Unnatural doubts : epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism

In Unnatural Doubts , Michael Williams constructs a masterly polemic against the very idea of epistemology, as traditionally conceived. Although philosophers have often found problems in efforts to study the nature and limits of human knowledge, Williams provides the first book that systematically argues against there being such a thing as knowledge of the external world. He maintains that knowledge of the world consitutes a theoretically coherent kind of knowledge, whose possibility needs to be defended, only given a deeply problematic doctrine he calls "epistemological realism." The only alternative to epistemological realism is a thoroughgoing contextualism. Contents......Page ix Preface......Page xii 1.1 Unnatural Doubts?......Page 1 1.2 Philosophy versus Common Life......Page 2 1.3 The New Humcans......Page 10 1.4 The Epistemologist's Dilemma......Page 17 1.5 Unusual Questions......Page 22 1.6 Definitive Refutation......Page 31 1.7 The Burden of Theory......Page 40 2.1 Epistcmology and Radical Scepticism......Page 47 2.2 Scepticism and Epistcmological Priority......Page 51 2.3 Presupposition or By-product?......Page 57 2.4 Agrippa's Trilcmma......Page 60 2.5 Knowledge and the Senses......Page 68 2.6 The Neutrality of Experience......Page 73 2.7 Sceptical Hypotheses......Page 79 2.8 Dreaming and Knowing......Page 84 3.1 Generality and Epistcmic Priority......Page 89 3.2 Extcrnalism and Traditional Epistcmology......Page 93 3.3 Knowledge as an Object of Theory......Page 101 3.4 Explanation or Deflation?......Page 111 3.5 Foundationalism......Page 114 3.6 Methodological Necessity......Page 121 3.7 Priority Reconsidered......Page 125 3.8 Scepticism in Context......Page 129 4.1 The Best-case Argument......Page 135 4.2 Knowledge by Example......Page 139 4.3 Generic and Specific......Page 146 4.4 Knowing and Claiming......Page 149 4.5 The Scope of Knowledge......Page 155 4.6 Examples and Paradigms......Page 161 4.7 Ordinary Language and Philosophical Diagnosis......Page 166 5.1 Philosophy as Reflective Understanding......Page 172 5.2 Diagnosis and Disappointment......Page 175 5.3 Reflection and Detachment......Page 181 5.4 Relevant Alternatives and Epistemic Closure......Page 185 5.5 The Two-factor Theory......Page 191 5.6 Error and Estrangement......Page 201 5.7 Practical Knowledge and Radical Doubt......Page 205 5.8 Epistcrrfblogy as Pure Inquiry......Page 211 5.9 The Unreality of Knowledge......Page 218 6.1 Realism and Scepticism......Page 225 6.2 Truth and Justification......Page 228 6.3 Scepticism without Truth......Page 237 6.4 Objectivity and Progress......Page 247 6.5 Epistcmology Naturalizxd......Page 254 6.6 Truth and Context......Page 265 7.1 What is a Coherence Theory?......Page 267 7.2 Radical Holism......Page 272 7.3 Coherence and Explanation......Page 279 7.4 Local and Global......Page 287 7.5 Intcrnalism and Epistemic Priority......Page 292 7.6 Criterial Justification......Page 299 7.7 Scepticism and Charity......Page 306 8.1 Closure Again......Page 317 8.2 Knowledge and Reliability......Page 318 8.3 Context and Closure......Page 322 8.4 Knowing and Telling......Page 326 8.5 Relevant Alternatives......Page 330 8.6 Tracking the Truth......Page 336 8.7 Closure Regained......Page 346 8.8 The Instability of Knowledge......Page 350 8.9 The Humean Condition......Page 355 Notes......Page 360 Index......Page 383

Exceptionally well-argued. . . . Williams's Unnatural Doubts is a major contribution to epistemology—or, rather, to the discussion of the possibility of epistemology. It includes some excellent discussions of Nozick, Dretske, Davidson, and other important contemporary philosophers.—Richard Rorty

Williams makes a good case for the view that skepticism as it is usually presented and defended is not a presuppositionless doctrine. He argues compellingly that if we examine its presuppositions, then quite often the case made for epistemological skepticism loses much of its persuasiveness. These points are well worth considering and discussing.—Ernest Sosa

John Skorupski - Mind

Williams has a feeling for the larger intellectual significance of skepticism and for its phenomenology. He attacks the skeptic's citadel with boldness, determination, and strategic sense. . . . [H]is treatment of a large range of other writings on the subject . . . combines sympathy with acute criticisms.

Constructs a masterly polemic against the very idea of epistemology, as traditionally conceived. This title maintains that knowledge of the world constitutes a theoretically coherent kind of knowledge, whose possibility needs to be defended, only given a deeply problematic doctrine he calls 'epistemological realism.'