Truth

After a brief presentation of the classical conceptions of truth - correspondence, coherence, verificationist, and pragmatist theories - the book focuses on the debate between those who favour "substantive" conceptions of this classical kind and those who advocate so-called "minimalist" and "deflationist" conceptions and deny that truth can be any more than a thin concept, carrying no metaphysical weight. Cover Contents Preface Introduction: Truth lost? 1 Classical theories of truth 1.1 A preliminary map 1.2 Correspondence 1.3 Coherence 1.4 Verificationism 1.5 Pragmatism 1.6 The identity theory 2 Deflationism 2.1 Varieties of deflationism 2.2 Redundancy and disquotation 2.3 Tarski's semantic theory 2.4 Horwich's deflationist minimalism 2.5 The false modesty of deflationism 2.6 Rorty, Nietzsche and Heidegger 3 Minimal realism 3.1 Wright's minimal anti-realism 3.2 Putnam's "natural realism" 3.3 Truth and truth-aptness 3.4 Minimal realism stated 3.5 Minimal realism and the norm of knowledge 4 The realist/anti-realist controversies 4.1 Theoretical truths in science 4.2 Truth in ethics 4.3 Mathematical truth 4.4 Realism vindicated 5 The norm of truth 5.1 Truth and normativity 5.2 The ethics of belief 5.3 Cognitive suicide 5.4 What's wrong with relativism Conclusion: Truth regained Notes Bibliography Index A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W "There's been a murder. Allegedly." "William de Worde is the Discworld's first investigative journalist. He didn't mean to be - it was just an accident." "But, as William fills his pages with reports of local club meetings and pictures of humorously-shaped vegetables, dark forces high up in Ankh-Morpork's society are plotting to overthrow the city's ruler, Lord Vetinari. They've employed two Tarantino-esque thugs, Mr Tulip and Mr Pin. They mean business." "Luckily, William has an informant. He can't be a talking dog because dogs can't talk. He's known only as ... Deep Bone."--Jacket Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics. An introduction to the philosophical issues in the theory of truth that provides exposition of ideas while offering perspectives that advances discussion of the key issues. It begins with a presentation of the conceptions of truth - the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and verificationist and pragmatist accounts