Varieties of Moral Personality : Ethics and Psychological Realism

Owen Flanagan argues in this book for a more psychologically realistic ethical reflection and spells out the ways in which psychology can enrich moral philosophy. Beginning with a discussion of such "moral saints" as Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Oskar Shindler, Flanagan charts a middle course between an ethics that is too realistic and socially parochial and one that is too idealistic, giving no weight to our natures. Preface......Page 8 Contents......Page 12 PART I Ethics and Psychological Realism......Page 30 Prologue: Saints......Page 18 The Topic......Page 32 Ethics, Psychology, and the Human Sciences......Page 37 The Autonomy Thesis......Page 41 Minimal Psychological Realism......Page 49 Psychological Distance......Page 55 Natural and Social Psychological Traits......Page 58 Environmental Sensitivity......Page 63 Natural Teleology and the Naturalistic Fallacy......Page 66 The Argument from the Personal Point of View......Page 73 Minimal Persons......Page 76 Persons and Plans......Page 82 Characters, Commitments, and Projects......Page 85 Separateness and Impersonality......Page 88 Strong Realism and Socially Fortified Persons......Page 96 Abstraction and Kinds of Impartiality......Page 100 Integrity, Alienation, and Virtues of Form......Page 108 PART II Liberal and Communitarian Philosophical Psychology......Page 120 The Social Construction of Persons......Page 122 The Classical Picture and the Primacy of Justice......Page 125 Community, Friendship, and Flourishing......Page 129 Appreciation, Emulation, and Self-Respect......Page 135 Social Union......Page 139 Actual and Self-Represented Identity......Page 150 Identity, Self-Esteem, and Effective Agency......Page 156 Self-Understanding, Encumbered Identity, and Psychological Realism......Page 158 Self-Understanding and Like-Mindedness......Page 162 Narrativity and Homogeneity......Page 165 PART III Moral Psychology......Page 176 Psychological Realism and Deep Structure......Page 178 The Moral Judgment of the Child......Page 179 Moral Consciousness, Speech Acting, and Opacity......Page 182 Rules and Autonomy: The Marble Study......Page 185 Games and Gender......Page 189 Consequences and Intentions......Page 192 The “Consciousness of Something Attractive”......Page 194 Stage Theory......Page 198 Stage Holism and Globality......Page 202 Moral Stage, Character Assessment, and Unified Justification......Page 204 Development and Improvement......Page 208 The Adequacy of the Highest Stage......Page 210 ldentity and Morality......Page 213 Psychological Realism and Gender......Page 215 Two Different Global Voices?......Page 220 Gestalt Shifts......Page 229 The No-Difference Claim......Page 235 The Relation of Justice and Care......Page 238 Further Empirical Questions......Page 245 Six Theses......Page 252 The Separate-but-Equal Doctrine......Page 253 The Integration Doctrine......Page 255 The Hammer- Wrench Doctrine......Page 256 Impartialism......Page 258 Noncognitivist Care......Page 260 Context-Sensitive Care......Page 264 PART IV Situations, Dispositions, and Well-Being......Page 270 Two Thought Experiments about Character......Page 272 Persons in Situations......Page 277 Moral Gaps and the Unity of Character......Page 283 Moral Modularity......Page 285 Traits and Traitology......Page 293 lndividual Trait Globality and Situation Sensitivity......Page 296 The Trait-Inference Network and Evaluative Consistency......Page 299 Evaluative Consistency, the Authoritarian Personality, and Authoritarian Behavior......Page 304 Moral Traits......Page 307 Miligram’s “One Great Unchanging Result“......Page 310 Coercion and Rebellion in Groups......Page 315 Situations and Samaritans......Page 317 Attribution Theory and Moral Personality......Page 322 Illusion and Well-Being......Page 332 The Traditional View Meets the Facts......Page 335 The Traditional View versus the Classical View......Page 340 Virtue, Again......Page 346 Epilogue......Page 350 Notes......Page 