Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Why do ethnic riots break out when and where they do? Why do some governments try to prevent ethnic riots while others do nothing or even participate in the violence? In this book Steven I. Wilkinson uses newly collected data on Hindu-Muslim riots, socio-economic factors and competitive politics in India to test his theory that riots are fomented in order to win elections and that governments decide whether to stop them or not based on the likely electoral cost of doing so. He finds that electoral factors account for most of the state-level variation in Hindu-Muslim riots: explaining for example why riots took place in Gujarat in 2002 but not in many other states where militants tried to foment violence. The general electoral theory he develops for India is extended to Ireland, Malaysia and Romania as Wilkinson shows that similar political factors motivate ethnic violence in many different countries. Half-title......Page 2 Series-title......Page 4 Title......Page 6 Copyright......Page 7 Contents......Page 8 Figures......Page 9 Tables......Page 10 Acknowledgments......Page 12 1 The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence......Page 16 The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence......Page 19 Testing the Electoral Incentives Explanation......Page 24 The Importance of Understanding Hindu-Muslim Violence......Page 27 Plan of the Book......Page 31 2 Explaining Town-Level Variation in Hindu-Muslim Violence......Page 34 The Importance of Local Electoral Incentives......Page 35 An Electoral Incentives Model of Ethnic Riot Occurrence......Page 36 The Economic Division of Labor Hypothesis......Page 41 The Demographic Balance–Security Dilemma Hypothesis......Page 47 The Embittered Refugee Hypothesis......Page 48 The Violence-Begets-Violence Hypothesis......Page 50 Testing the Theories......Page 52 Testing the Economic Competition Hypothesis......Page 55 Measures of Town-Level Electoral Competition......Page 56 Statistical Model......Page 57 Qualitative Evidence on the Relationship between Electoral Competition and Violence......Page 62 Electoral Effects of Town-Level Mobilization......Page 64 Alternative Hypotheses Not Tested: Institutional Riot Mechanisms and Civic Engagement......Page 67 Which Level of Analysis: Town or State?......Page 72 3 State Capacity Explanations for Hindu-Muslim Violence......Page 78 The Structure of Local Law Enforcement in India......Page 80 State Autonomy, State Capacity, and Hindu-Muslim Violence......Page 84 The Decline of State Autonomy and State Capacity......Page 86 The Decline of State Institutional Autonomy......Page 88 The Decline of State Capacity......Page 94 Are Growing State Weakness and Hindu-Muslim Violence Related?......Page 100 State Capacity......Page 101 Conclusion......Page 109 4 The Consociational Explanation for Hindu-Muslim Violence......Page 112 India as a Test Case for Consociational Theory......Page 113 When Was India Consociational?......Page 117 India from 1919 to 1947: A Consociational State......Page 118 The End of Ethnic Proportionality......Page 123 The Loss of Cultural Autonomy......Page 129 Overruling the Minority Veto......Page 133 Were Congress Governments Grand Coalitions?......Page 137 India since the Mid-1960s: Increasingly Consociational......Page 138 Consociationalism, Congress Decline, and Communal Violence......Page 141 Conclusion......Page 149 5 The Electoral Incentives for Hindu-Muslim Violence......Page 152 Electoral Competition and the Supply of State Protection for Minorities......Page 153 Why Should Minorities Benefit from High Levels of Party Fractionalization?......Page 155 How Do Indian States Fit the Model?......Page 157 Testing for the Observable Implications of the Model......Page 161 Party Competition and Riot Prevention......Page 162 Discussion of Regression Results......Page 165 Party Competition, Minority Support, and State Riot Prevention......Page 169 How Electoral Competition Affects Riot Prevention......Page 175 Varanasi, November 8–11, 1991......Page 176 Mathura, 1995......Page 180 Conclusion......Page 184 6 Party Competition and Hindu-Muslim Violence......Page 187 Does Ethnic Fractionalization Explain Party Fractionalization?......Page 189 Preindependence Caste Mobilization in Travancore and Cochin......Page 192 Postindependence