Theoretical Analyses of Commodity Tax in an Oligopolistic Market (New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, 57)

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of tax consequences in an oligopolistic market. It provides the reader with a systematic and precise way of understanding the research content of tax incidence. A major feature of the book is its analysis of tax incidence from both domestic and international oligopolies. Then, by examining various oligopoly models, it approaches the essence of domestic and multilateral tax issues. Starting with the general theory of commodity tax incidence in an oligopoly, the topics addressed in this book include tax reform, environmental regulation, and policy coordination in international oligopolies. In addition to the usual oligopoly model, managerial oligopoly, the public pricing problem for firms in an oligopoly, and mixed oligopoly are dealt with. By presenting individual issues and explaining the relevance of each topic, this book is highly recommended for readers interested in policymaking and the global market in relation to the interdisciplinary developments of public economics, regional economics, and international economics. This book is also valuable as an advanced textbook on applied economics. Preface Acknowledgements Contents Chapter 1: Commodity Tax Incidence in an Oligopolistic Market 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Basic Model 1.3 Tax Incidence in an Oligopolistic Market with a Fixed Number of Firms 1.4 Tax Incidence with Free-Entry Equilibrium 1.5 Optimal Entry Tax 1.6 Conclusion References Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of Specific and Ad Valorem Commodity Taxes: Welfare Analysis of Tax Rate Combination and Optim... 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Model 2.3 Pareto-Improving Tax Rate Reform (PIT) 2.4 Optimal Tax Rate Combination in Free-Entry Equilibrium 2.5 Conclusion References Chapter 3: Commodity Tax Incidence in a Labor-Managed Firm Oligopoly 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Model 3.3 Incidence of Commodity Taxes: The Case of a Fixed Number of Firms 3.4 Free-Entry Equilibrium 3.5 Comparison Between Specific Tax and Ad Valorem Tax 3.6 Conclusion References Chapter 4: Managerial Incentives and Principal-Agent Type Oligopoly: Shifting of the Tax Burden 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Model 4.3 Comparison of Shifting Effects Between Profit Tax and Commodity Tax 4.4 Numerical Example of the Tax Burden 4.5 Conclusion Appendix References Chapter 5: Public Pricing and Oligopolistic Market 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Model 5.3 Replication of Diamond-Mirrlees World 5.4 Public Pricing in an Oligopolistic Market 5.5 Excess-Entry Problem 5.6 Conclusion Appendix References Chapter 6: Comparative Analysis of Environmental Regulation and Environmental Tax 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Model 6.3 Welfare Comparison of Emission Tax and Relative Emission Standard 6.4 Welfare Comparison Between Emission Tax and Relative Emission Standard Under Free-Entry Equilibrium 6.5 Optimal Entry Tax 6.6 Conclusion References Chapter 7: Commodity Tax in an International Oligopoly 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Segmented Market 7.3 Integrated Market 7.4 Conclusion References Chapter 8: Commodity Tax Harmonization and Global Tariff Reduction with Differentiated International Oligopoly 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Model 8.3 Domestic Tariff and Commodity Tax Reforms 8.4 Global Tariff Reduction 8.5 Commodity Tax Harmonization 8.6 Conclusion References Chapter 9: Partial Policy Coordination and Strategic Response in International Oligopoly 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Model 9.3 Non-cooperative Policy Equilibrium 9.4 Partial Coordination Starting from the Policy Equilibrium 9.4.1 Welfare Effects of Partial Coordination 9.4.2 Partial Coordination of Tariffs 9.4.3 Partial Coordination of Commodity Taxes 9.4.4 Partial Coordination of Production Subsidies 9.5 Conclusion Appendix Comparative Statics Results Derivation of the Non-cooperative Policy Equilibrium Consumption at the Non-cooperative Policy Equilibrium Properties of Non-cooperative Policy Equilibrium Reaction to the Partial Coordination References Chapter 10: Privatization Neutrality Theorem in an International Mixed Oligopoly 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Analytical Background 10.3 Model 10.4 Privatization of the Fully State-Owned Firm 10.5 Neutrality Theorem Under Partial Privatization 10.6 Neutrality Theorem on Managerial Incentives 10.7 Conclusion References