Truth

## Abstract This book presents a deflationary perspective called ‘minimalism’—a reaction against the traditional and widespread idea that the property of truth has some sort of underlying nature and that our problem as philosophers is to say what that nature is, to analyse truth either conceptually or substantively, to specify, at least roughly, the conditions necessary and sufficient for something to be true. In contrast, minimalism makes three correlated claims. First, the function of our concept of truth is merely to permit the formulation of certain generalizations (e.g. we are able to say ‘Every instance of “p→p” is true’, but without such a concept it is unclear how one might articulate the logical law whose instances are ‘dogs bark → dogs bark’, ‘Killing is wrong → killing is wrong’, etc.). Second, the meaning of the word ‘true’ derives, not from any explicit definition of the familiar kind, but rather from the fact that we are disposed to infer ‘It is true that ‘p’ from ‘p’, and vice versa. Third, such a mundane logical notion cannot play the fundamental role in philosophical theorizing to which it is often assigned within debates surrounding the nature of meaning, vagueness, normativity, reality, etc. Thus minimalism has ramifications throughout the subject. The book begins by articulating these claims and proceeds to refine and defend them in the course of responding to 39 potential objections (which are set out in the Contents). What is truth? Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a notable philosophical theory, `minimalism'. This is the controversial theory that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore, despite the philosophical struggles to which it has given rise, an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. Horwich makes a powerful case for the minimalist view, and gives a careful systematic explanation of its implications for a cluster of important philosophical issues on which questions about truth have impinged. The first edition of Truth, published in 1990, established itself both as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition Paul Horwich has refined and developed his treatment of the subject in the light of subsequent discussions, while preserving the distinctive format which made the book so successful. It appears simultaneously with his new book Meaning, a companion work which sets out the broader philosophical context for the theory of truth: an account of meaning which seeks to accommodate the diversity of valuable insights that have been gained in the twentieth century within a common-sense view of meaning as deriving from use. The two books together present a compelling view of the relations between language, thought, and reality. Horwich's demystification of meaning and truth will be essential reading for all philosophers of language. Praise for the first edition:'subtle, penetrating and ingenious... everyone interested in philosophy is in his debt'Michael Dummett, University of Oxford'lucid and compact... a forthright presentation of an interesting thesis'Donald Davidson, University of California, Berkeley'This is an excellent book and deserves to be widely read and used as a text. It states its thesis clearly and argues for it briskly: a style that seems well calculated to start discussions... It seems like an admirable starting-point for several weeks'worth of discussions in a philosophy of language course at upper-division undergraduate level.'Australasian Journal of Philosophy'clearly written and well-structured'British Journal for the Philosophy of Science'clear, informed and provocative... I thoroughly recommend the book to everyone in the philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and metaphysics'Michael Devitt, Mind and Language What Is Truth? Paul Horwich Gives The Definitive Exposition Of A Notable Philosophical Idea, 'minimalism'. This Is The Controversial Idea That The Nature Of Truth Is Entirely Captured In The Trivial Fact That Each Proposition Specifies Its Own Condition For Being True, And That Truth Is Therefore, Despite The Philosophical Struggles To Which It Has Given Rise, An Entirely Mundane And Unpuzzling Concept. Horwich Makes A Powerful Case For The Minimalist View, And Gives A Careful Systematic Explanation Of Its Implications For A Cluster Of Important Philosophical Issues On Which Questions About Truth Have Impinged. For This New Edition Paul Horwich Has Refined And Developed His Treatment Of The Subject In The Light Of Subsequent Discussions, While Preserving The Distinctive Format That Made The Book So Successful.--jacket. The Minimal Theory -- The Proper Formulation -- The Explanatory Role Of The Concept Of Truth -- Methodology And Scientific Realism -- Meaning And Logic -- Propositions And Utterances -- The 'correspondence' Intuition. Paul Horwich. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [147]-154) And Index. What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed his treatment of the subject in the light of subsequent discussions, while preserving the distinctive format that made the earlier edition so successful. 'What is truth?', we sometimes ask-but the question tends to be rhetorical, conveying the somewhat defeatist idea that a good answer, if indeed there is such a thing, will be so subtle, so profound, and so hard to find, that to look for one would surely be a waste of time. What is truth? Horwich offers an exposition of the theory of minimalism, which argues that truth is an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. He makes a case for the minimalist view and explains its implications in a variety of situations