United We Stand?: Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility (SUNY series in Global Politics)

Annotation It has long been assumed that leaders engage in international conflict to unify their followers--" what is often called the "rally' round the flag" hypothesis. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this hypothesis does not always provide a compelling explanation of the relationship between domestic politics and international conflict. In "United We Stand? Aaron Belkin shows that in one important realm, civil-military relations, leaders often prefer divisiveness over cohesion. When they feel domestically vulnerable, leaders use international conflict in order to create and exacerbate rivalries among their own military forces to lower the risk of a coup and to contribute to the consolidation and stability of the political order. Case studies include post-Soviet Georgia and Syria. "Belkin addresses an underexplained source of international conflict and does a persuasive job of turning widely accepted truisms on their heads. His basic argument is important, cleary presented, and well supported."--"Paul N. Stockton, coeditor of "Reconstituting America's Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy United We Stand?: Divide-and-Conquer Politicsand the Logic ofInternational Hostility......Page 4 Contents......Page 6 Preface......Page 8 Acknowledgments......Page 10 Part One: Introduction......Page 12 1. Regime Vulnerability and International Conflict......Page 14 Part Two: Theory......Page 26 2. Coup Risk and Military Division: Hostility within the Armed Forces and Regime Survival......Page 28 3. A Theory of Counterbalancing as a Cause of International Conflict......Page 46 Part Three: Data......Page 64 4. Regime Vulnerability, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict during the Cold War: A Quantitative Analysis......Page 66 5. Regime Vulnerability as a Cause of Counterbalancing in Syria in the Early 1970s......Page 80 6. When Dividing the Military Provides an Incentive for Conflict: Fragmented Military Forces and InternationalConflict in Shevardnadze’s Georgia......Page 112 7. Conclusion......Page 126 2. Coup-Risk and Military Division......Page 134 4. Regime Vulnerability, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict during the Cold War......Page 135 5. Regime Vulnerability as a Cause of Counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970s......Page 138 6. When Dividing the Military Provides an Incentive for Conflict......Page 140 7. Conclusion......Page 141 References......Page 142 G......Page 168 w......Page 169 SUNY series in Global Politics......Page 170 In United We Stand? Aaron Belkin Shows That In One Important Realm, Civil-military Relations, Leaders Often Prefer Divisiveness Over Cohesion. When They Feel Domestically Vulnerable, Leaders Use International Conflict In Order To Create And Exacerbate Rivalries Among Their Own Military Forces To Lower The Risk Of A Coup And To Contribute To The Consolidation And Stability Of The Political Order. Case Studies Include Post-soviet Georgia And Syria.--book Jacket. Regime Vulnerability And International Conflict -- Coup Risk And Military Division : Hostility Within The Armed Forces And Regime Survival -- A Theory Of Counterbalancing As A Cause Of International Conflict -- Regime Vulnerability, Counterbalancing, And International Conflict During The Cold War : A Quantitative Analysis / Aaron Belkin, Evan Schofer -- Regime Vulnerability As A Cause Of Counterbalancing In Syria In The Early 1970s -- When Dividing The Military Provides An Incentive For Conflict : Fragmented Military Forces And International Conflict In Shevardnadze's Georgia. Aaron Belkin. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 131-156) And Index. Regime vulnerability and international conflict Coup risk and military division : hostility within the armed forces and regime survival A theory of counterbalancing as a cause of international conflict Regime vulnerability, counterbalancing, and international conflict during the Cold War : a quantitative analysis / Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer Regime vulnerability as a cause of counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970s When dividing the military provides an incentive for conflict : fragmented military forces and international conflict in Shevardnadze's Georgia. When former president Bill Clinton launched a series of cruise missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan just three days after testifying before a federal grand jury in August 1998, observers speculated that this was "a manufactured crisis to divert public attention from his personal troubles."