Unflinching Zeal The Air Battles Over France and Britain, May℗ئOctober 1940

List of Tables and Illustrations ; List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ; Preface ; Acknowledgments ; Introduction ; PART 1 The Air Forces ; 1. The Armee de L'Air; 2. The Luftwaffe; 3. The Royal Air Force; PART 2 The Battles ; 4. The Battle of France ; 5. Analysis and the Paradox of the Battle of France ; 6. Aftermath -- The Battle of Britain ; Conclusions from the Air Battles of 1940 ; Notes; Glossary ; Bibliography ; Index ; About the Author.;Noted aviation historian Robin Higham examines the evolution of the Armée de l'Air and RAF during the interwar period. Although France and England shared a mutual enemy in Germany, the development of the air forces of in each nation shared few commonalities. Higham demonstrates that the Armée de l'Terre dominated strategic and doctrinal planning in France. The resulting emphasis on traditional land warfare, combined with the volatility of French politics in 1920s, blunted the development of French air forces. By 1940, they were ill prepared, technologically inferior, and out man. This consequential work by a pioneer aviation historian fills a significant lacuna in the story of the defeat of France in May-June 1940 and more fully explains the Battle of Britain of July–October of that year and the influence it had on the Luftwaffe in the 1941 invasion of the USSR. Robin Higham approaches the subject by sketching the story and status of the three air forces—the Armée de l'Air, the Luftwaffe, and the Royal Air Force—their organization and preparation for their battles. He then dissects the the campaigns, their losses and replacement policies and abilities. He paints the struggles of France and Britain from both the background provided by his recent Two Roads to War: From Versailles to Dunkirk (NIP, 2012) and from the details of losses tabulated by After the Battle's The Battle of Britain (1982, 2nd ed.) and Peter Cornwell's The Battle of France Then and Now (2007), as well as in Paul Martin's Invisible Vainqueurs (1990) and from the Luftwaffe summaries in the British National Archives Cabinet papers. One important finding is that the consumption and wastage was not nearly as high as claimed. The three air forces actually shot down only 19 percent of the number claimed. In the RAF case, in the summer of 1940, 44 percent of those shot down were readily repairable thanks to the salvage and repair organizations. This contrasted with the much lower 8 percent for the Germans and zero for the French. Brave as the aircrews may have been, the inescapable conclusion is that awareness of consumption, wastage, and sustainability were intimately connected to survival. Noted aviation historian Robin Higham examines the evolution of the Armée de l’Air and RAF during the interwar period. Although France and England shared a mutual enemy in Germany, the development of the air forces of in each nation shared few commonalities. Higham demonstrates that the Armée de l’Terre dominated strategic and doctrinal planning in France. The resulting emphasis on traditional land warfare, combined with the volatility of French politics in 1920s, blunted the development of French air forces. By 1940, they were ill prepared, technologically inferior, and out manned when the Luftwaffe aircraft darkened the skies over the French countryside. Although the causes of the defeat of France in 1940 have been debated by historians, none have focused on the role and place of the Armée de l’Air in that defeat. Historians of France have been much more comfortable arguing about politics and the Armée de Terre. As Higham illustrates, however, it is important understand the impact of the development of the Armée de l’Air, its doctrine, equipment, personnel, and budgets. Comparatively, the success of the Royal Air Force in the skies over Britain was due largely to the fact that the independent RAF evolved into a sophisticated, scientifically based force, supported by consistent government practices. Higham’s thorough examination, however, finds the British not without error in the two decades that followed the Treaty of Versailles. But strong government support and technological innovation during this period paved the way for success once the war began.