Truth In Marketing: A Theory Of Claim-evidence Relations (routledge Studies In Business Ethics)

"Can we believe the claims that marketers make? Does truth in marketing matter? Apparently not... Despite the role of regulators, marketing claims are often ruled to be misleading, deceptive or incomplete. Surprisingly, scholars of marketing ethics have devoted little time to this key issue. This may be because although key codes of marketing conduct insist on truthful communications, there is only limited understanding of what truthfulness itself actually entails. This innovative book develops a theory of truth in marketing and discusses the implications for consumers, marketing professionals and policymakers. Focusing on the problem of truth in marketing, it analyses the theory of truth in marketing, and examines the wider significance of marketing truth for society. Using a wide selection of engaging global examples and cases to illustrate this fascinating analysis, this engaging book will provide a provocative read for all scholars and educators in marketing, marketing/business ethics and CSR." -- Publisher's description 1. Specifying the Domain1.1 The problem of truth in marketing1.2 What is a theory of truth in marketing?1.3 Constructs of meaning1.4 Domain epistemology1.5 Truth-values and truth measurement1.6 Interpretation, truth and objectivity1.7 Conclusion2. The Classical Pragmatic Theory of Truth2.1 The legacy of American pragmatism2.2 The pragmatic maxim2.3 Preliminary remarks on the pragmatic theory of truth2.4 The pragmatic theory of truth2.5 Conclusion3. The Correspondence Criterion of Truth3.1 Correspondence in historic context3.2. The general correspondence theory of truth3.3 Marketing specific truth-makers and functional claims3.4 Objections3.5 Conclusion4. The Coherence Criterion of Truth4.1 Key components of the coherence theory4.2 Symbolic value and symbolic claims4.3 Symbolic truth as internal and external coherence4.4 The nature of coherence: inferential connectivity4.5 Objections4.6 Conclusion5. The Instrumental Criterion of Truth5.1 The general idea5.2 Truth, segmentation and targeting5.3 Alethic facilitation and ontological truth5.4 Alethic responsibility5.5 When is the consumer entitled to believe a behavioural claim?5.6 A standard objection5.7 Conclusion6. Alethic Pluralism6.1 The pluralistic nature of the theory of truth in marketing6.2 Alethic pluralism and objectivity6.3 Pluralism and the metaphysical concept of truth: versus 6.4 Truth and normativity6.5 ConclusionReferences 2.4 The pragmatic theory of truth -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 3 The correspondence criterion of truth -- 3.1 Correspondence in historic context -- 3.2 The general correspondence theory of truth -- 3.3 Marketing-specific truth-makers and functional claims -- 3.4 Objections -- 3.5 Conclusion -- 4 The coherence criterion of truth -- 4.1 Key components of the coherence theory -- 4.2 Symbolic value and symbolic claims -- 4.3 Symbolic truth as internal and external coherence -- 4.4 The nature of coherence: inferential connectivity -- 4.5 Objections -- 4.6 Conclusion -- 5 The instrumental criterion of truth Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- List of figures and tables -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Specifying the domain -- 1.1 The problem of truth in marketing -- 1.2 What is a theory of truth in marketing? -- 1.3 Constructs of meaning -- 1.4 Domain epistemology -- 1.5 Truth-values and truth measurement -- 1.6 Interpretation, truth and objectivity -- 1.7 Conclusion -- 2 The classical pragmatic theory of truth -- 2.1 The legacy of American pragmatism -- 2.2 The pragmatic maxim -- 2.3 Preliminary remarks on the pragmatic theory of truth 5.1 The general idea -- 5.2 Truth, segmentation and targeting -- 5.3 Alethic facilitation and ontological truth -- 5.4 Alethic responsibility -- 5.5 When is the consumer entitled to believe a behavioural claim? -- 5.6 A standard objection -- 5.7 Conclusion -- 6 Alethic pluralism -- 6.1 The pluralistic nature of the theory of truth in marketing -- 6.2 Alethic pluralism and objectivity -- 6.3 Truth and normativity -- 6.4 Conclusion -- References -- Index