Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa (Studies in Comparative Philosophy and Religion)

This book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. Furthermore, understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy.;Cover; Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India; Series page; Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations for Classical Texts; Introduction; 0.1 Telling the Story of Skepticism in Classical India; 0.2 Skepticism about Philosophy versus Epistemological Skepticism; 0.3 The Scope of This Study and Preview of Contents; 0.4 Expanding the History of Philosophy; Notes; Chapter 1; Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy; 1.1 Digging for Skeptical Roots Cover Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India Series page Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa Copyright page Dedication Contents Preface Acknowledgments Abbreviations for Classical Texts Introduction 0.1 Telling the Story of Skepticism in Classical India 0.2 Skepticism about Philosophy versus Epistemological Skepticism 0.3 The Scope of This Study and Preview of Contents 0.4 Expanding the History of Philosophy Notes Chapter 1 Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy 1.1 Digging for Skeptical Roots 1.2 Skepticism in the Ṛg Veda: The Shadow of Philosophical Inquiry1.3 Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism: Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaṭha, and Kena Upaniṣads 1.4 Materialism, Sañjayan Eel-Wriggling, and Early Buddhist Quietism 1.5: Can Skepticism about Philosophy be a Tradition?: Vitaṇḍa, Prasaṅga, and Prasajya 1.6 Conclusion: Previewing the Fruits of these Skeptical Roots Notes Chapter 2 Nāgārjuna's Buddhist Skepticism 2.1 Interpreting Nāgārjuna: Mysticism, Anti-Realism, and Epistemological Skepticism 2.2 The Middle Way between Mysticism and Anti-Realism 2.3 Nāgārjuna's Two Phases 2.4 How Skepticism about Philosophy Takes Both Phases Seriously2.5 Nāgārjuna's Development of Early Buddhist Quietism: Religiosity without Belief 2.6 Other Historical Precedents: Candrakīrti, Kumārajīva, Khedrupjey's Opponent, and Patsab Nyimadrak 2.7 Conclusion Notes Chapter 3 Nāgārjuna and the Cause of Skepticism 3.1 An Overview of Nāgārjuna's Argumentative Strategies 3.2 Brief Tour of Arguments Concerning the Means of Knowledge in the Vigrahavyāvartanī 3.3 Nāgārjuna's Critique of Theories of Causation 3.4 Conventionalist, Anti-Realist, and Epistemological Skeptical Interpretations 3.5 The Cause of Skepticism3.6 Conclusion: Combining Analysis-Insight and Quietism Notes Chapter 4 Jayarāśi's Cārvāka Skepticism 4.1 The Need for Cārvāka Studies 4.2 Jayarāśi's Method of Destruction: Developing the Materialist and Sañjayan Strains of Early Indian Skepticism 4.3 Jayarāśian Contextualism 4.4 A Contextualist Response to the Inconsistency Objection 4.5 How to Stop Worrying and Love a Life without Philosophy or Religion 4.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 5 Jayarāśi and the Delightful Destruction of Buddhist Epistemology 5.1 Jayarāśi's Denial of Epistemological Realism 5.2 Buddhist Epistemological Realism: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti5.3 The Non-Establishment of Difference Argument 5.4 The Impossibility of Considering Duality Argument 5.5 The Delightful Destruction of Epistemology and Jayarāśi's Skepticism About Philosophy 5.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 6 Śrī Harṣa's Advaita Skepticism 6.1 The Rise of Advaita Vedānta and the Continuing Refinement of Realism 6.2 Interpreting Śrī Harṣa: Negative Dialectic, Positive Idealism, and Non-Realism 6.3 The Critique of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Realism 6.4 The Possibility of Mystical Experience Beginning with the earliest strata of Indian philosophy, this book uncovers a distinct tradition of skepticism in Indian philosophy through a study of the “three pillars” of Indian skepticism near the beginning, middle, and end of the classical era: Nāgārjuna (c. 150-200 CE), Jayarāśi (c. 770-830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa (c. 1125-1180 CE). Moving beyond the traditional school model of understanding the history of Indian philosophy, this book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures coming from different schools but utilizing similar methods: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. This book argues that there is a category of skepticism often overlooked by philosophers today: skepticism about philosophy, varieties of which are found not only in classical India but also in the Western tradition in Pyrrhonian skepticism. Skepticism about philosophy consists of intellectual therapies for those afflicted by the quest for dogmatic beliefs. The book begins with the roots of this type of skepticism in ancient India in the Ṛg Veda, Upaniṣads, and early Buddhist texts. Then there are two chapters on each of the three major figures: one chapter giving each philosopher's overall aims and methods and a second demonstrating how each philosopher applies these methods to specific philosophical issues. The conclusion shows how the history of Indian skepticism might help to answer philosophy's detractors today: while skeptics demonstrate that we should be modest about philosophy's ability to produce firm answers, philosophy nonetheless has other uses such as cultivating critical thinking skills and lessening dogmatism. This book is situated within a larger project of expanding the history of philosophy. Just as the history of Western philosophy ought to inform contemporary philosophy, so should expanding the history of philosophy to include classical India illuminate understandings of philosophy today: its value, limits, and what it can do for us in the 21st century. This book argues that the history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures: Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Har?a. Furthermore, understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy.