160 The Egyptian Invasion of Palestine: From Containment to the First Truce 184 The Israeli;Jordanian Front, 15 May 10 June 216 The Palestine Northern Front, 15 May 10 June 262 The First Truce 284 Ten Days of Fighting: The Egyptian;Israeli Front 306 Ten Days of Fighting: The Israeli;Jordanian Front 318 Ten Days of Fighting: The Northern Front 348 The Second Truce: Days of Diplomacy and Military Preparation 360 The Egyptian;Israeli Front: The Decisive Campaigns, I 388 Jordan;Israel: A Permanent Cease-Fire Agreement 416 The Northern Campaign: The Decisive Stage 432 The Egyptian;Israeli Front: The Decisive Campaigns, II 444 Conclusion 484 Select bibliography 492 Index 500 Interdisciplinary Studies
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