Ukrainian Nationalism In The Post-stalin Era: Myth, Symbols And Ideology In Soviet Nationalities Policy (studies In Contemporary History)

It is a truism that, with only a few notable exceptions, western scholars only belatedly turned their attention to the phenomenon of minority nationalism in the USSR. In the last two decades, however, the topic has increasingly occupied the attention of specialists on the Soviet Union, not only because its depths and implications have not yet been adequately plumbed, but also because it is clearly a potentially explosive problem for the Soviet system itself. The problem that minority nationalism poses is perceived rather differently at the "top" of Soviet society than at the "bottom. " The elite views - or at least rationalize- the problem through the lens of Marxism-Leninism, which explains nationalist sentiment as a part of the "super­ structure," a temporary phenomenon that will disappear in the course of building communism. That it has not done so is a primary source of concern for the Soviet leadership, who do not seem to understand it and do not wish to accept its reality. This is based on a fallacious conceptuali­ zation of ethnic nationalism as determined wholly by external, or objective, factors and therefore subject to corrective measures. In terms of origins, it is believed to be the result of past oppression and discrimination; it is thus seen as a negative attitudinal set the essence of which lies in tangible, rather than psychological, factors. Below the level of the leadership, however, ethnic nationalism reflects entrenched identifications and meanings which lend continuity and authenticity to human existence. It is a truism that, with only a few notable exceptions, western scholars only belatedly turned their attention to the phenomenon of minority nationalism in the USSR. In the last two decades, however, the topic has increasingly occupied the attention of specialists on the Soviet Union, not only because its depths and implications have not yet been adequately plumbed, but also because it is clearly a potentially explosive problem for the Soviet system itself. The problem that minority nationalism poses is perceived rather differently at the "top" of Soviet society than at the "bottom." The elite views - or at least rationalize- the problem through the lens of Marxism-Leninism, which explains nationalist sentiment as a part of the "superƯ structure," a temporary phenomenon that will disappear in the course of building communism. That it has not done so is a primary source of concern for the Soviet leadership, who do not seem to understand it and do not wish to accept its reality. This is based on a fallacious conceptualiƯ zation of ethnic nationalism as determined wholly by external, or objective, factors and therefore subject to corrective measures. In terms of origins, it is believed to be the result of past oppression and discrimination; it is thus seen as a negative attitudinal set the essence of which lies in tangible, rather than psychological, factors. Below the level of the leadership, however, ethnic nationalism reflects entrenched identifications and meanings which lend continuity and authenticity to human existence When the First World War ended, the political and economic system of prewar Europe lay in ruins. Though Allied politicians tried at various post­ war conferences to create a new and stable European order they failed because of conflicting and competing national interests. The peace settle­ ments neither established security from renewed attacks by the defeated nations nor did they lay the groundwork for a reconstruction of Europe's devastated economic system, because the members of the Allied war coali­ tion could not agree on the goals to be pursued by the treaties or on the means to enforce their settlement. In this context, reparations played a most signi­ ficant role. The conflict between the European protagonists France, Great Britain and Germany reached its peak at the beginning of 1923 when Franco­ Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr district in a last attempt to implement strategies developed in 1919 for a control ofthe German economic potential until reparations had been paid and to show to the Anglo-Saxon powers that any modification of Allied policy toward Germany could not be attained against French objections or without a simultaneous adjustment of French war debts. By focusing on the reparation issue during the period of the Cuno Cabinet, this book attempts to contribute both to the literature on Cuno and to the interrelationship of political and economic problems after W orId War I. In the spring of the year 1898 the long rivalry of Britain and France in West Africa reached a dangerous climax. The West African crisis was but one aspect of an extensive Anglo-French contest for colonial possessions which characterized the final decade of the nineteenth century. Competi­ tion for dominion went on relentlessly in the Nile Valley, along the banks of the Mekong in Southeast Asia, and within the territories of the Niger River Bend. The Upper Nile dispute dwarfed all others; and ultimately the inability of Britain and France to settle this question through diplo­ matic negotations was to lead to the confrontation at Fashoda. Simulta­ neously, however, a more obscure struggle was in process, namely the contest for possession of the thousand mile stretch of the Middle Niger. Aside from an infrequent flurry of diplomatic activity occasioned by the foray of an English or French officer into the little known realms of the Niger Bend, the protracted struggle for control of the river artery received scant notice. The Foreign Offices in both France and Britain traditionally regarded the region as one of secondary interest and tended to subordinate it to more pressing concerns. Even the eruption of a dan­ gerous crisis in West Africa in the spring of 1898 was somewhat over­ shadowed by the subsequent incident at Fashoda so that the earlier cli­ max appeared mainly a curtain raiser. In this book I have attempted to analyze the dilemmas confronting the Polish government-in-exile in London during the Second World War. My main objective has beeen to investigate the actual operation of the Polish govern­ ment and the overall policies of the British government vis-a-vis the Soviet Union insofar as they had a direct bearing on Anglo-Polish relations. Since the outstanding conflicts over territorial claims, and, ultimately, sovereignty, were between Poland and the Soviet Union, considerable attention has been devoted to the relationship between the Polish and Soviet governments during a most trying and difficult period of inter-Allied diplomacy. This work covers the period of operation of the Polish government on British soil until the resignation of Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk in November 1944. Although Great Britain did not withdraw diplomatic recognition from the Polish government until July 1945, the Arciszewski government, formed after Mikolajczyk's resignation, was generally ignored by Great Britain. As with all subsequent governments, including that which exists today, Arciszewski's government functioned primarily as the voice of Poland in the West - a government of protest. Front Matter....Pages I-XII Introduction: Approach and Conceptualization....Pages 1-35 Ideology and Myth: Soviet Nationalities Policy....Pages 36-77 Culture and Symbolism: The Myth of National Moral Patrimony....Pages 78-121 Symbolism and Status: The Ukrainian Language....Pages 122-152 Symbolic Action: Nationalist Opposition and Regime Response....Pages 153-206 Summary and Conclusions....Pages 207-216 Back Matter....Pages 217-241 By Hermann J. Rupieper. Includes Index. Bibliography: P. [261]-282. By Claire Hirshfield. Includes Index. Bibliography: P. [219]-227.