Ethnic Politics in Kerala......Page 195 The Effects of Party Fractionalization in Kerala......Page 200 Caste Mobilization in Preindependence Madras......Page 204 Postindependence Politics in Tamil Nadu......Page 207 Hindu-Muslim Violence in Tamil Nadu......Page 209 Caste Mobilization before Independence......Page 211 Postindependence Politics......Page 212 Hindu-Muslim Violence in Bihar......Page 214 Conclusion......Page 217 7 The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence in Comparative Perspective......Page 219 Franchise Reform and Ethnic Riots in the First Wave......Page 222 Protestant-Catholic Riots in 19th-Century Britain......Page 226 Postcolonial Responses to Growing Interethnic Political Competition......Page 234 Malay-Chinese Riots in Malaysia......Page 235 Transitions from Communist Rule in Eastern Europe......Page 240 Romanian-Hungarian Violence in Post-Ceaucescu Romania......Page 241 Conclusion......Page 247 8 Democracy and Ethnic Violence......Page 251 Problems with the Existing Data......Page 258 Improving Our Data on Hindu-Muslim Riots......Page 261 British Parliamentary Papers......Page 265 Manuscripts: Files on Princely States......Page 266 Secondary Sources......Page 267 Dissertations......Page 268 Fields and Entry Protocol......Page 270 Village......Page 271 Appendix C: Additional Results from Statistical Tables......Page 278 Published Government Documents......Page 282 Books and Articles......Page 285 Index......Page 298 ISBN-13: 9780521829168 Half-title 2 Series-title 4 Title 6 Copyright 7 Contents 8 Figures 9 Tables 10 Acknowledgments 12 1 The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence 16 The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence 19 Testing the Electoral Incentives Explanation 24 The Importance of Understanding Hindu-Muslim Violence 27 Plan of the Book 31 2 Explaining Town-Level Variation in Hindu-Muslim Violence 34 The Importance of Local Electoral Incentives 35 An Electoral Incentives Model of Ethnic Riot Occurrence 36 Alternative Explanations for Town-Level Riot Variation 41 The Economic Division of Labor Hypothesis 41 The Demographic Balance–Security Dilemma Hypothesis 47 The Embittered Refugee Hypothesis 48 The Violence-Begets-Violence Hypothesis 50 Testing the Theories 52 Testing the Economic Competition Hypothesis 55 Measures of Town-Level Electoral Competition 56 Statistical Model 57 Qualitative Evidence on the Relationship between Electoral Competition and Violence 62 Electoral Effects of Town-Level Mobilization 64 Alternative Hypotheses Not Tested: Institutional Riot Mechanisms and Civic Engagement 67 Which Level of Analysis: Town or State? 72 3 State Capacity Explanations for Hindu-Muslim Violence 78 The Structure of Local Law Enforcement in India 80 State Autonomy, State Capacity, and Hindu-Muslim Violence 84 The Decline of State Autonomy and State Capacity 86 The Decline of State Institutional Autonomy 88 The Decline of State Capacity 94 Are Growing State Weakness and Hindu-Muslim Violence Related? 100 State Capacity 101 Conclusion 109 4 The Consociational Explanation for Hindu-Muslim Violence 112 India as a Test Case for Consociational Theory 113 When Was India Consociational? 117 India from 1919 to 1947: A Consociational State 118 India from 1947 to 1966: A Nonconsociational State 123 The End of Ethnic Proportionality 123 The Loss of Cultural Autonomy 129 Overruling the Minority Veto 133 Were Congress Governments Grand Coalitions? 137 India since the Mid-1960s: Increasingly Consociational 138 Consociationalism, Congress Decline, and Communal Violence 141 Conclusion 149 5 The Electoral Incentives for Hindu-Muslim Violence 152 Electoral Competition and the Supply of State Protection for Minorities 153 Why Should Minorities Benefit from High Levels of Party Fractionalization? 155 How Do Indian States Fit the Model? 157 Testing for the Observable Implications of the Model 161 Party Competition and Riot Prevention 162 Discussion of Regression Results 165 Party Competition, Minority Support, and State Riot Prevention 169 How Electoral Competition Affects Riot Prevention 175 Varanasi, November 8–11, 1991 176 Mathura, 1995 180 Conclusion 184 6 Party Competition and Hindu-Muslim Violence 187 Does Ethnic Fractionalization Explain Party Fractionalization? 