The world without, the mind within : an essay on first-person authority The world without, the mind within : an essay on first-person authority

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. In This Original And Challenging Study, Andre Gallois Proposes And Defends A New Thesis About The Character Of Our Knowledge Of Our Own Intentional States. Taking Up Issues At The Centre Of Attention In Contemporary Analytic Philosophy Of Mind And Epistemology, He Examines Accounts Of Self-knowledge By Such Philosophers As Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge And Crispin Wright, And Advances His Own View That, Without Relying On Observation, We Are Able To Justifiably Self-attribute Consciously Held Propositional Attitudes Such As Belief. His Study Will Be Of Wide Interest To Philosophers Concerned With Questions About Self-knowledge. Pt. I. First-person Authority. 1. The Problem. 2. Scepticism About First-person Authority -- Pt. Ii. The Basic And Extended Accounts. 3. A Preliminary Account. 4. Defending The Basic Account. 5. Extending The Basic Account. 6. Objections. 7. The Problem Of Scope -- Pt. Iii. Self-knowledge And Content Externalism. 8. Arguments From Content Externalism. 9. Deflationary Self-knowledge: Davidson And Barge. 10. Externalism And First-person Authority. 11. Psychological Properties As Secondary. André Gallois. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 206-208) And Index. In this original and challenging study, Andr? Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the center of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. In this challenging study, Andre Gallois examines issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, and advances a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Various characterizations of first-person authority have been offered in the literature.