The Works of John Locke in 9 volumes, vol. 2 (1689)

The Works of John Locke, Volume II (1824) -1 Front Matter -1 Title Page 1 Contents of the Volume 3 Contents of the Essay on Human Understanding, pp. v-xiv 5 The Essays Of Human Understanding 15 Book III, Of Words 15 Chapter VII, Of Particles 15 1. Particles connect parts, p. 1 15 2. In them consists the art of well speaking, p. 1 15 3, 4. They show what relations the mind gives to its own thoughts, p. 2 16 5. Instance in But, p. 3 17 6. This matter but lightly touched here, p. 3 17 Chapter VIII, Of Abstract and Concrete Terms 18 1. Abstract terms not predicable one of another, p. 4 18 2. They show the difference of our ideas, p. 5 19 Chapter IX, Of the Imperfection of Words 20 1. Words are used for recording and communicating our thoughts, p. 6 20 2. Any words will serve for recording, p. 6 20 3. Communication by words, civil or philosophical, p. 7 21 4. The imperfection of words is the doubtfulness of their signification, p. 7 21 5. Causes of their imperfection, p. 7 21 6. The names of mixed modes doubtful because the ideas are complex, p. 8 22 7. Secondly, they have no standards, p. 9 23 8. Propriety not a sufficient remedy, p. 10 24 9. The way of learning these names contributes also to their doubtfulness, p. 10 24 10. Hence unavoidable obscurity in ancient authors, p. 12 26 11. Names of substances, p. 12 26 12. Names of substances referred, p. 13 27 13, 14. Secondly, to co-existing qualities, p. 13 27 15. With this imperfection they may serve for civil, but not philosophical use, p. 15 29 16. Instance, liquor of the nerves, p. 16 30 17. Instance, gold, p. 17 31 18. The names of simple ideas, p. 18 32 19. And next to them, simple modes, p. 19 33 20. The most doubtful, p. 19 33 21. Why this imperfection charged upon words, p. 19 33 22, 23. This should teach us moderation in imposing our own sense of old authors, p. 20 34 Chapter X, Of the Abuse of Words 36 1. Abuse of words, p. 22 36 2, 3. First, words without any clear ideas, p. 22 36 4. Occasioned by learning names, p. 23 37 5. Secondly, a steady application of them, p. 24 38 6. Thirdly, affected obscurity, p. 25 39 7. Logic and dispute have much contributed to this, p. 26 40 8. Calling it subtilty, p. 26 40 9. This learning very little benefits society, p. 27 41 10. But destroys the instruments of knowledge and communication, p. 27 41 11. As useful as to confound the sound of the letters, p. 28 42 12. This art has perplexed religion and justice, p. 28 42 13. And ought not to pass for learning, p. 29 43 14. Fourthly, taking them for things, p. 29 43 15. Instance in matter, p. 30 44 16. This makes errours lasting, p. 31 45 17. Fifthly, setting them for what they cannot signify, p. 32 46 18. V. g. putting them for the real essence of substances, p. 33 47 19. Hence we think every change of our ideas in substances, p. 33 47 20. The cause of this abuse, a supposition of nature's working always regularly, p. 34 48 21. This abuse contains two false suppositions, p. 35 49 22. Sixthly, a supposition that words have a certain signification, p. 35 49 23. The ends of language, to convey our ideas, p. 37 51 24. To do it with quickness, p. 38 52 25. To convey the knowledge of things, p. 38 52 26-31. How men's words fail in all these, p. 38 52 32. How in substances, p. 40 54 33. How in modes and relations, p. 40 54 34. Seventhly, figurative speech also an abuse of language, p. 41 55 Chapter XI, Of the Remedies of the Foregoing Imperfections and Abuses 56 1. They are worth seeking, p. 42 56 2. Are not easy, p. 42 56 3. But yet necessary to philosophy, p. 43 57 4. Misuse of words, p. 43 57 5. Obstinacy, p. 43 57 6. And wrangling, p. 44 58 7. Instance, bat and bird, p. 44 58 8. First remedy, to use no word without an idea, p. 45 59 9. Secondly, to have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes, p. 46 60 10. And distinct and conformable in substances, p. 47 61 11. Thirdly, propriety, p. 47 61 12. Fourthly, to make known their meaning, p. 48 62 13. And that three ways, p. 49 63 14. First, in simple ideas by synonymous terms, p. 49 63 15. Secondly, in mixed modes by definition, p. 49 63 16. Morality capable of demonstration, p. 50 64 17. Definitions can make moral discourses clear, p. 51 65 18. And is the only way, p. 51 65 19. Thirdly, in substances, by showing and defining, p. 52 66 21. Ideas of the leading qualities of substances, p. 53 67 22. The ideas of their powers, p. 53 67 23. A reflection on the knowledge of spirits, p. 54 68 24. Ideas also of substances must be conformable to things, p. 54 68 25. Not easy to be made, p. 56 70 26. Fifthly, by constancy in their signification, p. 57 71 27. When the variation is to be explained, p. 58 72 Book IV, Of Knowledge and Opinion 72 Chapter I, Of Knowledge in General 72 1. Our knowledge conversant about our ideas, p. 58 72 2. