Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

This book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply throw the "rascals out of office" because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of "electoral autocracies," among the most common type of autocracy today, and the factors that lead to the transformation of autocratic elections into democratic ones. This book is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Contents......Page 9 Acknowledgments......Page 11 Introduction......Page 15 The Point of Departure and the Dependent Variable of the Book......Page 17 Survival Through Electoral Fraud ?......Page 18 The Role of Elections in Autocratic Regimes......Page 21 Alternative Theories of Hegemonic-Party Survival......Page 24 My Theory of Hegemonic-Party Survival......Page 29 Elite Unity......Page 30 Electoral Support......Page 33 Opposition's Coordination Dilemmas......Page 38 The Process of Democratization......Page 42 Why Mexico, and What Is New about This Book?......Page 44 Defining Hegemonic-Party Autocracies and the Universe of Cases in the World......Page 46 Plan of the Book......Page 56 Elite Divisions and the Golden Years of the PRI......Page 58 Modeling Electoral Support in Autocracies......Page 69 A Bayesian Logic of Learning and the Economic History of the Regime......Page 70 The Punishment Regime: Side Payments and Deterrence......Page 78 The Calculus of Voting and the Trade-off between Ideology and Transfers......Page 82 The Autocrats' Optimal Strategy: Economic Growth and Poverty Traps......Page 86 Mass Coordination Dilemmas......Page 87 The Game of Fraud and Expectations of Post-electoral Violence......Page 90 Conclusion......Page 93 Economic Performance and Support for the PRI......Page 96 Modernization and the Decline in the PRI's Support......Page 99 Poverty and the Partisan Distribution of Municipalities......Page 102 Opposition Entry in Local Elections......Page 103 The North-South Division, Trade Liberalization, and Remitances......Page 109 Conclusion......Page 111 3 Budget Cycles under PRI Hegemony......Page 112 Existing Literature on Electoral Business Cycles......Page 113 Increased Spending by a Lame Duck and Presidencialismo in Mexico......Page 115 Budget Cycles, 1938-2000......Page 116 1970-2000: Macroeconomic Instability and the Shift toward Neoliberalism......Page 123 Achilles’ Heel of the Mexican Political Economy: Exchange Rate Cycles and the Presidential Succession, 1970–2000......Page 128 A Boom-and-Bust Economy and the Electoral Cycle......Page 131 Conclusion......Page 133 4 The Politics of Vote Buying......Page 136 Failing Corporatism and the Introduction of PRONASOL......Page 139 The Mechanics of PRONASOL: Theoretical and Empirical Controversies in the Literature......Page 141 Model Specification, Independent Variables, and Hypotheses......Page 145 Explaining PRONASOL: Alternative Hypotheses......Page 149 The Political Effectiveness of PRONASOL......Page 158 Conclusion......Page 163 5 Judging Economic Performance in Hard Times......Page 165 The Economic Background......Page 168 The 1994 Peso Crisis and Its Aftermath......Page 170 Existing Research on Presidential Approval in Mexico......Page 173 The Approval Time Series, 1988-2000......Page 176 Presidential Approval and the Economy......Page 177 Presidential Approval and Income......Page 180 The Zedillo Paradox: Intertemporal Weakness of Will and Electoral Opportunism......Page 182 Effects of Perceptionson Presidential Approval......Page 185 Effects of Economic Conditionson Expectations about the Future......Page 187 6 Ideological Divisions in the Opposition Camp......Page 189 Coordination Dilemmas and Party Dominance......Page 190 Policy Issue Positions of the Three Major Parties......Page 194 Economic Issues......Page 195 Political Issues......Page 197 Value-Related Issues......Page 199 Voting Choices......Page 202 Conclusion......Page 205 The Context of the Elections......Page 207 Expected Economic Performance......Page 210 Voter Coordination Dilemmas......Page 212 The