Two Roads to War : The French and British Air Arms From Versailles to Dunkirk

__Two Roads to 1940__ is a comparative study of the French and British air arms, from 1918 to 10 May 1940. Higham seeks the answer to the question "Why was the Armée de l'Air defeated in June 1940 whereas the Royal Air Force won the Battle Over Britain in September?"To reach a conclusion, the structure, the men and matériel, the government, and the economic infrastructure were analyzed. The story reveals that the French, dominated by the Armée de l'Terre, was hypnotized by "1918"; in contrast, the independent RAF evolved in the interwar years into a sophisticated, scientifically based force, which got the Air Defence of Great Britain (1924-1936) ready, was supported by government practices and consistency, as well as the necessary technical support for Fighter Command (1936-). Thus in 1940 the RAF could meet the Luftwaffe challenge.But the RAF also suffered from three major errors; no Air Officer Commander-in-Chief to control all the air commands, the... Two Roads to 1940 is a comparative study of the French and British air arms, from 1918 to 10 May 1940. Higham seeks the answer to the question #x93;Why was the Armée de l'Air defeated in June 1940 whereas the Royal Air Force won the Battle Over Britain in September?" To reach a conclusion, the structure, the men and matériel, the government, and the economic infrastructure were analyzed. The story reveals that the French, dominated by the Armée de l'Terre, was hypnotized by #x93;1918"; in contrast, the independent RAF evolved in the interwar years into a sophisticated, scientifically based force, which got the Air Defence of Great Britain (1924-1936) ready, was supported by government practices and consistency, as well as the necessary technical support for Fighter Command (1936-). Thus in 1940 the RAF could meet the Luftwaffe challenge. But the RAF also suffered from three major errors; no Air Officer Commander-in-Chief to control all the air commands, the almost fatal miscalculations of the power of Bomber Command, and the Army Ordnance's refusal to develop the .50-caliber machine-gun instead of the .303. Serious historians and buffs should find the story salutary, as well as a detailed explanation of why air forces fail Noted aviation historian Robin Higham has written this comparative study of the evolution of the French and British air arms from 1918 to 1940 to determine why the Armée de l'Air was defeated in June 1940 but the Royal Air Force was able to win the battle over Britain in September. After analyzing the structure, men, and matériel of the air arms, and the government and economic infrastructure of both countries, he concludes that the French force was dominated by the Armée de Terre, had no suitably powerful aero engines, and suffered from the chaos of French politics. In contrast, the independent RAF evolved into a sophisticated, scientifically based force, supported by consistent government practices. Higham's thorough examination, however, finds the British not without error.