Transnational Private Regulations for Sustainable Urban Development (New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, 69)

This book analyzes the mechanism of transnational private regulations (TPRs) in the global property investment market and the conditions of their effectiveness for sustainable urban development. In the present economy, with control over national legislation alone, state policymakers have been challenged to regulate transnational investors, markets, and issues such as global warming, financial crises, food safety risks, deforestation, and cross-border business transactions. Transgovernmental networks of regulators have assembled representatives and technical experts from national regulatory agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private firms, and business organizations. As private corporations become increasingly globalized, many forms of TPRs have emerged since the 1990s for legislation, standard-setting, monitoring of compliance, and implementation of transnational rules, to respond to challenges posed by the transformation of domestic and international regulatory environments. TPRs are self-regulated, non-state, market-driven regulations. Since the emergence of TPRs, the global rule-making landscape has become dynamic. Urban development and property investment have been viewed historically as local phenomena: The regulations and standards in this field have been established and enforced by governments, local associations, and national professional bodies. However, as urban development and property investment increasingly have been globalized, the services, transactions, and investments by private firms have transcended national boundaries. For this reason, it has become difficult for states to regulate global activities through existing national legislation or international regulatory systems. As the management of new transnational issues through collaborations between various actors is unpredictable, it is necessary to examine the mechanism of TPRs in global property investment and their effectiveness for sustainable urban development. Preface Contents List of Abbreviations List of Figures List of Tables Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Target of Research: TPRs 1.1.1 Background: Emergence of TPRs 1.1.2 Trans-Governmental Networks (TGNs) of Regulators 1.2 Value of Research and Missing Information 1.2.1 Background of Sustainable Urban Development 1.2.2 The Global REIT Market 1.2.3 Policy Challenges within Global Urban Development 1.2.3.1 Economic Issues of Global Urban Development 1.2.3.2 Environmental Issues of Global Urban Development 1.2.3.3 Social Issues of Global Urban Development 1.2.4 TPRs for Sustainable Urban Development 1.2.5 Transgovernmental Forums in the Global Property Market 1.3 Purpose 1.3.1 Research Objective 1.3.2 Research Questions 1.4 Research Methodology 1.5 Research Organization References Chapter 2: Framework for the Analysis of Transnational Private Regulations 2.1 Previous Studies and Key Literature 2.1.1 Previous Studies on the TPR Theory and Example of Cases 2.1.2 Global Regulatory Governance through the RIT Model 2.1.3 Global Regulatory Governance through the OIT Model 2.2 Re-examination of the Framework: Proposal of the ORIITO Model 2.2.1 Background of the Framework for the Analysis of the Mechanism of TPRs 2.2.2 Definition of the ORIITO Model 2.2.3 Reasons for Proposing the ORIITO Model 2.3 Demonstration of TPR Analysis Using the ORIITO Model 2.3.1 International Financial Reporting Standards 2.3.2 Good Agricultural Practice 2.3.3 International Business Management System Standards 2.4 Hypothesis on the Conditions for the Effectiveness of TPRs 2.4.1 Previous Studies on the Effectiveness of TPRs 2.4.2 Measurement Structure for the Effectiveness of TPRs 2.4.2.1 Independent Variables of the Effectiveness of TPRs 2.4.2.2 Indicators for Effectiveness of TPRs 2.5 Need for Case Studies on TPRs for Sustainable Urban Development References Chapter 3: Case Study of TPRs for Economic Issues in Urban Development 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Analysis of GRETI (Category I-1) 3.2.1 Background of GRETI 3.2.2 Mechanism of GRETI: ORIITO Stakeholders in GRETI 3.2.2.1 Relationship Between Orchestrator and Regulator 3.2.2.2 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary I 3.2.2.3 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary II 3.2.2.4 Relationship among Target, Organizer, and Other Stakeholders 3.2.3 Effectiveness of GRETI 3.2.3.1 Analysis of Independent Variables Securing Legitimacy Expertise and Public Commitment Criteria for Membership Decision-making Processes Regulator Focality Goal Similarity Intermediary Availability State Commitment 3.2.3.2 Analysis of the Indicators of Effectiveness Transparent Engagement with Regulators and Other Stakeholders in TPR Implementation Market Stakeholders ́ Compliance Improvement Rise in the Uptake of TPR Implementation 3.3 Analysis of the IVS (Category I-2) 3.3.1 Background of the IVS 3.3.2 Mechanism of the IVS: ORIITO Stakeholders in the IVS 3.3.2.1 Relationship Between Orchestrator and Regulator 3.3.2.2 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary I 3.3.2.3 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary II 3.3.2.4 Relationship among Target, Organizer, and Other stakeholders 3.3.3 Effectiveness of the IVS 3.3.3.1 Analysis of Independent Variables Securing Legitimacy Expertise and Public Commitment Criteria for Membership Decision-making Processes Regulator Focality Goal Similarity Intermediary Availability