Viewpoint Relativism: A New Approach to Epistemological Relativism based on the Concept of Points of View (Synthese Library Book 419)

This book offers new insights into truth, knowledge, and reality. It details a unique approach to epistemological relativism based on the concept of points of view. In a point of view, an aspect represents an object for a subject. By applying this concept of points of view, the author develops a consistent and adequate form of relativism, called viewpoint relativism, according to which epistemic questions like “Is X true (or justified or existing)” are viewpoint-dependent. The monograph examines central issues related to epistemological relativism. It analyzes major arguments pro and con from different opinions. The author presents the arguments of well-known philosophers. These include such thinkers as Paul Boghossian, John Dewey, Nelson Goodman, Martin Kusch, C.I. Lewis, John MacFarlane, Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, Richard Rorty, John Searle, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the process, the author deconstructs the standard account of correspondence theory of truth. Viewpoint relativism is a moderate relativism, which is not subjected to standard criticism of extreme relativism. This book argues that knowledge creation presupposes openness to different points of view and their comparison. It also explores the broader implications of viewpoint relativism into current debate about truth in society. The author defends a critical relativism, which accepts pluralism but is critical against all points of view. In the conclusion, he explores the relevance of viewpoint relativism to democracy by showing that the main threat of modern democratic society is not pluralism but absolutism and fundamentalism. Preface to the English Edition Preface to the Finnish Edition Introduction Contents Chapter 1: The Historical Background of Relativism 1.1 A Look into the History of Relativism 1.2 Kant on Constructing Knowledge 1.3 Leibniz’s Perspectivism 1.4 Nietzsche’s Perspectivism 1.5 Myers’ Systematic Pluralism 1.6 Goodman’s Worldmaking Chapter 2: Conditions of a Philosophical Discussion 2.1 Core Rationality in Philosophy 2.1.1 Philosophical Relativity 2.1.2 Principles of Argumentation and Core Rationality 2.2 C-Theory: The Common Conditions of Discussion 2.2.1 Common Language 2.2.2 Intuitive Conception of Truth 2.2.3 Shared Reality Chapter 3: Points of View and Relativism 3.1 The Concept of Points of View 3.2 Subjective Points of View and Mental Worlds 3.3 Points of View Produce Maps of the World 3.4 The Changing and Objectification of Points of View 3.5 The Comparison of Points of View 3.6 Cases of Viewpoint Analysis 3.6.1 Human-Centric Cosmology 3.6.2 Dialectical Contradictions as Complementary Oppositions 3.7 Viewpoint Relativism as a Philosophical Hypothesis 3.8 Defending Relativism Chapter 4: The Relativity of Truth 4.1 Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge 4.2 Theories of Truth 4.3 The Contextuality of Truth 4.4 Viewpoint-Relative Truth 4.5 New Relativism 4.6 Truth Relativism Chapter 5: The Relativity of Knowledge 5.1 The Standard Definition of Knowledge and Its Problems 5.2 The Possibility of Objective Knowledge 5.2.1 Objectivity as Correspondence 5.2.2 Objectivity as a Consensus 5.3 The Relativity of Justification 5.3.1 Epistemic Viewpoint Relativism 5.3.2 Dispute About the Heliocentric System as a Case 5.4 Incommensurability of Conceptual Frameworks 5.5 Epistemic Relativism by Wittgenstein Chapter 6: The Relativity of Reality 6.1 Conceptual Relativism 6.2 Natural Kinds and Social Constructionism 6.3 Internal and External Realisms 6.4 Conceptual Spaces and Conceptual Relativism Chapter 7: Relativism and Realism in the Philosophy of Science 7.1 Problems with Scientific Realism 7.1.1 Miracle Argument and Scientific Realism 7.1.2 Semantic Theory of Truth and Scientific Realism 7.2 Viewpoint Relativism and Perspectivism in the Philosophy of Science 7.3 Strong Objectivity and Standpoint-Methodology Chapter 8: Critical Relativism and Disagreement 8.1 Critical Relativism 8.1.1 A Post-truth Era? 8.1.2 Networking Expertise 8.1.3 The Debate on the Social Meaning of Truth 8.1.4 Points of View Meet in Dialogue 8.2 Epistemic Disagreements 8.2.1 Disagreement Based on Points of View 8.2.2 Changing Points of View in Disagreements Conclusions Background and Acknowledgements References Index