Theories of Vagueness (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

Vague expressions, such as ''heap,'' ''red'' and ''child,'' proliferate throughout natural languages, and an increasing amount of philosophical attention is being directed at theories of the logic and semantics associated with them. In this book Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from theories of vagueness and how we should compare them. Her powerful and original study will be of interest to readers in philosophy of language and of mind, philosophical logic, epistemology and metaphysics. Most Expressions In Natural Language Are Vague. But What Is The Best Semantic Treatment Of Terms Like 'heap', 'red' And 'child'? And What Is The Logic Of Arguments Involving This Kind Of Vague Expression? These Questions Are Receiving Increasing Philosophical Attention, And In This Timely Book Rosanna Keefe Explores The Questions Of What We Should Want From An Account Of Vagueness And How We Should Assess Rival Theories. Her Discussion Ranges Widely And Comprehensively Over The Main Theories Of Vagueness And Their Supporting Arguments, And She Offers A Powerful And Original Defence Of A Form Of Supervaluationism, A Theory That Requires Almost No Deviation From Standard Logic Yet Can Accommodate The Lack Of Sharp Boundaries To Vague Predicates And Deal With The Paradoxes Of Vagueness In A Methodologically Satisfying Way. Her Study Will Be Of Particular Interest To Readers In Philosophy Of Language And Of Mind, Philosophical Logic, Epistemology And Metaphysics.--jacket. The Phenomena Of Vagueness -- How To Theorise About Vagueness -- The Epistemic View Of Vagueness -- Between Truth And Falsity: Many-valued Logics -- Vagueness By Numbers -- The Pragmatic Account Of Vagueness -- Supervaluationism -- Truth Is Super-truth. Rosanna Keefe. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Most expressions in natural language are vague. But what is the best semantic treatment of terms like'heap','red'and'child'? And what is the logic of arguments involving this kind of vague expression? These questions are receiving increasing philosophical attention, and in this book, first published in 2000, Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from an account of vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her discussion ranges widely and comprehensively over the main theories of vagueness and their supporting arguments, and she offers a powerful and original defence of a form of supervaluationism, a theory that requires almost no deviation from standard logic yet can accommodate the lack of sharp boundaries to vague predicates and deal with the paradoxes of vagueness in a methodologically satisfying way. Her study will be of particular interest to readers in philosophy of language and of mind, philosophical logic, epistemology and metaphysics. Table of Contents......Page 10 Acknowledgements......Page 12 Introduction......Page 14 1 The phenomena of vagueness......Page 19 2 How to theorise about vagueness......Page 50 3 The epistemic view of vagueness......Page 75 4 Between truth and falsity: many-valued logics......Page 98 5 Vagueness by numbers......Page 138 6 The pragmatic account of vagueness......Page 152 7 Supervaluationism......Page 165 8 Truth is super-truth......Page 215 References......Page 234 D......Page 242 K......Page 243 R......Page 244 U......Page 245 Z......Page 246 Table of Contents 10 Acknowledgements 12 Introduction 14 1 The phenomena of vagueness 19 2 How to theorise about vagueness 50 3 The epistemic view of vagueness 75 4 Between truth and falsity: many-valued logics 98 5 Vagueness by numbers 138 6 The pragmatic account of vagueness 152 7 Supervaluationism 165 8 Truth is super-truth 215 References 234 Index 242 A 242 B 242 C 242 D 242 E 243 F 243 G 243 H 243 I 243 K 243 L 244 M 244 N 244 O 244 P 244 Q 244 R 244 S 245 T 245 U 245 V 246 W 246 Z 246 In this book, first published in 2000, Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from an account of vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her powerful study will be of interest to readers in philosophy of mind and of language, philosophical logic, epistemology and metaphysics. The parties to the vigorous debates about vagueness largely agree about which predicates are vague: paradigm cases include 'tall', 'red', 'bald', 'heap', 'tadpole' and 'child'.