Economy and the Voters' Comparative Prospective Assessments......Page 214 Voting Choices in the 1994, 1997, and 2000 Elections......Page 221 Punishment and Peasants......Page 227 Policy Issues......Page 228 Voter Coordination and Perceptions that the PRI Could Be Defeated......Page 231 Simulated Probabilities of Strategic Voting among Opposition Voters......Page 232 Strategic Defections from the PRI......Page 236 Conclusions......Page 238 8 Electoral Fraud and the Game of Electoral Transitions......Page 241 Electoral Fraud and the Game of "Electoral Transitions"......Page 242 Authoritarian Equilibrium with Electoral Fraud......Page 247 The Role of Public Information about Electoral Outcomes......Page 250 Endogenous Institutional Change and Delegation to an Independent Electoral Commission......Page 251 The 1988 Electoral Fraud and the Opposition's Coordination Dilemma......Page 253 The Creation of an Independent IFE......Page 257 Voters' Understanding of the Transition Game: Evidence from the 1994 Presidential Elections......Page 259 Modeling Voters’ Expectations for Post-Electoral Violence......Page 264 The PRI's Peaceful Defeat in the 2000 Elections......Page 266 Elections under Autocracy......Page 271 Autocratic Institutions and the Endogeneity of the Constitution......Page 273 Modernization, Economic Growth, and Authoritarian Demise......Page 275 Opposition Coordination and the Formation of Electoral Fronts......Page 277 Electoral Malpractice and the Game of Fraud......Page 280 The Creation of an Independent Electoral Commission and the Transition......Page 282 The Resiliency of Electoral Autocracies......Page 284 References......Page 287 Index......Page 305 9780521862479 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Series-title 5 Title 7 Copyright 8 Contents 9 Acknowledgments 11 Introduction 15 The Point of Departure and the Dependent Variable of the Book 17 Survival Through Electoral Fraud ? 18 The Role of Elections in Autocratic Regimes 21 Alternative Theories of Hegemonic-Party Survival 24 My Theory of Hegemonic-Party Survival 29 Elite Unity 30 Electoral Support 33 Opposition's Coordination Dilemmas 38 The Process of Democratization 42 Why Mexico, and What Is New about This Book? 44 Defining Hegemonic-Party Autocracies and the Universe of Cases in the World 46 Plan of the Book 56 1 Equilibrium Party Hegemony 58 Elite Divisions and the Golden Years of the PRI 58 Modeling Electoral Support in Autocracies 69 A Bayesian Logic of Learning and the Economic History of the Regime 70 The Punishment Regime: Side Payments and Deterrence 78 The Calculus of Voting and the Trade-off between Ideology and Transfers 82 The Autocrats' Optimal Strategy: Economic Growth and Poverty Traps 86 Mass Coordination Dilemmas 87 The Game of Fraud and Expectations of Post-electoral Violence 90 Conclusion 93 2 Structural Determinants of Mass Support for the PRI 96 Economic Performance and Support for the PRI 96 Modernization and the Decline in the PRI's Support 99 Poverty and the Partisan Distribution of Municipalities 102 Opposition Entry in Local Elections 103 The North-South Division, Trade Liberalization, and Remitances 109 Conclusion 111 3 Budget Cycles under PRI Hegemony 112 Existing Literature on Electoral Business Cycles 113 Increased Spending by a Lame Duck and Presidencialismo in Mexico 115 Budget Cycles, 1938-2000 116 1970-2000: Macroeconomic Instability and the Shift toward Neoliberalism 123 Achilles’ Heel of the Mexican Political Economy: Exchange Rate Cycles and the Presidential Succession, 1970–2000 128 A Boom-and-Bust Economy and the Electoral Cycle 131 Conclusion 133 4 The Politics of Vote Buying 136 Failing Corporatism and the Introduction of PRONASOL 139 The Mechanics of PRONASOL: Theoretical and Empirical Controversies in the Literature 141 The Political Logic of PRONASOL 145 Model Specification, Independent Variables, and Hypotheses 145 Explaining PRONASOL: Alternative Hypotheses 149 The Political Effectiveness of PRONASOL 158 Conclusion 163 5 Judging Economic Performance in Hard Times 165 The Economic Background 168 The 1994 Peso Crisis and Its Aftermath 170 Existing Research on Presidential Approval in Mexico 173 The Approval Time Series, 1988-2000 176 Presidential Approval and the Economy 177 Presidential Approval and Income 180 The Zedillo Paradox: Intertemporal Weakness of Will and Electoral Opportunism 182 Effects of Perceptionson Presidential Approval 185 Effects of Economic Conditionson Expectations about the Future 187 6 Ideological Divisions in the Opposition Camp 189 Coordination Dilemmas and Party Dominance 190 Policy Issue Positions of the Three Major Parties 194 Economic Issues 195 Political Issues 197 Value-Related Issues 199 Voting Choices 202 Conclusion 205 7 How Voters Choose and Mass Coordination Dilemmas 207 The Context of the Elections 207 Modeling Voting Choices and Hypotheses 210 Expected Economic Performance 210 Expected Government Transfers 212 Voter Coordination Dilemmas 212 The Economy and the Voters' Comparative Prospective Assessments 214 Voting Choices in the 1994, 1997, and 2000 Elections 221 The Economy and the Vote 227 Punishment and Peasants 227 Policy Issues 228 Voter Coordination and Perceptions that the PRI Could Be Defeated 231 Simulated Probabilities of Strategic Voting among Opposition Voters 232 Strategic Defections from the PRI 236 Conclusions 238 8 Electoral Fraud and the Game of Electoral Transitions 241 Electoral Fraud and the Game of "Electoral Transitions" 242 Authoritarian Equilibrium with Electoral Fraud 247 The Role of Public Information about Electoral Outcomes 250 Endogenous Institutional Change and Delegation to an Independent Electoral Commission 251 The 1988 Electoral Fraud and the Opposition's Coordination Dilemma 253 The Creation of an Independent IFE 257 Voters' Understanding of the Transition Game: Evidence from the 1994 Presidential Elections 259 Modeling Voters’ Expectations for Post-Electoral Violence 264 The PRI's Peaceful Defeat in the 2000 Elections 266 9 Conclusion 271 Elections under Autocracy 271 Autocratic Institutions and the Endogeneity of the Constitution 273 Modernization, Economic Growth, and Authoritarian Demise 275 Opposition Coordination and the Formation of Electoral Fronts 277 Electoral Malpractice and the Game of Fraud 280 The Creation of an Independent Electoral Commission and the Transition 282 The Resiliency of Electoral Autocracies 284 References 287 Index 305 #,Publisher:,Cambridge,University,Press,#,Number,Of,Pages:,312,#,Publication,Date:,2006-09-04 This 2006 book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply 'throw the rascals out of office' because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of 'electoral autocracies', among the most common type of autocracy, and is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy. "Most autocracies today hold elections. Yet the role of autocratic elections and the behavior of voters and parties in these regimes often appear puzzling. Through the use of simple formal theory, quantitative analysis, and historic narrative, this book develops a broadly comparative theory of the survival and demise of "electoral autocracies" and the strategies they use to resolve intraparty conflict, divide and deter elite opponents, and win political loyalty from the masses. The book illustrates the theory with an analysis of the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes of the twentieth century."-- Jaquette "Most autocracies today hold elections. Yet the role of autocratic elections and the behavior of voters and parties in these regimes often appear puzzling. Through the use of simple formal theory, quantitative analysis, and historic narrative, this book develops a broadly comparative theory of the survival and demise of "electoral autocracies" and the strategies they use to resolve intraparty conflict, divide and deter elite opponents, and win political loyalty from the masses. The book illustrates the theory with an analysis of the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes of the twentieth century."--Jacket