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement, p. 59 73 3. This agreement fourfold, p. 60 74 4. First, of identity, or diversity, p. 60 74 5. Secondly, relation, p. 62 76 6. Thirdly, of co-existence, p. 63 77 7. Fourthly, of real existence, p. 64 78 8. Knowledge actual or habitual, p. 66 80 9. Habitual knowledge, p. 67 81 Chapter II, Of the Degrees of our Knowledge 83 1. Intuitive, p. 69 83 2. Demonstrative, p. 70 84 3. Depends on proof, p. 71 85 4. But not so easy, p. 71 85 5. Not without precedent doubt, p. 71 85 6. Not so clear, p. 72 86 7. Each step must have intuitive evidence, p. 72 86 8. Hence the mistake ex precognitis & preconcessis, p. 73 87 9. Demonstration not limited to quantity, p. 73 87 10-13. Why it has been so thought, p. 74 88 14. Sensitive knowledge of particular existence, p. 76 90 15. Knowledge not always clear, p. 77 91 Chapter III, Of the extent of human knowledge 92 1. First, no farther than we have ideas, p. 78 92 2. Secondly, no farther than we can perceive their agreement or disagreement, p. 78 92 3. Thirdly, intuitive knowledge extends itself not to all the relations of all our ideas, p. 78 92 4. Fourthly, not demonstrative knowledge, p. 78 92 5. Fifthly, sensitive knowledge, p. 79 93 6. Sixthly, our knowledge narrower than our ideas, p. 79 93 7. How far our knowledge reaches, p. 106 120 8. First, our knowledge of identitiy and diversity, p. 106 120 9. Secondly, of co-existence, p. 106 120 10. Because the connexion between most simple ideas is unknown, p. 107 121 11. Especially of secondary qualities, p. 107 121 12-14. Because all connexion between secondary and primary qualities is undiscoverable, p. 107 121 15. Of repugnancy to co-exist, p. 109 123 16. Of the co-existence of powers, p. 110 124 17. Of spirits yet narrower, p. 111 125 18. Thirdly, of other relations, p. 111 125 19. Two things have made moral ideas thought incapable of demonstration, p. 113 127 20. Remedies of those difficulties, p. 115 129 21. Fourthly, of real existence, p. 116 130 22. Our ignorance great, p. 116 130 23. First, one cause of it, want of ideas, p. 117 131 24. Because of their remoteness, p. 118 132 25. Because of their minuteness, p. 119 133 26. Hence no science of bodies, p. 120 134 27. Much less of spirits, p. 121 135 28. Secondly, want of a discoverable connexion, p. 122 136 29. Instances, p. 123 137 30. Thirdly, want of tracing our ideas, p. 124 138 31. Extent in respect of universality, p. 125 139 Chapter IV, Of the Reality of Knowledge 140 1. Objection, p. 126 140 2, 3. Answer, where ideas agree with things, p. 127 141 4. As, first, all simple ideas do, p. 127 141 5. Secondly, all complex ideas, except of substances, p. 128 142 6. Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge, p. 128 142 7. And of moral, p. 129 143 8. Existence not required to make it real, p. 129 143 9. Nor will it be less true, p. 130 144 10. Mis-naming disturbs not the certainty of the knowledge, p. 132 146 11. Ideas of substances have their archetypes without us, p. 132 146 12. So far our knowledge concerning them is real, p. 132 146 13. We must consider ideas, p. 133 147 14, 15. Objection against a changeling being something between man and beast, p. 134 148 16. Monsters, p. 136 150 17. Words and species, p. 137 151 18. Recapitulation, p. 138 152 Chapter V, Of Truth in General 152 1. What truth is, p. 138 152 2. A right joining, or seperating of signs, p. 138 152 3. Which make mental, or verbal propositions, p. 139 153 4. Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of, p. 139 153 5. Being nothing but joining, or seperating ideas, without words, p. 140 154 6. When mental propositions contain real truth, p. 141 155 7. Objection against verbal truth, p. 141 155 8. Real truth is about ideas agreeing to things, p. 142 156 9. Falsehood is the joining of names, p. 143 157 10. General propositions to be treated of more at large, p. 143 157 11. Moral and metaphysical truth, p. 143 157 Chapter VI, Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty 158 1. Treating of words, p. 144 158 2. General truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal propositions, p. 144 158 3. Certainty two-fold, of truth, and of knowledge, p. 145 159 4. No proposition can be known to be true, p. 145 159 5. This more particularly concerns substances, p. 146 160 6. The truth of few universal propositions concerning substances, p. 147 161 7. Co-existence of ideas in few cases is to be known, p. 147 161 8, 9. Instance in gold, p. 148 162 10. Universal propositions may be certain, p. 149 163 11, 12. The qualities depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived causes, p. 151 165 13. Judgment may reach farther, p. 154 168 14. What is requisite for our knowledge of substances, p. 155 169 15. Whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real constituions, p. 155 169 16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions, p. 157 171 Chapter VII, Of Maxims 171 1. They are self-evident, p. 157 171 2. Wherein that self-evidence consists, p. 157 171 3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms, p. 158 172 4. First, all propositions are equally self-evident, p. 158 172 5. Secondly, we have few self-evident propositions, p. 160 174 6. Thirdly, in other relations we may have, p. 161 175 7. Fourthly, concerning real existence, we have none, p. 161 175 8. These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge, p. 161 175 9. Because they are not the truths the first known, p. 162 176 10. Because on them the other parts of our knowledge do not depend, p. 163 177 11. What use these general maxims have, p. 165 179 12. Maxims may prove contradictions, p. 171 185 13. Instance in vacuum, p. 172 186 14. They prove not the existence of things without us, p. 172 186 15. Their application dangerous about complex ideas, p. 173 187 16-18. Instance in man, p. 174 188 19. Little use of these maxims, p. 175 189 20. Their use dangerous, p. 176 190 Chapter VIII, Of Trifling Propositions 190 1. Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge, p. 176 190 2, 3. As, first, identical propositions, p. 177 191 4. Secondly, when a part of any complex ideas is predicated of the whole, p. 180 194 5. As part of the definition of the term defined, p. 180 194 6. Instance, man and palfry, p. 181 195 7. For this teaches but the signification of words, p. 182 196 8. But no real knowledge, p. 182 196 9. General propositions, concerning substances, are often trifling, p. 183 197 10. And why, p. 184 198 11. Thirdly, using words variously, is trifling with them, p. 184 198 12. Marks of verbal propositions. First, predication in abstract, p. 185 199 13. Secondly, a part of the definition, predicated of any term, p. 185 199 Chapter IX, Of our Knowledge of Existence 200 1. Certain propositions concern not existence, p. 186 200 2. A threefold knowledge of existence, p. 186 200 3. Our knowledge of our own existence, is intuitive, p. 187 201 Chapter X, Of the Existence of God 201 1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God, p. 187 201 2. Man knows that he himself is, p. 188 202 3. Nothing cannot produce a being, p. 188 202 4. That eternal being must be most powerful, p. 189 203 5. And most knowing, p. 189 203 6. And therefore God, p. 189 203 7. Our idea of a most perfect being, p. 190 204 8. Something from eternity, p. 191 205 9. Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative, p. 191 205 10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative, p. 191 205 11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom, p. 193 207 13. Whether material, or no, p. 194 208 14. Not material because every particle of matter is not cogitative, p. 195 209 15. On particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative, p. 195 209 16. A system of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative, p. 196 210 17. Whether in motion or at rest, p. 196 210 18, 19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind, p. 197 211 Chapter XI, Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things 