Truth in virtue of meaning : [a defence of the analytic, synthetic distinction

The Analytic/synthetic Distinction Looks Simple. It Is A Distinction Between Two Different Kinds Of Sentence. Synthetic Sentences Are True In Part Because Of The Way The World Is, And In Part Because Of What They Mean. Analytic Sentences - Like All Bachelors Are Unmarried And Triangles Have Three Sides - Are Different. They Are True In Virtue Of Meaning, So No Matter What The World Is Like, As Long As The Sentence Means What It Does, It Will Be True. This Distinction Seems Powerful Because Analytic Sentences Seem To Be Knowable In A Special Way. One Can Know That All Bachelors Are Unmarried, For Example, Just By Thinking About What It Means. But Many Twentieth-century Philosophers, With Quine In The Lead, Argued That There Were No Analytic Sentences, That The Idea Of Analyticity Didn't Even Make Sense, And That The Analytic/synthetic Distinction Was Therefore An Illusion. Others Couldn't See How There Could Fail To Be A Distinction, However Ingenious The Arguments Of Quine And His Supporters. But Since The Heyday Of The Debate, Things Have Changed In The Philosophy Of Language. Tools Have Been Refined, Confusions Cleared Up, And Most Significantly, Many Philosophers Now Accept A View Of Language - Semantic Externalism - On Which It Is Possible To See How The Distinction Could Fail. One Might Be Tempted To Think That Ultimately The Distinction Has Fallen For Reasons Other Than Those Proposed In The Original Debate. In Truth In Virtue Of Meaning, Gillian Russell Argues That It Hasn't. Using The Tools Of Contemporary Philosophy Of Language, She Outlines A View Of Analytic Sentences Which Is Compatible With Semantic Externalism And Defends That View Against The Old Quinean Arguments. She Then Goes On To Draw Out The Surprising Epistemological Consequences Of Her Approach.--jacket. The 'in Virtue Of' Relation -- Meaning -- Beyond Modality -- The Spectre Of Two Dogmas -- Definitions -- More Arguments Against Analyticity -- Analytic Justification. Gillian Russell. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [223]-228) And Index. Contents......Page 8 Preface......Page 10 Acknowledgements......Page 14 Introduction......Page 18 I. THE POSITIVE VIEW......Page 42 1.1 The Two-Factor Argument......Page 46 1.2 Disambiguating ‘in virtue of’......Page 49 1.3 Collapse into Necessity?......Page 54 2.1 The Language Myth......Page 60 2.2 Kripke and Kaplan......Page 64 2.3 Truth in Virtue of Reference Determiner......Page 69 2.4 Examples of Analytic Truths......Page 74 2.5 Two Objections and a Serious Problem......Page 83 3.1 The Problem......Page 88 3.2 Semantics and Modality......Page 89 3.3 Strict Truth in Virtue of Meaning......Page 99 3.4 The Definition of Analyticity......Page 116 3.5 Examples......Page 121 A.1 Preliminaries......Page 126 A.2 The Language......Page 134 A.3 Semantics......Page 136 A.4 Content, Validity and Reference Determiners......Page 138 A.5 Some Theorems......Page 139 II. A DEFENSE......Page 142 4.1 The Circularity Objection......Page 146 4.2 The Argument from Confirmation Holism......Page 152 5. Definitions......Page 160 5.1 The Transience of Definition......Page 161 5.2 Rethinking Definitions......Page 163 5.3 Definitions as Postulates......Page 174 5.4 Conventions of Notational Abbreviation......Page 176 6.1 The Regress Argument......Page 180 6.2 The Indeterminacy of Translation......Page 187 6.3 Two Arguments from Externalism......Page 192 6.4 An Argument from Vagueness......Page 194 6.5 Blue Gold, Robot Cats......Page 197 III. WORK FOR EPISTEMOLOGISTS......Page 208 7. Analytic Justification......Page 212 7.1 A Priori Justification......Page 213 7.2 Analytic Justification......Page 215 7.3 Theory 1: Naive Analytic Justification......Page 216 7.4 Theory 2: Nihilism about Analytic Justification......Page 219 7.5 The Problem of Semantic Competence......Page 220 7.6 An Alternative Basis for Analytic Justification......Page 224 7.7 Theory 3: Analytic Justification......Page 226 7.8 Some Consequences......Page 232 Bibliography......Page 240 C......Page 246 K......Page 247 S......Page 248 Z......Page 249 ## Abstract The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences. The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences (the idea that some sentences are true or false just in virtue of what they mean) is a famous focus of philosophical controversy. Gillian Russell reinvigorates the debate with a new defence of the distinction, showing that it is compatible with semantic externalism. Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 1 kapitel eller op til 5% af teksten