The worlds of possibility : modal realism and the semantics of modal logic

This book is truly awful. It's an attack on Platinga and Forbes' views (well, and of course Lewis as well) concerning actualism, possibilism, modal realism, and related areas. It is poorly written, the arguments are unconvincing, and the logic, where it occurs, is unmotivated and uninteresting. There is virtually nothing novel to be found in the whole book, though I confess to not having read the \*whole\* thing. I made it roughly half way, and that was quite unbearable. I even read reviews and went over the stuff that was supposedly interesting, but it turned out just more of the same crap. The book hardly even deserves a review, except to warn others with a serious interest in metaphysics and good philosophy to avoid it. And with that I shall close. Charles Chihara gives a thorough critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world -- the universe in which we live -- is just one. The striking success of possible-worlds semantics in modal logic has made this ontological doctrine attractive. Modal realists maintain that philosophers must accept the existence of possible worlds if they wish to have the benefit of using possible-worlds semantics to assess modal arguments and explain modal principles. Chihara challenges this claim, and argues instead for modality without worlds; he offers a new account of the role of interpretations or structures of the formal languages of logic.

a Powerful Challenge To Some Highly Influential Theories, This Book Offers A Thorough Critical Exposition Of Modal Realism, The Philosophical Doctrine That Many Possible Worlds Exist Of Which Our Own Universe Is Just One. Chihara Challenges This Claim And Offers A New Argument For Modality Without Worlds.

Much of what follows will be concerned with the philosophical theories and presuppositions of applying possible worlds semantics in order to draw conclusions about matters involving what are called 'conceptual' or 'broadly logical' possibilities and necessities. Modal realism is the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds, of which the actual world is just one. This volume offers a critical exposition of the theory