US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution : The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance

This book provides a fresh perspective on the origins of the confrontation between the US and Iran. It demonstrates that, contrary to the claims of Iran's leaders, there was no instinctive American hostility towards the Revolution, and explains why many assumptions guiding US policy were inappropriate for dealing with the new reality in Iran. In February 1979, a revolution led by a seventy-six year old cleric espousing a relatively obscure interpretation of Shia Islam succeeded in dislodging one of Washington's most powerful allies in the Middle East. Although low-level analysts had long warned of a crisis looming in Iran, Carter's senior foreign policy advisors, distracted by more pressing foreign policy initiatives, had resisted any serious rethinking of US strategy. US policymakers now had no choice but to adjust to a completely new reality in Iran. This book examines the nature of that adjustment. It demonstrates that, contrary to the claims of Iran's leaders, US diplomats tried in good faith to build bridges with the new regime. Good faith was not enough, however, and this study explains why many assumptions guiding US policy were inappropriate for dealing with the new reality in Iran. It examines how US policy objectives in Iran were refashioned in light of three major and converging crises: the Iran hostage crisis, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the onset of the Iran-Iraq dynamic. By re-examining the Carter administration's record in post-revolutionary Iran, Emery provides a fresh perspective on the origins of one of the most bitter and enduring confrontations in international relations Front Matter....Pages i-viii Introduction....Pages 1-25 Front Matter....Pages 27-27 The Collapse of US Policy 1977–1979....Pages 29-45 Framing the Revolution as a Cold War Crisis....Pages 46-70 US—Iranian Elite Interactions and the Pathologies of Engagement....Pages 71-89 Front Matter....Pages 91-91 Putting Engagement into Practice....Pages 93-118 The CIA and Engagement....Pages 119-130 Front Matter....Pages 131-131 Re-evaluating US Policy after the Hostage Crisis....Pages 133-153 Viewing Afghanistan through the Prism of Iran....Pages 154-172 US Policy and the Iran—Iraq War 1980–1981....Pages 173-190 Conclusion....Pages 191-201 Back Matter....Pages 202-267 This text provides a fresh perspective on the origins of the confrontation between the US and Iran. It demonstrates that, contrary to the claims of Iran's leaders, there was no instinctive American hostility towards the Revolution, and explains why many assumptions guiding US policy were inappropriate for dealing with the new reality in Iran