Vygotsky and cognitive science : language and the unification of the social and computational mind

Is a human being a person or a machine? Is the mind a social construction or a formal device? It is both, William Frawley tells us, and by bringing together Vygotsky's sociocultural theory of the mind and cognitive science's computational model, he shows us how this not only can but must be. To do so, Frawley focuses on language, particularly on how the computational mind uses language to mediate the internal and the external during thought. By reconciling the linguistic device and the linguistic person, he argues for a Vygotskyan cognitive science. Frawley begins by exploding the internalist/externalist dichotomy that presently drives cognitive science and falsely pits computationalism against socioculturalism. He replaces the reigning Platonic paradigm of computational mind-science with a framework based on an unusual, unified account of Wittgenstein, thus setting the stage for a Vygotskyan cognitive science centered on three aspects of mind: subjectivity, real-time operation, and breakdown. In this context, he demonstrates how computational psychology accommodates a critical aspect of Vygotskyan theory--private speech--as the mind's metacomputational regulator. An examination of certain congenital disorders (such as Williams Syndrome, Turner Syndrome, and autism) that disrupt speech further clarifies the issue of computational and cognitive control. Is A Human Being A Person Or A Machine? Is The Mind A Social Construction Or A Formal Device? It Is Both, William Frawley Tells Us, And By Bringing Together Vygotsky's Sociocultural Theory Of The Mind And Cognitive Science's Computational Model, He Shows Us How This Not Only Can But Must Be. To Do So, Frawley Focuses On Language, Particularly On How The Computational Mind Uses Language To Mediate The Internal And External Worlds During Thought. By Reconciling The Linguistic Device And The Linguistic Person, His Book Argues For A Vygotskyan Cognitive Science. Frawley Begins By Exploding The Internalist/externalist Dichotomy That Presently Drives Cognitive Science And Falsely Pits Computationalism Against Socioculturalism. He Replaces The Reigning Platonic Paradigm Of Computational Mind-science With A Framework Based On An Unusual Account Of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Struggle. He Thus Sets The Stage For A Vygotskyan Cognitive Science Centered On Three Aspects Of Mind: Subjectivity, Real-time Operation, And Breakdown. In This Context, He Demonstrates That A Critical Aspect Of Vygotskyan Theory - Private Speech - Can Be Understood As The Mind's Metacomputational Regulator. An Examination Of Certain Congenital Disorders (such As Williams Syndrome, Turner Syndrome, And Autism) That Disrupt Speech Further Clarifies The Issue Of Computational And Cognitive Control. 1. Internalism And The Ideology Of Cognitive Science. 1.1. Luria's Peasant And The Frame Problem. 1.2. The Deprivileging Of External Causes. 1.3. Luria's Peasant, Again (and Fodor On Vygotsky). 1.4. Vygotsky And The Frame Problem -- 2. From Plato's Problem To Wittgenstein's Problem. 2.1. Plato's Answer: The Inward Turn. 2.2. Universal Grammars. 2.3. Troubles In Paradise. 2.4. Wittgenstein's Problem -- 3. Architectures And Contexts: Unifying Computational And Cultural Psycholinguistics. 3.1. Incommensurablity And Unity. 3.2. Cognitive Science: A Primer. 3.3. Vygotskyan Theory: A Primer. 3.4. Architectures And Contexts: Three Prospects For Unity -- 4. Subjectivity: Consciousness And Metaconsciousness. 4.1. Consciousness Regained. William Frawley. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 293-319) And Index. Review text: A clear and witty writer, Frawley has a rare ability to explain honestly and carefully the views of scholars that he disagrees with, and an excellent grasp of the literature within philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. Professor Frawley's book is a major accomplishment--fascinating, compelling, and accessible. It brings together Vygotskian studies and major segments of cognitive science in a way that many have thought important to do but no one has succeeded in accomplishing. At many points the level and breadth of coverage is breathtaking. Frawley reminds us of the continuing relevance of early Soviet psychology to the understanding of cognitive development and attempts to unite this with modern-day (western) computationalism ... [He] begins his quest for unification with a thorough, and frequently masterful survey of the background terrain. The breadth of coverage is impressive ... [and his] arguments concerning consciousness and meta-consciousness are compelling ... Frawley has presented a coherent position that modern cognitive science cannot ignore Contents Acknowledgments Introduction I Foundations for Unification 1 Internalism and the Ideology of Cognitive Science 2 From Plato’s Problem to Wittgenstein’s Problem 3 Architectures and Contexts: Unifying Computational and Cultural Psycholinguistics II Three Unities 4 Subjectivity: Consciousness and Metaconsciousness 5 Control and the Language for Thought 6 Control Disorders: Splitting the Computational from the Social Epilogue: Is Everything Cognitive Science? Notes Bibliography Index Attempting to prove that the human mind is both a social construct and a computational device, as opposed to one or the other, linguistics expert William Frawley focuses on language and reconciles the linguistic device (the mind) and the linguistic person. He presents an examination of certain congenital disorders, like autism, that disrupt speech to clarify the issue of computational AND cognitive control. Is a human being a person or a machine? Is the mind a social construction or a formal device? It is both, William Frawley argues, and by bringing together Vygotsky's sociocultural theory of the mind and cognitive science's computational model, he shows how this not only can, but must be Biographical note: FrawleyWilliam: William Frawley is Professor and Chair of the Department of Linguistics at the University of Delaware, where he is also Director of Cognitive Science