Uncivil War: The British Army and the Troubles, 1966–1975 (Cambridge Military Histories)

When Operation Banner was launched in 1969 civil war threatened to break out in Northern Ireland and spread over the Irish Sea. Uncivil War reveals the full story of how the British army acted to save Great Britain from disaster during the most violent phase of the Troubles but, in so doing, condemned the people of Northern Ireland to protracted, grinding conflict. Huw Bennett shows how the army's ambivalent response to loyalist violence undermined the prospects for peace and heightened Catholic distrust in the state. British strategy consistently underestimated community defence as a reason for people joining or supporting the IRA whilst senior commanders allowed the army to turn in on itself, hardening soldiers to the suffering of ordinary people. By 1975 military strategists considered the conflict unresolvable: the army could not convince Catholics or Protestants that it was there to protect them and settled instead for an unending war. Cover Half-title page Series page Title page Copyright page Dedication Contents List of Figures List of Maps List of Tables List of Illustrations List of Abbreviations Introduction 1 Baggage 2 The Army’s Short-Lived Ulster Honeymoon 3 Escalation and the Erosion of Impartiality 4 Edward Heath’s Bid for Victory 5 The Road to Bloody Sunday 6 The Most Deadly Year 7 Strategy in the Shadow of Loyalist Power 8 We Cannot Envisage Peace Conclusion A Note on Sources Acknowledgements Notes Bibliography Index