Thomas C. Mann: President Johnson, the Cold War, and the Restructuring of Latin American Foreign Policy (Studies In Conflict Diplomacy Peace)

When launching the Alliance for Progress in 1961, John F. Kennedy promised that this new development program would transform Latin America into a community of modern, prosperous, and politically stable allies. Yet, when Richard Nixon ended the program ten years later, there was more evidence of broken promises, political coups, and covert military operations than of transformative cooperation. Sandwiched between Kennedy’s and Nixon’s presidencies, Lyndon Johnson’s marked a transformative era in inter-American relations as Johnson and his chief inter-American aide, Thomas C. Mann, struggled to deliver on their predecessors’ bold promises while grappling with the demands of Cold War national security. In this first in-depth study of Johnson, Mann, and Latin America in the 1960s, Thomas Tunstall Allcock provides a nuanced and balanced assessment of two often maligned yet hugely influential policy makers during this vital period. In demonstrating that Johnson and Mann were New Dealers, keen to operate as good neighbors and support Latin American development and regional integration, Tunstall Allcock illuminates the difficulties faced by US modernization efforts. Ranging from domestic challenges from both right and left to a series of military and political crises including riots in the Panama Canal Zone and the threat of “another Cuba” in the Dominican Republic, these difficulties would be handled with wildly varying degrees of success. In Tunstall Allcock’s account, Johnson and Mann emerge as complex, rounded figures struggling to overcome a host of challenges and their own limitations even as the flaws and shortcomings of US policy are laid bare.

Lyndon Johnson was often blamed for abandoning Kennedy's vision of development and progress in Latin America in favor of his own domestic concerns: anti-communism and economic stability. Johnson, along with his fellow Texan and chief adviser on inter-American affairs Thomas C. Mann, nonetheless offered a vision for American engagement with the developing world even as congressional funding and public enthusiasm for such programs waned and Johnson's presidency collapsed under the weight of the Vietnam War.

This book explores Lyndon Johnson's Latin American policy, from his key advisers to development programs and military interventions, to establish a new perspective on the impact of a complex and controversial president on a tumultuous period in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Demonstrating that much of the negative coverage of their efforts emerged from disgruntled Kennedy loyalists, Tunstall Allcock argues that Johnson and Mann were both New Dealers who possessed a keen desire to operate as good neighbors and support Latin American development and regional integration while dealing with domestic pressure from both right and left.

Based on extensive primary research in multiple archives, this much-needed book provides a crucial exploration of how inter-American relations transitioned from the enthusiasm and excitement of the Kennedy years to the neglect and frustration of the Nixon presidency.

Lyndon Johnson was often blamed for abandoning Kennedy's vision of development and progress in Latin America in favor of his own domestic concerns: anti-communism and economic stability. Johnson, along with his fellow Texan and chief adviser on inter-American affairs Thomas C. Mann, nonetheless offered a vision for American engagement with the developing world even as congressional funding and public enthusiasm for such programs waned and Johnson's presidency collapsed under the weight of the Vietnam War. This book explores Lyndon Johnson's Latin American policy, from his key advisers to development programs and military interventions, to establish a new perspective on the impact of a complex and controversial president on a tumultuous period in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Demonstrating that much of the negative coverage of their efforts emerged from disgruntled Kennedy loyalists, Tunstall Allcock argues that Johnson and Mann were both New Dealers who possessed a keen desire to operate as good neighbors and support Latin American development and regional integration while dealing with domestic pressure from both right and left. Based on extensive primary research in multiple archives, this much-needed book provides a crucial exploration of how inter-American relations transitioned from the enthusiasm and excitement of the Kennedy years to the neglect and frustration of the Nixon presidency. Lyndon Johnson was often blamed for abandoning Kennedy's vision of development and progress in Latin America in favor of his own domestic concerns: anti-communism and economic stability. Johnson, along with his fellow Texan and chief adviser on inter-American affairs Thomas C. Mann, nonetheless offered a vision for American engagement with the developing world even as congressional funding and public enthusiasm for such programs waned and Johnson's presidency collapsed under the weight of the Vietnam War. 0This book explores Lyndon Johnson's Latin American policy, from his key advisers to development programs and military interventions, to establish a new perspective on the impact of a complex and controversial president on a tumultuous period in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Demonstrating that much of the negative coverage of their efforts emerged from disgruntled Kennedy loyalists, Tunstall Allcock argues that Johnson and Mann were both New Dealers who possessed a keen desire to operate as good neighbors and support Latin American development and regional integration while dealing with domestic pressure from both right and left.0Based on extensive primary research in multiple archives, this much-needed book provides a crucial exploration of how inter-American relations transitioned from the enthusiasm and excitement of the Kennedy years to the neglect and frustration of the Nixon presidency When launching the Alliance for Progress in 1961, John F. Kennedy promised that this new development program would transform Latin America into a community of modern, prosperous, & politically stable allies. Yet, when Richard Nixon ended the program ten years later, there was more evidence of broken promises, political coups, & covert military operations than of transformative cooperation. Sandwiched between Kennedy's & Nixon's presidencies, Lyndon Johnson's marked a transformative era in inter-American relations as Johnson & his chief inter-American aide, Thomas C. Mann, struggled to deliver on their predecessors' bold promises while grappling with the demands of Cold War national security. In this study of Johnson, Mann, & Latin America in the 1960s, the author provides a nuanced & balanced assessment of two often maligned yet hugely influential policy makers during this vital period Trade, aid, and the Cold War in the Americas: Thomas Mann and Latin America -- A new deal for the new frontier: from Kennedy to Johnson -- The good neighbor returns? Panama, Brazil, and the alliance for progress -- No more Cubas: the Dominican Republic intervention -- New alliances: the Post-Mann Era