Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 : Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics

As it became evident that the Allies were winning World War II, Turkish policy-makers struggled to achieve their objectives in the shifting circumstances of wartime diplomacy. Edward Weisband's detailed description of Turkish foreign policy from 1943 to 1945 reveals that it was complicated by the fact that its two principal aims dictated contradictory positions. The first aim was the priority of peace over expansionism—this implied a noninterventionist policy. On the other hand, the belief that the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to the security of the Republic often made intervention to contain Russia seem necessary for national defense. Turkish officials became determined to influence the postwar settlement towards an equilibrium among the great powers that would limit Soviet expansionism, which the Turks assumed they could not do alone. Consequently, they were among the first to envision the contours of the Cold War. After outlining the historical origins of the ideology that lay behind Turkish diplomacy, the first part of the book concentrates on the policy-making process in Ankara and assesses the relative influence of individual leaders and institutions. The second part analyzes both Turkey's responses to the exigencies of war and the general nature of small state diplomacy. Originally published in 1973. The **Princeton Legacy Library** uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. Contents Acknowledgments Introduction The Analytical Framework: The Operational Code of Turkish Foreign Policy The Impact of Kemalism on the Ideology of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Priority of Peace, Sovereignty, and National Development Over Expansionist-Revisionism The Second Principle in the Operational Code of Turkish Foreign Policy: Russia as Primary Threat to the Security of the Republic Part I. Inside Turkey During the War I. The Policy-Making Process Ismet Inonu and the Constants of Turkish Foreign Policy Numan Menemencioglu and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Council of Ministers The Grand National Assembly and the Parliamentary Group of the CHP The Turkish Historical Society II. The Press and Public Opinion in Turkey The Press in Turkey During the War Public Opinion in Turkey During the War III. A Brief Analysis of the Economic Picture The Scourge of Inflation Repressive Domestic Measures Turkey's Economic Dependence on Germany The Attempt to Break Loose from Germany The Anglo-American Preemptive Purchasing Program The Issue of Chromite and the Turkish Reaction The Result of Tough Turkish Bargaining Part II. Inside Turkey During the War IV. Allied Ascendancy Begins: The Conference at Casablanca The Casablanca Meeting The Casablanca Agreement and its Consequences The Doctrine of Unconditional Surrender V. The Conference at Adana: A Meeting of Misunderstandings The Adana Talks The Ambiguous Aftermath of Adana VI. Operation Footdrag The British Play their Hand with Russia and Turkey The Turks Drag their Feet Churchill Plays his Trump The Turkish Escape and Supply Route VII. Pressure on Turkey Mounts: Meetings of Foreign Ministers The Moscow Conference: The Russians Try to Force Turkey into the War Menemencioglu and Eden at Cairo: The British Play the Russian Hand The New Turkish Strategy: A Tactical Shift VIII. Pressures on Turkey at the Summit: Meetings of Heads of Government The First Cairo Conference: A Brief Handshake The Tehran Conference: The Soviet Reversal The Second Cairo Conference: Inonu Confronts Roosevelt and Churchill Part III. Turkey's Efforts to Contain Allied Victory IX. A Time of Estrangement The Deterioration of Anglo-Turkish Relations Menemencioglu Approaches the Russians X. The Shift in Internal Policy The Varhk Vergisi The Pan-Turanian Question Pan-Turanian Elements Pan-Turanist Partisans in Government and their Influence on Decision-Making XI. Realignment of Turkish Foreign Policy The Cessation of Chromite Deliveries to Germany Menemencioglu's Resignation and the Closure of the Straits to Axis Warships Severance of Relations with Germany XII. Turkey Between Emerging Spheres Allied Victories during the Summer and Fall of 1944 Soviet Occupation of Bulgaria and the Reaction in Turkey The British Occupation of Greece: A Time of Tribulation The Churchill-Stalin Meeting of October 1944 and the Decision to Establish Spheres of Influence XIII. The Search for Postwar Security The Dumbarton Oaks Conference The Crimea Conference: The Ending of War The Turkish Declaration of War The Soviet Note of March 19, 1945 The San Francisco Conference: The Turkish Perspective XIV. A Historical Note: The Predicted Soviet Demands on Turkey XV. Conclusion: Summary Analysis Bibliography Index As it became evident that the Allies were winning World War II, Turkish policy-makers struggled to achieve their objectives in the shifting circumstances of wartime diplomacy. Edward Weisband's detailed description of Turkish foreign policy from 1943 to 1945 reveals that it was complicated by the fact that its two principal aims dictated contradictory positions. The first aim was the priority of peace over expansionism--this implied a noninterventionist policy. On the other hand, the belief that the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to the security of the Republic often made intervention to contain Russia seem necessary for national defense. Turkish officials became determined to influence the postwar settlement towards an equilibrium among the great powers that would limit Soviet expansionism, which the Turks assumed they could not do alone. Consequently, they were among the first to envision the contours of the Cold War. After outlining the historical origins of the ideology that lay behind Turkish diplomacy, the first part of the book concentrates on the policy-making process in Ankara and assesses the relative influence of individual leaders and institutions. The second part analyzes both Turkey's responses to the exigencies of war and the general nature of small state diplomacy. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905