213 1. Is to be had only by sensation, p. 199 213 2. Instance, whiteness of this paper, p. 200 214 3. This yet may be called knowledge and proves the existence of things without us, p. 200 214 4. First, because we cannot have them but by the inlets of the senses, p. 201 215 5. Secondly, because an idea from actual sensation, and another from memory, are very distince perceptions, p. 201 215 6. Thirdly pleasure of pain, accompanies not the returning of those ideas, p. 202 216 7. Fourthly, our senses assist one another's testimony of the existence of outward things, p. 203 217 8. This certainty is as great as our condition needs, p. 204 218 9. But reaches no farther than actual sensation, p. 205 219 10. Folly to expect demonstration in every thing, p. 205 219 11. Past existence is known by memory, p. 206 220 12. The existence of spirits not knowable, p. 207 221 13. Particular propositions concerning existence are knowable, p. 207 221 14. And general propositions concerning abstract ideas, p. 208 222 Chapter XII, Of the Improvement of our Knowledge 223 1. Knowledge is not from maxims, p. 209 223 2. The occassion of that opinion, p. 209 223 3. But from the comparing clear and distinct ideas, p. 209 223 4. Dangerous to build upon precarious principles, p. 211 225 5. This no certain way to truth, p. 212 226 6. But to compare clear, complete ideas under steady names, p. 212 226 7. The true method of advancing knowledge, p. 213 227 8. By which, morality, also, may be made clearer, p. 214 228 9. But knowledge of bodies is to be improved only by experience, p. 214 228 10. This may procure us convenience, not science, p. 216 230 11. We are fitted for moral knowledge, and natural improvements, p. 216 230 12. But must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles, p. 217 231 13. The true use of hypotheses, p. 218 232 14. Clear and distinct ideas, p. 219 233 15. Mathematics an instance of it, p. 219 233 Chapter XIII, Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledge 234 1. Our knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary, p. 220 234 2. The application voluntary, p. 221 235 3. Instances in number, and in natrual religion, p. 222 236 Chapter XIV, Of Judgment 237 1. Our knowledge being short, we want something else, p. 223 237 2. What use to be made of this twilight estate, p. 223 237 3. Judgment supplies the want of knowledge, p. 224 238 4. Judgment is the presuming things to be so, without perceiving it, p. 224 238 Chapter XV, Of Probability 239 1. Probability is the appearance of agreement, p. 225 239 2. It is to supply the want of knowledge, p. 226 240 3. Being that before we know them to be so, p. 226 240 4. The ground of probability are two, p. 227 241 5. All the arguments ought to be examined, p. 227 241 6. They being capable of great variety, p. 228 242 Chapter XVI, Of the Degrees of Assent 243 1. Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability, p. 229 243 2. These cannot be always actually in view, p. 229 243 3. The ill consequence of this, p. 230 244 4. The right use of it, is mutual charity and forbearance, p. 231 245 5. Probability is either of matter of fact, or speculation, p. 233 247 6. The concurrent experience of all other men withours produces assurance approaching to knowledge, p. 233 247 7. Unquestionable testimony and experience for the most part produce confidence, p. 234 248 8. Fair testimony produces also confident belief, p. 234 248 9. Experience and testimonies clashing, p. 235 249 10. Traditional testimonies, the farther removed, the less their proof, p. 235 249 11. Yet history is of great use, p. 236 250 12. In things which sense cannot discover, p. 237 251 13. One case, where contrary experience lessens not the testimony, p. 239 253 14. The bare testimony of revelation is the highest certainty, p. 239 253 Chapter XVII, Of Reason 254 1. Various significatins of the word reason, p. 240 254 2. Wherein reasoning consists, p. 241 255 3. Its four parts, p. 242 256 4. Syllogism, not the great instrument of reason, p. 242 256 5. Helps little in demonstration, p. 252 266 6. Serves not to increase our knowledge, but fence with it, p. 252 266 7. Other helps should be sought, p. 253 267 8. We reason about particulars, p. 254 268 9. First, reason fails us for want of ideas, p. 255 269 10. Secondly, because of obscure and imperfect ideas, p. 256 270 11. Thirdly, for want of intermediate ideas, p. 256 270 12. Fourthly, because of wrong principles, p. 256 270 13. Fifthly, because of doubtful terms, p. 257 271 14. Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, p. 257 271 15. The next is demonstration by reasoning, p. 257 271 16. To supply the narrowness of this, p. 259 273 17. Intuition, demonstration, judgment, p. 259 273 18. Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas, p. 259 273 19. Four sorts of arguments: first, ad verecundiam, p. 260 274 20. Secondly, ad ignorantiam, p. 260 274 21. Thirdly, ad hominem, p. 260 274 22. Fourthly, ad judicium, p. 260 274 23. Above, contrary, and according to reason, p. 261 275 24. Reason and faith not opposite, p. 261 275 Chapter XVIII, Of Faith and Reason, and their Distinct Provinces 276 1. Necessary to know their boundaries, p. 262 276 2. Faith and reason what, as contra-distinguished, p. 263 277 3. No new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation, p. 263 277 4. Traditional revelation may make us know propositions, p. 265 279 5. Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason, p. 266 280 6. Traditional revelation much less, p. 267 281 7. Things above reason, p. 268 282 8. Or not contrary to reason are matter of faith, p. 269 283 9. Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, p. 269 283 10. In matters that is to be hearkened to, p. 270 284 11. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, p. 270 284 Chapter XIX, Of Enthusiasm 285 1. Love of truth necessary, p. 271 285 2. A forwardness to dictate, p. 272 286 3. Force of enthusiasm, p. 273 287 4. Reason and revelation, p. 273 287 5. Rise of enthusiasm, p. 273 287 6, 7. Enthusiasm, p. 274 288 8, 9. Enthusiasm mistaken for seeing and feeling, p. 274 288 10. Enthusiasm, how to be discovered, p. 275 289 11. Enthusiasm fails of evidence, p. 277 291 12. Firmness of persuasion, p. 279 293 13. Light in the mind, what, p. 279 293 14. Revelation must be judged of by reason, p. 279 293 15, 16. Belief, no proof of revelation, p. 280 294 Chapter XX, Of Wrong Assent, or Errour 296 1. Causes of errour, p. 282 296 2. First, want of proofs, p. 282 296 3. What shall become of those who want them, p. 283 297 4. People hindered from inquiry, p. 284 298 5. Secondly, want of skill to use them, p. 285 299 6. Thirdly, want of will to use them, p. 286 300 7. Fourthly, wrong measures of probability, p. 287 301 8-10. First, doubtful propositions taken from principles, p. 287 301 11. Secondly, received hypothese, p. 290 304 12. Thirdly, predominant passions, p. 291 305 13. The means of evading probabilities, p. 291 305 14. Secondly, supposed arguments for the contrary, p. 292 306 15. What probabilities determine the assent, p. 292 306 16. Where it is in our power to suspend it, p. 293 307 17. Fourthly, authority, p. 294 308 18. Men not in so many errours, p. 295 309 Chapter XXI, Of the Division of the Sciences 310 1. Three sorts, p. 296 310 2. First, Physica, p. 296 310 3. Secondly, Practica, p. 297 311 4. Thirdly, the doctrine of signs, p. 297 311 5. This is the first division of the objects of knowledge, p. 297 311 The End of the Essay of Human Understanding, p. 298 312 A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity 313 Appendix, p. 319 333 Of the Conduct of the Understanding 335 Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman 417 Elements of Natural Philosophy 427 Chapter I, Of Matter and Motion, p. 415 429 Chapter II, Of the Universe, p. 417 431 Chapter III, Of our Solar System, p. 418 432 Chapter IV, Of the Earth, considered as a Planet, p. 421 435 Chapter V, Of the Air and Atmosphere, p. 422 436 Chapter VI, Of Meteors in General, p. 425 439 Chapter VII, Of Springs, Rivers, and the Sea, p. 427 441 Chapter VIII, Of several Sorts of Earth, Stones, Metals, Minerals, and other Fossils, p. 428 442 Chapter IX, Of Vegetables, or Plants, p. 430 444 Chapter X, Of Animals, p. 431 445 Chapter XI, Of the Five Senses, p. 433 447 Chapter XII, Of the Understanding of Man, p. 439 453 A New Method of a Common-Place-Book 455 Index to the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 461 475 Index to the Additional Pieces in the Second Volume, p. 483 497 End of Volume II, p. 486 500