Vietnam's Second Front : Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War

the Vietnam War Has Been Analyzed, Dissected, And Debated From Multiple Perspectives For Decades, But Domestic Considerations — Such As Partisan Politics And Election-year Maneuvering — Are Often Overlooked As Determining Factors In The Evolution And Outcome Of America's Longest War. in Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, The Republican Party, And The War, Andrew L. Johns Assesses The Influence Of The Republican Party — Its Congressional Leadership, Politicians, Grassroots Organizations, And The Nixon Administration — On The Escalation, Prosecution, And Resolution Of The Vietnam War. This Groundbreaking Work Also Sheds New Light On The Relationship Between Congress And The Imperial Presidency As They Struggled For Control Over U.s. Foreign Policy. beginning His Analysis In 1961 And Continuing Through The Paris Peace Accords Of 1973, Johns Argues That The Kennedy, Johnson, And Nixon Administrations Failed To Achieve Victory On Both Fronts Of The Vietnam War — Military And Political — Because Of Their Preoccupation With Domestic Politics. Johns Details The Machinations And Political Dexterity Required Of All Three Presidents And Of Members Of Congress To Maneuver Between The Countervailing Forces Of Escalation And Negotiation, Offering A Provocative Account Of The Ramifications Of Their Decisions. With Clear, Incisive Prose And Extensive Archival Research, Johns's Analysis Covers The Broad Range Of The Republican Party's Impact On The Vietnam War, Offers A Compelling Reassessment Of Responsibility For The Conflict, And Challenges Assumptions About The Roles Of Congress And The President In U.s. Foreign Relations. The Vietnam War has been analyzed, dissected, and debated from multiple perspectives for decades, but domestic considerations—such as partisan politics and election-year maneuvering—are often overlooked as determining factors in the evolution and outcome of America's longest war. In Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War, Andrew L. Johns assesses the influence of the Republican Party— its congressional leadership, politicians, grassroots organizations, and the Nixon administration—on the escalation, prosecution, and resolution of the Vietnam War. This groundbreaking work also sheds new light on the relationship between Congress and the imperial presidency as they struggled for control over U.S. foreign policy. Beginning his analysis in 1961 and continuing through the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, Johns argues that the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations failed to achieve victory on both fronts of the Vietnam War—military and political—because of their preoccupation with domestic politics. Johns details the machinations and political dexterity required of all three presidents and of members of Congress to maneuver between the countervailing forces of escalation and negotiation, offering a provocative account of the ramifications of their decisions. With clear, incisive prose and extensive archival research, Johns's analysis covers the broad range of the Republican Party's impact on the Vietnam War, offers a compelling reassessment of responsibility for the conflict, and challenges assumptions about the roles of Congress and the president in U.S. foreign relations. The Vietnam War has been analyzed, dissected, and debated from multiple perspectives for decades, but domestic considerationssuch as partisan politics and election-year maneuveringare often overlooked as determining factors in the evolution and outcome of America's longest war. In Vietnam's Second Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the Wa r, Andrew L. Johns assesses the influence of the Republican Party its congressional leadership, politicians, grassroots organizations, and the Nixon administrationon the escalation, prosecution, and resolution of the Vietnam War. This groundbreaking work also sheds new light on the relationship between Congress and the imperial presidency as they struggled for control over U.S. foreign policy. Beginning his analysis in 1961 and continuing through the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, Johns argues that the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations failed to achieve victory on both fronts of the Vietnam Warmilitary and politicalbecause of their preoccupation with domestic politics. Johns details the machinations and political dexterity required of all three presidents and of members of Congress to maneuver between the countervailing forces of escalation and negotiation, offering a provocative account of the ramifications of their decisions. With clear, incisive prose and extensive archival research, Johns's analysis covers the broad range of the Republican Party's impact on the Vietnam War, offers a compelling reassessment of responsibility for the conflict, and challenges assumptions about the roles of Congress and the president in U.S. foreign relations. "In Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War, Andrew L. Johns examines the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics during America's longest war, assessing the influence of the Republican Party - including the congressional leadership, state and local politicians, grassroots organizations, and the Nixon administration - on the escalation, evolution, and resolution of the conflict. This groundbreaking work also sheds new light on the institutional tensions that existed between Congress and the president as they struggled to formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy." "In clear, incisive prose based on virtually unprecedented research in more than eighty congressional and presidential archives, Vietnam's Second Front covers the broad range of the Republican Party's impact on the Vietnam War, offers a compelling reassessment of responsibility for the conflict, and challenges assumptions about the roles of Congress and the president in U.S. foreign relations." --Book Jacket Copyright 5 Contents 6 Acknowledgments 8 Introduction: Ares, Virginia, and the Myth of the Water's Edge 12 1. Trapped between Scylla and Charybdis: JFK, the GOP, and Domestic Politics 22 2. The Cassandra Conundrum: GOP Opposition to LBJ's Vietnam Policy, 1963–1965 54 3. Opening Pandora's Box: Escalation and Domestic Politics, 1965–1966 90 4. Confronting the Hydra: LBJ on the Defensive, 1966–1967 130 5. Sisyphus and Tantalus: The Political Impact of the War, 1967–1968 170 6. The Zalmoxis Effect: Vietnam and the 1968 Presidential Election 206 7. The Icarus Agenda: Vietnamization and Its Political Implications 248 8. Whither Ariadne? Domestic Politics and Nixon's Search for Peace 290 Conclusion: Sowing Dragon's Teeth 336 Appendix 352 Notes 356 Bibliography 406 Index 438 0813125723,9780813125725 The University Press of Kentucky Introduction : Ares, Virginia, and the myth of the water's edge -- Trapped between Scylla and Charybdis : JFK, the GOP, and domestic politics -- The Cassandra conundrum : GOP opposition to LBJ's Vietnam policy, 1963-1965 -- Opening Pandora's box : escalation and domestic politics, 1965-1966 -- Confronting the hydra : LBJ on the defensive, 1966-1967 -- Sisyphus and Tantalus : the political impact of the war, 1967-1968 -- The Zalmoxis effect : Vietnam and the 1968 presidential election -- The Icarus agenda : Vietnamization and its political implications -- Whither Ariadne? domestic politics and Nixon's search for peace -- Conclusion: sowing dragon's teeth -- Appendix: Republicans, 1961-1973