State Commitment 3.3.3.2 Analysis of Indicators of Effectiveness Transparent Engagement of Regulators and Other Stakeholders in TPR Implementation Market Stakeholders ́ Compliance Improvement Rise in the Uptake of TPR Implementation 3.4 Effectiveness of TPRs for Economic Issues in Urban Development Chapter 4: Case Study of TPRs for Environmental Issues in Urban Development 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Analysis of the GRESB (Category II-1) 4.2.1 Background of the GRESB 4.2.2 Mechanism of the GRESB: ORIITO Stakeholders in the GRESB 4.2.2.1 Relationship Between Orchestrator and Regulator 4.2.2.2 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary I 4.2.2.3 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary II 4.2.2.4 Relationship among Target, Organizer, and Other stakeholders 4.2.3 Effectiveness of the GRESB 4.2.3.1 Analysis of Independent Variables Securing Legitimacy Expertise and Public Commitment Criteria for Membership Decision-making Processes Regulator Focality Goal Similarity Intermediary Availability State Commitment 4.2.3.2 Analysis of Indicators of Effectiveness Transparent Engagement with Regulators and Other Stakeholders in TPR Implementation Market Stakeholders ́ Compliance Improvement Rise in the Uptake of TPR Implementation 4.3 Analysis of LEED (Category II-2) 4.3.1 Background of LEED 4.3.2 Mechanism of LEED: ORIITO Stakeholders in LEED 4.3.2.1 Relationship Between Orchestrator and Regulator 4.3.2.2 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary I 4.3.2.3 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary II 4.3.2.4 Relationship among Target, Organizer, and Other stakeholders 4.3.3 Effectiveness of LEED 4.3.3.1 Analysis of Independent Variables Securing Legitimacy Expertise and Public Commitment Criteria for Membership Decision-making Processes Regulator Focality Goal Similarity Intermediary Availability State Commitment 4.3.3.2 Analysis of Indicators of Effectiveness Transparent Engagement with Regulators and Other Stakeholders in TPR Implementation Market Stakeholders ́ Compliance Improvement Rise in the Uptake of TPR Implementation 4.4 Effectiveness of TPRs for Environmental Issues in Urban Development Reference Chapter 5: Case Study of TPRs for Social Issues in Urban Development 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Analysis of SURF (Category III-1) 5.2.1 Background of SURF 5.2.2 Mechanism of SURF: ORIITO Stakeholders in SURF 5.2.2.1 Relationship Between Orchestrator and Regulator 5.2.2.2 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary I 5.2.2.3 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary II 5.2.2.4 Relationship among Target, Organizer, and Other Stakeholders 5.2.3 Effectiveness of SURF 5.2.3.1 Analysis of Independent Variables Securing Legitimacy Expertise and public commitment Criteria for membership Decision-making processes Regulator Focality Goal Similarity Intermediary availability State commitment 5.2.3.2 Analysis of Indicators for Effectiveness Transparent engagement with regulators and other stakeholders in TPR implementation Market stakeholders ́ compliance improvement Rise in the uptake of TPR implementation 5.3 Analysis of the JCI (Category III-2) 5.3.1 Background of the JCI 5.3.2 Mechanism of the JCI: ORIITO Stakeholders in JCI 5.3.2.1 Relationship Between Orchestrator and Regulator 5.3.2.2 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary I 5.3.2.3 Relationship Between Regulator and Intermediary II 5.3.2.4 Relationship Among Target, Organizer, and Other Stakeholders 5.3.3 Effectiveness of JCI 5.3.3.1 Analysis of Independent Variables Securing Legitimacy Expertise and Public Commitment Criteria for Membership Decision-making processes Regulator Focality Goal Similarity Intermediary Availability State commitment 5.3.3.2 Analysis of Indicators of Effectiveness Transparent engagement with regulators and other stakeholders in TPR implementation Market stakeholders ́ compliance improvement Rise in the uptake of TPR implementation 5.4 Effectiveness of TPRs for Social Issues in Urban Development Chapter 6: Conclusion 6.1 Conclusion 6.1.1 Mechanism of TPRs for Sustainable Urban Development 6.1.2 The Relevance of the ORIITO Model to Other Global Policy Issues 6.1.3 Conclusion Regarding the Effectiveness of TPRs 6.1.3.1 Conditions for the Effectiveness of TPRs Securing Legitimacy Hypothesis Expertise and Public Commitment Criteria for Membership Decision-Making Processes Regulator Focality Hypothesis Goal Similarity Hypothesis Intermediary Availability Hypothesis State Commitment Hypothesis 6.1.3.2 The Inter-Connection of Variables for the Effectiveness of TPRs 6.2 Considerations on TPRs for Sustainable Urban Development 6.2.1 Limitations of the Study Derived from the Case Studies 6.2.2 The Role of TPR Stakeholders for the Effectiveness of TPRs 6.2.3 The Governance Systems for the Effectiveness of TPRs Reference Appendix: Effectiveness and Outcome: Quantitative Analysis of the Global Real Estate Transparency Index (GRETI) A.1 Introduction: GRETI Introduction in the Global Property Market A.2 Quantitative Analysis of GRETI A.2.1 Purpose of the Research A.2.1.1 Hypothesis of the Research A.2.1.2 Previous Research A.2.2 Empirical Analysis A.2.2.1 Data on Transparency in the Property Market A.2.2.2 Data on Cross-Border Transaction Ratio in Property Markets A.2.2.3 Data on the Exchange Rate A.2.2.4 Summary Statistics A.2.3 Estimation Model and Results A.2.4 Conclusions of Quantitative Analysis A.3 Conclusion: Outcome of GRETI for Sustainable Property Investment References