To Agree or Not to Agree : Leadership, Bargaining, and Arms Control

Explains why, despite the fierce rivalry of the Cold War, Russians and Americans could negotiate arms control agreements | Why were the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union able to negotiate a series of arms control agreements despite the deep and important differences in their interests during the Cold War? Lisa A. Baglione considers a variety of explanations for the successes—and failures—of these negotiations drawn from international relations theories. Focusing on the goals and strategies of individual leaders—and their ability to make these the goals and strategies of their nation—the author develops a nuanced understanding that better explains the outcome of these negotiations. Baglione then tests her explanation in a consideration of negotiations surrounding the banning of above-ground nuclear tests, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s, the negotiations for the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the 1980s, and the last negotiations between the Americans and the disintegrating Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991. How these great rivals were able to negotiate significant arms control agreements not only will shed light on international relations during an important period of history but will help us understand how such agreements might develop in the post-Cold War period, when arms proliferation has become a serious problem. This book will appeal to scholars of international relations and arms control as well as those interested in bargaining and international negotiations and contemporary military history. Lisa A. Baglione is Assistant Professor of Political Science, St. Joseph's University. Why were the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union able to negotiate a series of arms control agreements despite the deep and important differences in their interests during the Cold War? Lisa A. Baglione considers a variety of explanations for the successes -and failures -- of these negotiations drawn from international relations theories. Focusing on the goals and strategies of individual leaders -- and their ability to make these the goals and strategies of their nation -the author develops a nuanced understanding that better explains the outcome of these negotiations. Baglione then tests her explanation in a consideration of negotiations surrounding the banning of aboveground nuclear tests, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s, the negotiations for the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the 1980s, and the last negotiations between the Americans and the disintegrating Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991. How these great rivals were able to negotiate significant arms control agreements not only will shed light on international relations during an important period of history but will help us understand how such agreements might develop in the post-Cold War period, when arms proliferation has become a serious problem.This book will appeal to scholars of international relations and arms control as well as those interested in bargaining and international negotiations and contemporary military history. Lisa Baglione offers a model that focuses on the role of leaders to help us understand the successes and failures of American-Soviet negotiations and by implication other sets of critical negotiations. In examining the goals and strategies of individual leaders - and their ability to make these the goals and strategies of their nations - the author provides a nuanced understanding that demonstrates how leaders facing a variety of domestic and international pressures sometimes succeed and sometimes fail to arrive at agreements with the leaders of their most important rival. Scholars of international relations and arms control as well as those interested in bargaining and international negotiations and contemporary military history will find To Agree or Not to Agree an indispensable addition to the literature. Leadership, bargaining, and arms control Conflicting strategies and inconclusive discussions : Khrushchev, Eisenhower, and the test ban talks From deadlock to mutual compromise : Khrushchev, Kennedy, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty The search for unilateral advantage : impasse at the intermediate-range nuclear forces talks Concluding the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty : Gorbachev and new thinking break the deadlock Finishing start and achieving unilateral reductions : bargaining and leadership at the end of the Cold War Superpower arms control and joint decision making in international relations.