UK Monetary Policy from Devaluation to Thatcher, 1967-82 (Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance)

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. This book charts the course of monetary policy in the UK from 1967 to 1982. It shows how events such as the 1967 devaluation, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the stagflation of the 1970s, and the IMF loan of 1976 all shaped policy. It shows that the 'monetarist' experiment of the 1980s was based on a fundamental misreading of 1970s monetary policy. UK Monetary Policy from Devaluation to Thatcher, 1967-1982 charts the course of monetary policy in the UK from the 1960s to the early 1980s. It shows how events such as the 1967 sterling devaluation, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the stagflation of the 1970s and the International Monetary Fund loan of 1976 all shaped policy. It challenges the existing historiography by showing the Bank of England and the UK Treasury experimenting with money supply 'targets' nearly a decade before the Thatcher government placed monetarism at the heart of economic policy. By misreading the monetary history of the 1970s, the Thatcher government subjected the UK economy to a recession of unnecessary depth and severity that required the monetary policy U-turn of the 1981 budget, the most controversial in post-war British history. Fiscal policy was tightened - to the bewilderment of much of the economics profession; monetary policy was loosened - to the relief of British business. This rebalancing allowed personal consumption, through increased household debt, to become the engine of growth in the 1980s. This failure to heed the lessons of 1970s monetary policy, and the subsequent increase in personal debt, has had profound long-term consequences for the shape of the British economy UK Monetary Policy from Devaluation to Thatcher, 1967-1982 charts the course of monetary policy in the UK from the 1960s to the early 1980s. It shows how events such as the 1967 sterling devaluation, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the stagflation of the 1970s and the International Monetary Fund loan of 1976 all shaped policy. It challenges the existing historiography by showing the Bank of England and the UK Treasury experimenting with money supply 'targets' nearly a decade before the Thatcher government placed monetarism at the heart of economic policy. By misreading the monetary history of the 1970s, the Thatcher government subjected the UK economy to a recession of unnecessary depth and severity that required the monetary policy U-turn of the 1981 budget, the most controversial in post-war British history. Fiscal policy was tightened 6 to the bewilderment of much of the economics profession; monetary policy was loosened -- to the relief of British business. This rebalancing allowed personal consumption, through increased household debt, to become the engine of growth in the 1980s. This failure to heed the lessons of 1970s monetary policy, and the subsequent increase in personal debt, has had profound long-term consequences for the shape of the British economy Front Matter....Pages i-xiii Introduction....Pages 1-20 From Devaluation to Competition and Credit Control, 1967–71....Pages 21-45 Competition and Credit Control, 1971–73....Pages 46-77 The PSBR Takes Over, 1974–76....Pages 78-108 Too Many Targets, 1977–79....Pages 109-133 The Lady Is for Turning, 1979–82....Pages 134-168 Conclusion....Pages 169-174 Back Matter....Pages 175-253