There is No Such Thing as a Social Science: In Defence of Peter Winch (Directions in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis)

Since Peter Winch's death in 1997 there has been a revival of interest in his work. However, this book contends that Winch has been misrepresented in both the recent literature and in contemporary critiques of his writing. Debates in philosophy and sociology about foundational questions of social ontology and methodology often claim to have adequately incorporated and moved beyond Winch's concerns. Reestablishing a Winchian voice, the authors argue that such contentions involve a failure to understand central themes in Winch's writings and that the issues which occupied him in his "Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy" and in his later papers remain central to social studies.A careful reading of crucial parts of the text is offered in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights, alongside a focus on the key question of the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. Drawing parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably Ethnomethodology, "There is No Such Thing as a Social Science" contends that social studies as a discipline has yet to rise to the challenges posed by Winch, demonstrating that Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined. The death of Peter Winch in 1997 sparked a revived interest in his work with this book arguing his work suffered misrepresentation in both recent literature and in contemporary critiques of his writing. Debates in philosophy and sociology about foundational questions of social ontology and methodology often claim to have adequately incorporated and moved beyond Winch's concerns. Re-establishing a Winchian voice, the authors examine how such contentions involve a failure to understand central themes in Winch's writings and that the issues which occupied him in his Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy and later papers remain central to social studies. The volume offers a careful reading of the text in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights and alongside a focus on the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. It draws parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably ethnomethodology, to demonstrate how Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined. Contents......Page 6 Preface......Page 8 Introduction: The Legendary Peter Winch and the Myth of ‘Social Science’......Page 10 1 Beyond Pluralism, Monism, Relativism, Realism etc.: Reassessing Peter Winch......Page 38 2 Winch and Linguistic Idealism......Page 80 3 Seeing Things for Themselves: Winch, Ethnography, Ethnomethodology and Social Studies......Page 100 4 Winch and Conservatism: The Question of Philosophical Quietism......Page 122 Conclusion......Page 146 Bibliography......Page 148 K......Page 156 W......Page 157 Introduction : The Legendary Peter Winch And The Myth Of 'social Science' -- Beyond Pluralism, Monism, Relativism, Realism, Etc. : Reassessing Peter Winch -- Winch And Linguistic Idealism -- Seeing Things For Themselves : Winch, Ethnography, Ethnomethodology, And Social Studies -- Winch And Conservatism : The Question Of Philosophical Quietism. Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read, Wes Sharrock. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [139]-145) And Index. The revived interest in Peter Winch's work since his death in 1997 provoked this exciting new volume. A focus on the misrepresentation he suffered through a failure to understand central social and philosophical themes in his writing, encouraged the authors to re-establish a Winchian voice and examine how his central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined What does Peter Winch mean by his claim that there is no such thing as a social science? Debates in philosophy and sociology about foundational questions of social ontology and methodology often claim to have adequately incorporated and moved beyond Winch's concerns