Transcendental Arguments and Science: Essays in Epistemology (Synthese Library, 133)

The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi­ cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi­ cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result­ ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep­ tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously. Editorial Introduction......Page 2 PART I: THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS......Page 4 Transcendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason (Manfred Baum)......Page 5 Transcendental Arguments, Synthetic and Analytic: Comment on Baum (Rudiger Bittner)......Page 29 A Note on Transcendental Propositions in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Comment on Baum (Konrad Cramer)......Page 38 Analytic Transcendental Arguments (Jonathan Bennett)......Page 45 On Bennett's "Analytic Transcendental Arguments" (Stephan Korner)......Page 65 Comment on Bennett (Gunther Patzig)......Page 70 Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism (Richard Rorty)......Page 75 Comment on Rorty (Wolfgang Carl)......Page 102 Challenger or Competitor? On Rorty's Account of Transcendental Strategies (Dieter Henrich)......Page 110 PART II: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE......Page 118 The Preconditions of Experience and the Unity of Physics (C. F. von Weizsacker)......Page 119 Comment on von Weizsacker (Mary Hesse)......Page 155 Comment on von Weizsacker (Peter Mittelstaedt)......Page 167 The Concept of Science: Some Remarks on the Methodological Issue "Construction" versus "Description" in the Philosophy of Science (Kuno Lorenz)......Page 173 Transcendentalism and Protoscience: Comment on Lorenz (Rudiger Bubner)......Page 187 Sellarsian Realism and Conceptual Change in Science (Richard M. Burian)......Page 192 Some Remarks on Realism and Scientific Revolutions: Comment on Burian (Lorenz Kruger)......Page 221 Realism and Underdetermination: Comment on Burian (Charles Parsons)......Page 228 PART III: THE TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH AND ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS......Page 236 Transcendental Arguments and Pragmatic Epistemology (Jay F. Rosenberg)......Page 237 Conceptual Schemes, Justification, and Consistency: Comment on Rosenberg (Rolf P. Horstmann)......Page 255 Comment on Rosenberg (Harald Pilot)......Page 262 The Significance of Scepticism (Barry Stroud)......Page 267 Scepticism and How to Take It: Comment on Stroud (Peter Bieri)......Page 288 Index of Names......Page 297 Index of Subjects......Page 300