356 References......Page 372 Index......Page 392 Preface 8 Contents 12 PART I Ethics and Psychological Realism 30 Prologue: Saints 18 1. Ethics and Psychology 32 The Topic 32 Ethics, Psychology, and the Human Sciences 37 The Autonomy Thesis 41 2. The Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism 49 Minimal Psychological Realism 49 Psychological Distance 55 Natural and Social Psychological Traits 58 Environmental Sensitivity 63 Natural Teleology and the Naturalistic Fallacy 66 3. Psychological Realism and the Personal Point of View 73 The Argument from the Personal Point of View 73 Minimal Persons 76 Persons and Plans 82 Characters, Commitments, and Projects 85 Separateness and Impersonality 88 4. Abstraction, Alienation, and Integrity 96 Strong Realism and Socially Fortified Persons 96 Abstraction and Kinds of Impartiality 100 Integrity, Alienation, and Virtues of Form 108 PART II Liberal and Communitarian Philosophical Psychology 120 5. Community and the Liberal Self 122 The Social Construction of Persons 122 The Classical Picture and the Primacy of Justice 125 Community, Friendship, and Flourishing 129 Appreciation, Emulation, and Self-Respect 135 Social Union 139 6. Identity and Community 150 Actual and Self-Represented Identity 150 Identity, Self-Esteem, and Effective Agency 156 Self-Understanding, Encumbered Identity, and Psychological Realism 158 Self-Understanding and Like-Mindedness 162 Narrativity and Homogeneity 165 PART III Moral Psychology 176 7. Moral Cognition: Development and Deep Structure 178 Psychological Realism and Deep Structure 178 The Moral Judgment of the Child 179 Moral Consciousness, Speech Acting, and Opacity 182 Rules and Autonomy: The Marble Study 185 Games and Gender 189 Consequences and Intentions 192 The “Consciousness of Something Attractive” 194 8. Modern Moral Philosophy and Moral Stages 198 Stage Theory 198 Stage Holism and Globality 202 Moral Stage, Character Assessment, and Unified Justification 204 Development and Improvement 208 The Adequacy of the Highest Stage 210 9. Virtue, Gender, and Identity 213 ldentity and Morality 213 Psychological Realism and Gender 215 Two Different Global Voices? 220 Gestalt Shifts 229 10. Gender Differences: The Current Status of the Debate 235 The No-Difference Claim 235 The Relation of Justice and Care 238 Further Empirical Questions 245 11. Gender, Normative Adequacy, Content, and Cognitivism 252 Six Theses 252 The Separate-but-Equal Doctrine 253 The Integration Doctrine 255 The Hammer- Wrench Doctrine 256 Impartialism 258 Noncognitivist Care 260 Context-Sensitive Care 264 PART IV Situations, Dispositions, and Well-Being 270 12. Invisible Shepherds, Sensible Knaves, and the Modularity of the Moral 272 Two Thought Experiments about Character 272 Persons in Situations 277 Moral Gaps and the Unity of Character 283 Moral Modularity 285 13. Characters and Their Traits 293 Traits and Traitology 293 lndividual Trait Globality and Situation Sensitivity 296 The Trait-Inference Network and Evaluative Consistency 299 Evaluative Consistency, the Authoritarian Personality, and Authoritarian Behavior 304 Moral Traits 307 14. Situations, Sympathy, and Attribution Theory 310 Character and Coercion 310 Miligram’s “One Great Unchanging Result“ 310 Coercion and Rebellion in Groups 315 Situations and Samaritans 317 Attribution Theory and Moral Personality 322 15. Virtue, Mental Health, and Happiness 332 Illusion and Well-Being 332 The Traditional View Meets the Facts 335 The Traditional View versus the Classical View 340 Virtue, Again 346 Epilogue 350 Notes 356 References 372 Index 392 Owen Flanagan argues in this book for a more psychologically realistic ethical reflection and spells out the ways in which psychology can enrich moral philosophy. Beginning with a discussion of such “moral saints” as Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Oskar Schindler, Flanagan charts a middle course between an ethics that is too realistic and socially parochial and one that is too idealistic, giving no weight to our natures.