Vagueness as Arbitrariness: Outline of a Theory of Vagueness (Synthese Library, 436)

This book proposes a new solution to the problem of vagueness. There are several different ways of addressing this problem and no clear agreement on which one is correct. The author proposes that it should be understood as the problem of explaining vague predicates in a way that systematizes six intuitions about the phenomenon and satisfies three criteria of adequacy for an ideal theory of vagueness. The third criterion, which is called the “criterion of precisification”, is the most controversial one. It is based on the intuition that a predicate is vague only if it is imprecise. The author considers some different definitions of linguistic imprecision, proposing that a predicate is imprecise if and only if there is no sharp boundary between objects to which its application yields some particular truth-value and objects to which its application does not yield that truth-value. The volume critically reviews the current theories of vagueness and proposes a new one, the Theory of Vagueness as Arbitrariness, which defines a vague predicate as an arbitrary predicate that must be precisified in order to contribute to a sentence that has truth-conditions. The main advantages of this theory over the current alternatives are that it satisfies all three criteria and systematizes the relevant intuitions. Preface Contents Chapter 1: Introduction References Chapter 2: Problem of Vagueness 2.1 Sorites 2.1.1 A Little Bit of History 2.1.2 Sorites (Conditional Version) 2.1.3 Sorites (Quantified Version) 2.1.4 Sorites (Line-Drawing Version) 2.1.5 Ways to Solve the Paradox 2.2 Criteria of Adequacy 2.2.1 Problem of Precisification 2.2.2 Three Criteria of Adequacy 2.2.3 The Foundational Problem of Precisification 2.3 Intuitions About Vagueness 2.3.1 How Not to Refute a Theory of Vagueness 2.4 Problem of Vagueness References Chapter 3: Imprecise Predicates 3.1 Criterion of Precisification 3.1.1 Naïve Many-Valued Picture of Imprecise Predicates 3.1.2 Hierarchical Higher-Order Imprecision 3.1.3 Imprecise Predicates 3.1.4 Criterion of Precisification 3.2 Epistemic Sense of Imprecision 3.2.1 Linguistic Imprecision Versus Epistemic Imprecision 3.2.2 Columnar Higher-Order Imprecision 3.2.3 Linguistic Imprecision Versus Epistemic Imprecision (II) References Chapter 4: Theories of Vagueness 4.1 Three-Valued Theory 4.1.1 Solution to the Sorites 4.1.2 Criteria of Adequacy 4.1.3 Intuitions 4.1.4 Further Objections 4.2 Degrees-of-Truth Theory 4.2.1 Solution to the Sorites 4.2.2 Criteria of Adequacy 4.2.3 Intuitions 4.2.4 Further Objections 4.3 Supervaluationism 4.3.1 Solution to the Sorites 4.3.2 Criteria of Adequacy 4.3.3 Intuitions 4.3.4 Further Objections 4.4 Other Theories 4.4.1 Epistemicism 4.4.2 Incoherentism 4.4.3 Contextualism References Chapter 5: Vagueness as Arbitrariness 5.1 Minimal Constraints 5.1.1 Tolerance: Problem of Unrestricted Application 5.1.2 Tolerance: Criterion of Precisification 5.1.3 Tolerance: Positive Case Against Unrestricted Application 5.1.4 Ideal Cases 5.1.5 Ideal Cases Versus Clear Cases 5.1.6 Three Kinds of Vague Predicates 5.1.7 Ideal Cases and Boundaries 5.2 Theory of Vagueness as Arbitrariness 5.2.1 Thesis of Arbitrariness 5.2.2 Sainsbury’s Many-Boundaries Approach 5.2.3 TA and Truth-Conditional Theories of Vagueness 5.2.4 Theory of Vagueness as Arbitrariness 5.2.5 Optimism, Pessimism and Nihilism 5.2.6 Nihilism and Pessimism 5.2.7 Expressivism: Do Vague Sentences Express Plans? 5.2.8 VA and Contextualism 5.2.9 Sorites: Rejecting the Principle of Tolerance 5.2.10 Arbitrariness Versus Tolerance 5.2.11 Intuitions 5.2.12 Some Advantages of VA 5.3 Objections 5.3.1 Do We Need a Clear-Case Constraint? 5.3.2 Counterexample to VA 5.3.3 Vague Sentences and Truth-Conditions References Index