Virtuous Emotions

Aristotelian virtue ethics has gained momentum within latter-day moral theorizing. Many people are drawn towards virtue ethics because of the central place it gives to emotions in the good life; after all, Aristotle says that emotions can have an intermediate and best condition proper to virtue. Yet nowhere does Aristotle provide a definitive list of virtuous emotions. In the __Rhetoric__, Aristotle does analyse a number of emotions. However, many emotions that one would have expected to see there fail to get a mention, and others are written off rather hastily as morally defective. Whereas most of what goes by the name of ‘Aristotelian’ virtue ethics nowadays is heavily reconstructed and updated Aristotelianism, such exercises in retrieval have not been systematically attempted with respect to his emotion theory. The aim of this book is to offer a revised ‘Aristotelian’ analysis and moral justification of a number of emotions that Aristotle either did not mention (such as __awe, grief__, and __jealousy__), relegated, at best, to the level of the semi-virtuous (such as __shame__), made disparaging remarks about (such as __gratitude__) or rejected explicitly (such as __pity__, understood as pain at another person’s deserved bad fortune). It is argued that there are good ‘Aristotelian’ reasons for understanding those emotions either as virtuous or as indirectly conducive to virtue. The book begins with an overview of Aristotle’s ideas on the nature of emotions and of emotional value, and it ends with an account of Aristotelian emotion education. "Many people are drawn towards virtue ethics because of the central place it gives to emotions in the good life. Yet it may seem odd to evaluate emotions as virtuous or non-virtuous, for how can we be held responsible for those powerful feelings that simply engulf us? And how can education help us to manage our emotional lives? The aim of this book is to offer readers a new Aristotelian analysis and moral justification of a number of emotions that Aristotle did not mention (awe, grief, and jealousy), or relegated, at best, to the level of the semi-virtuous (shame), or made disparaging remarks about (gratitude), or rejected explicitly (pity, understood as pain at another person's deserved bad fortune). Kristján Kristjánsson argues that there are good Aristotelian reasons for understanding those emotions either as virtuous or as indirectly conducive to virtue. 'Virtuous Emotions' begins with an overview of Aristotle's ideas on the nature of emotions and of emotional value, and concludes with an account of Aristotelian emotion education." Provided by publisher Many People Are Drawn Towards Virtue Ethics Because Of The Central Place It Gives To Emotions In The Good Life. Yet It May Seem Odd To Evaluate Emotions As Virtuous Or Non-virtuous, For How Can We Be Held Responsible For Those Powerful Feelings That Simply Engulf Us? And How Can Education Help Us To Manage Our Emotional Lives? The Aim Of This Book Is To Offer Readers A New Aristotelian Analysis And Moral Justification Of A Number Of Emotions That Aristotle Did Not Mention (awe, Grief, And Jealousy), Or Relegated, At Best, To The Level Of The Semi-virtuous (shame), Or Made Disparaging Remarks About (gratitude), Or Rejected Explicitly (pity, Understood As Pain At Another Person's Deserved Bad Fortune). Kristjan Kristjansson Argues That There Are Good Aristotelian Reasons For Understanding Those Emotions Either As Virtuous Or As Indirectly Conducive To Virtue. Virtuous Emotions Begins With An Overview Of Aristotle's Ideas On The Nature Of Emotions And Of Emotional Value, And Concludes With An Account Of Aristotelian Emotion Education. Virtue ethics sees emotions as central to the good life. But how can emotions over which we have no control be virtuous or non-virtuous? And how can education develop those emotions? Kristjan Kristjansson explores the ways in which six emotions (awe, grief, jealousy, shame, gratitude, and pity) can be understood as virtuous and educable.