189 Kerala: The Institutional Origins of Party Fractionalization 192 Preindependence Caste Mobilization in Travancore and Cochin 192 Postindependence Ethnic Politics in Kerala 195 The Effects of Party Fractionalization in Kerala 200 Tamil Nadu: Caste Polarization and Hindu-Muslim Peace 204 Caste Mobilization in Preindependence Madras 204 Postindependence Politics in Tamil Nadu 207 Hindu-Muslim Violence in Tamil Nadu 209 Bihar: Delayed Lower-Caste Mobilization 211 Caste Mobilization before Independence 211 Postindependence Politics 212 Hindu-Muslim Violence in Bihar 214 Conclusion 217 7 The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence in Comparative Perspective 219 Franchise Reform and Ethnic Riots in the First Wave 222 Protestant-Catholic Riots in 19th-Century Britain 226 Postcolonial Responses to Growing Interethnic Political Competition 234 Malay-Chinese Riots in Malaysia 235 Transitions from Communist Rule in Eastern Europe 240 Romanian-Hungarian Violence in Post-Ceaucescu Romania 241 Conclusion 247 8 Democracy and Ethnic Violence 251 Appendix A: Data Sources for Hindu-Muslim Riots 258 Problems with the Existing Data 258 Improving Our Data on Hindu-Muslim Riots 261 Database Sources Used in This Book 265 British Parliamentary Papers 265 India Office Records, London 266 Books/Official Publications 266 Manuscripts: Files on British India 266 Manuscripts: Files on Princely States 266 Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow 267 Miscellaneous Records 267 General Administration Department Files (GAD) 267 Indian Government Publications 267 Indian and British Newspapers 267 Secondary Sources 267 Dissertations 268 Appendix B: Data-Entering Protocol for Riot Database 270 Basic Entering Groundrules 270 Fields and Entry Protocol 270 Village 271 Appendix C: Additional Results from Statistical Tables 278 References 282 Archives 282 India Office Library, London (IOR) 282 Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow (UPSA) 282 Private Collections 282 Published Government Documents 282 Books and Articles 285 Index 298 "Why does ethnic violence break out in some places and not others? More important, why do some governments try to prevent antiminority riots while others do nothing, or even actively encourage attacks? This book answers these questions through a detailed study of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, as well as case studies of Ireland, Malaysia, and Romania. It shows how electoral incentives at two levels interact to explain both where violence breaks out and, more importantly, why some states decide to prevent mass violence and others do not. While developing this electoral incentives model, the author shows why several alternative explanations for ethnic violence - focusing on town-level social and economical factors, the weak capacity of the Indian state, or India's alleged lack of "consociational power sharing"--Cannot explain the observed variation in Hindu-Muslim riots."--Jacket. Why does ethnic violence break out in some places and not others? More important, why do some governments try to prevent antiminority riots while others do nothing, or even actively encourage attacks? This book answers these questions through a detailed study of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, as well as case studies of Ireland, Malaysia, and Romania. It shows how electoral incentives at two levels interact to explain both where violence breaks out and, more importantly, why some states decide to prevent mass violence and others do not. While developing this electoral incentives model, the author shows why several alternative explanations for ethnic violence - focusing on town-level social and economical factors, the weak capacity of the Indian state, or India's alleged lack of "consociational power sharing" - cannot explain the observed variation in Hindu-Muslim riots. Revealing why Hindu-Muslim riots in India break out when and where they do, Steven Wilkinson demonstrates why some state governments in India prevent Hindu-Muslim riots while others do not or even help to incite violence. Wilkinson asserts that riots are manipulated to help win elections, and that state governments decide whether to stop them--depending on electoral calculations concerning the loss or gain of votes. He tests this claim using a dataset on riots and their causes as well as case studies of several Indian states.